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Summary 
 
The main objective of the PhD project has been to develop concepts and methods 
that can be used to define, illustrate, analyse, and improve safety barriers in the 
operational phase of offshore oil and gas production platforms. 
 
The main contributions of this thesis are;  
 
 Clarification of the term safety barrier with respect to definitions, classification, 
and relevant attributes for analysis of barrier performance  
 Development and discussion of a representative set of hydrocarbon release 
scenarios  
 Development and testing of a new method, BORA-Release, for qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases  
 
Safety barriers are defined as physical and/or non-physical means planned to 
prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. The means may range 
from a single technical unit or human actions, to a complex socio-technical system. 
It is useful to distinguish between barrier functions and barrier systems. Barrier 
functions describe the purpose of safety barriers or what the safety barriers shall do 
in order to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. Barrier 
systems describe how a barrier function is realized or executed. If the barrier system 
is functioning, the barrier function is performed. If a barrier function is performed 
successfully, it should have a direct and significant effect on the occurrence and/or 
consequences of an undesired event or accident.  
 
It is recommended to address the following attributes to characterize the 
performance of safety barriers; a) functionality/effectiveness, b) reliability/ 
availability, c) response time, d) robustness, and e) triggering event or condition. For 
some types of barriers, not all the attributes are relevant or necessary in order to 
describe the barrier performance. 
 
The presented hydrocarbon release scenarios include initiating events, barrier 
functions introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, and barrier systems realizing 
the barrier functions. Both technical and human/operational safety barriers are 
considered. The initiating events are divided into five main categories; (1) human 
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and operational errors, (2) technical failures, (3) process upsets, (4) external events, 
and (5) latent failures from design.  
 
The development of the hydrocarbon release scenarios has generated new 
knowledge about causal factors of hydrocarbon releases and safety barriers 
introduced to prevent the releases. Collectively, the release scenarios cover the most 
frequent initiating events and the most important safety barriers introduced to 
prevent hydrocarbon releases.  
 
BORA-Release is a new method for qualitative and quantitative risk analysis of the 
hydrocarbon release frequency on oil and gas platforms. BORA-Release combines 
use of barrier block diagrams/event trees, fault trees, and risk influence diagrams in 
order to analyse the risk of hydrocarbon release from a set of hydrocarbon release 
scenarios.  
 
Use of BORA-Release makes it possible to analyse the effect on the hydrocarbon 
release frequency of safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases. 
Further, BORA-Release may be used to analyse the effect on the barrier 
performance of platform specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and 
organisational risk influencing factors. Thus, BORA-Release may improve today’s 
quantitative risk analyses on two weak points; i) analysis of causal factors of the 
initiating event hydrocarbon release (loss of containment), and ii) analysis of the 
effect on the risk of human and organisational factors.  
 
The main focus of this thesis is safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon 
releases on offshore oil and gas production platforms. Thus, the results are primarily 
useful for the oil and gas industry in their effort to control and reduce the risk of 
hydrocarbon releases. The Norwegian oil and gas industry can use the results in their 
work to fulfil the requirements to safety barriers and risk analyses from the 
Petroleum Safety Authority. However, the concepts and methods may also be 
applied in other industries (e.g., the process industry) and application areas (e.g., the 
transport sector) in their effort to reduce the risk. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In the regulations concerning health, environment, and safety within the petroleum 
activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) issued in 2001 [1], the 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) focuses on risk-informed principles and 
safety barriers as important means to reduce the risk of accidents. This focus is also 
prevailing in international regulations as the Seveso II directive [2] and the 
Machinery directive [3], and in international standards [4-6]. 
 
No common definition of safety barriers has been found in the literature, even 
though different aspects of the concept have been discussed in the literature [7-18], 
required in legislations and standards, and applied in practice for several decades. 
Different terms with similar meanings (e.g., barrier, defence, protection layer, safety 
critical element, and safety function) have been used in various industries, sectors, 
and countries. The two theorems of communication developed by Kaplan [19]; (1) 
50 % of the problems in the world result from people using the same words with 
different meanings, and (2) the other 50 % comes from people using different words 
with the same meaning, support the need for clarifying the terms in order to avoid 
misconceptions in communication about risk and safety barriers.  
 
Although PSA has developed requirements to safety barriers, they have not given a 
clear definition of the concept. Discussions have emerged on what is a safety barrier 
within the Norwegian offshore industry, and different views exist. A clarification of 
several terms as safety barrier, barrier function, barrier system, and barrier 
performance will make it easier for the Norwegian offshore industry to fulfil the 
requirements from PSA as regards safety barriers. Clear definitions will also make it 
easier for PSA to manage their regulations. 
 
This topic is also of interest due to the extended perspective on safety barriers that 
has evolved the later years as described by Hollnagel [10], who writes; “whereas the 
barriers used to defend a medieval castle mostly were of a physical nature, the 
modern principle of defence-in-depth combines different types of barriers – from 
protection against the release of radioactive materials to event reporting and safety 
policies”. 
Thesis – Part I Main Report 
4 
 
In-depth investigations of major accidents, like the process accidents at Longford 
[20] and Piper Alpha [21], the loss of the space shuttles Challenger [22] and 
Colombia [23], the high-speed craft Sleipner accident [24], the railway accidents at 
Ladbroke Grove [25] and Åsta [26], and several major accidents in Norway the last 
20 years [27], show that both technical, human, operational, as well as 
organisational factors influence the accident sequences. In spite of these findings, 
the main focus in quantitative risk analyses (QRA) is on technical safety systems 
and one of the weaknesses of current QRA is the “missing link” between the models 
applied in the analyses and human, operational, and organisational factors [28, 29]. 
This topic is addressed in several research projects [30-40]. However, different 
approaches have been applied in the various projects, and so far, no approach has 
been commonly applied for practical purposes.  
 
Traditional QRA of offshore oil and gas production platforms focus on consequence 
reducing barriers, and Kafka [41] states that the main interest is to estimate the 
consequences of the assumed initiating event, the harm to humans and environment, 
and to assess their frequencies. Normally, a system analysis of all the causes that 
may trigger such an initiating event will not be carried out. Further, Kafka [41] 
claims that the identification of the most effective safety measures to avoid initiating 
events is very limited.  
 
The new regulations from PSA have initiated several projects within the Norwegian 
oil and gas industry focusing on safety barriers and quantitative risk analysis, for 
example, a working group within the industry initiative Together for Safety [42] 
discussing the term safety barrier, a research project focusing on development of a 
method for barrier and operational risk analysis (the BORA project) [43], and 
projects initiated by PSA [44]. 
 
Based on the needs grown out of the problem areas discussed in this background 
section, the following problems are addressed as part of this thesis: 
 
• What is meant by a safety barrier? 
• How can safety barriers be classified? 
• Which kinds of attributes are necessary in order to describe and analyse the 
performance of safety barriers? 
• How are safety barriers treated in risk analysis and accident investigations? 
• How can we analyse the causal factors to the initiating event “Hydrocarbon 
release” in existing QRA? 
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• What types of safety barriers influence the hydrocarbon release frequency 
on offshore platforms? 
• What kinds of risk influencing factors (RIFs) affect the performance of these 
safety barriers? 
• How can we analyse the effect on the hydrocarbon release frequency of the 
safety barriers and the risk influence factors? 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of the PhD project has been to develop concepts and methods 
that can be used to define, illustrate, analyse, and improve safety barriers in the 
operational phase of offshore oil and gas production platforms. 
 
Based on this main objective, the following objectives are developed for this thesis; 
 
• To provide definitions of the term safety barrier and related terms 
• To develop a framework for categorization of safety barriers 
• To identify, define, and describe attributes necessary to analyse the 
performance of safety barriers  
• To develop a method for analysis of the hydrocarbon release frequency on 
oil and gas platforms that can be used to analyse the effect of safety barriers 
introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases  
• To develop a framework for identification of risk influencing factors 
affecting the performance of these safety barriers  
• To identify safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases on 
offshore oil and gas platforms 
• To carry out a case study to test and verify the method.  
 
1.3 Delimitations 
The main focus of this thesis is the use of the barrier concept within industrial 
safety, and especially prevention of the realization of hazards that may lead to major 
accidents. Thus, occupational accidents have not been explicitly discussed. 
 
The work is limited to the accident type process accident (hydrocarbon releases, fire 
and explosion) that is one of the main contributors to the total risk of major 
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accidents on oil and gas producing platforms. The work focuses on scenarios that 
may lead to hydrocarbon releases and safety barriers introduced to prevent such 
releases. Thus, consequence reducing barriers are not treated. Some results are also 
presented from a study of barriers preventing release of hydrocarbons during 
wireline operations.  
 
The aim of the work has been to ensure the safety during the operational phase of 
the life cycle of offshore oil and gas production platforms with special emphasis on 
operational safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon release. Consequently, 
discussions about barriers introduced to prevent latent failures from the design or 
construction phase are not covered in the thesis.  
 
Another delimitation is that the work concentrates on safety issues, implying that 
security issues as “intended actions” are not within the scope of the thesis. 
 
1.4 Structure of the report 
The present thesis is written for scientists, safety professionals, managers, and other 
people with knowledge about risk and risk analyses. In addition, some knowledge 
about the offshore oil and gas industry is beneficial. 
 
The thesis comprises two main parts; Part I Main report, and Part II Papers. 
 
Part I Main report comprises a brief presentation of the work, the main results, a 
discussion, and proposals for further research. The main report is a synthesis of the 
research papers and does not include all results or the detailed discussions of the 
results, but references are made to the research papers. The first chapter of the main 
report describes the background and the objectives of the thesis and presents some 
delimitations. Chapter two describes the research methodology and discusses the 
scientific framework for the thesis. The main results are presented in chapter three, 
while the results are discussed in chapter four.  
 
Part II consists of research papers already published in international journals or 
conferences and research papers accepted or submitted for publication in 
international journals:  
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Paper 1 
Sklet, S., Safety barriers; definition, classification and performance. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries (article in press, available online 20 January 
2006).  
 
Paper 2 
Sklet, S., Hydrocarbon releases on oil and gas production platforms; Release 
scenarios and safety barriers. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 
(article in press, available online 18 January 2006).  
 
Paper 3 
Aven, T., Sklet, S., and Vinnem, J.E., Barrier and operational risk analysis of 
hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release); Part I Method description. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials (submitted for publication 2 December 2005).  
 
Paper 4 
Sklet, S., Vinnem, J.E., and Aven, T., Barrier and operational risk analysis of 
hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release); Part II Results from a case study. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials (submitted for publication 2 December 2005). 
 
Paper 5 
Sklet, S., Comparison of some selected methods for accident investigation. Journal 
of Hazardous Materials (2004), 111, 1 – 3, 29-37. 
 
Paper 6 
Sklet S., Steiro T., & Tjelta O., Qualitative Analysis of Human, Technical and 
Operational Barrier Elements during Well Interventions. ESREL 2005, Tri City, 
Poland. 
 
Paper 7 
Botnevik, R., Berge, O., and Sklet, S., Standardised procedures for Work Permits 
and Safe Job Analysis on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. SPE Paper Number 
86629, Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2004. 
 
Paper 8 
Corneliussen, K., and Sklet, S., Challenges related to surveillance of safety 
functions. ESREL 2003, Maastricht. 
 
In addition, several papers not included in this thesis have been published during the 
PhD-study: 
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Sklet, S., Aven, T., Hauge, S., & Vinnem, J.E., Incorporating human and 
organizational factors in risk analysis for offshore installations. ESREL 2005, Tri 
City, Poland. 
 
Sklet, S., Storulykker i Norge de siste 20 årene. Kap. 7 i Fra flis i fingeren til 
ragnarok. Tapir Akademisk Forlag, Trondheim, 2004.  
 
Hovden, J., Sklet, S. og Tinmannsvik, R.K., I etterpåklokskapens klarsyn: Gransking 
og læring av ulykker. Kap. 8 i Fra flis i fingeren til ragnarok. Tapir Akademisk 
Forlag, Trondheim, 2004. 
 
Sklet, S., and Hauge, S., Reflections on the Concept of safety Barriers. PSAM 7 - 
ESREL 2004, Berlin. 
 
Sklet, S., Onnettomuustutkinnan menetelmiä. TUKES-julkaisu 6/2004, 
Turvatekniikan Keskus, Helsinki. 
 
Sklet, S., Methods for accident investigation. ROSS (NTNU) 200208, Report (75 
pages), Trondheim. 
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2 Research approach and principles 
2.1 Scientific approach 
This thesis deals with analysis of risk in a socio-technical system like an offshore oil 
and gas production platform. The risk in this system is influenced by human, 
technical, and organizational risk influencing factors. Thus, I have chosen to be 
pragmatic with respect to scientific approach, and include elements from both 
natural science and social science dealing with human, technical, and organizational 
risk influencing factors in my research. 
 
The main type of research in this thesis is development of concepts and methods 
meant for practical applications. The purpose of the work has not been to develop 
new theoretical models, but rather to systematize and apply existing knowledge 
within new application areas. Some empirical work is carried out, primarily in the 
form of case studies in order to test the concepts and methods developed during the 
work. 
 
2.2 Research principles 
The research resulting in this thesis is not performed in a vacuum, but in cooperation 
with other researchers and people from the industry and the authorities. The 
elements of the research are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Thesis – Part I Main Report 
10 
Figure 1.  The elements of the research. 
 
Review of literature, ongoing research and development (R&D) projects, and 
industry practice are carried out in order to obtain knowledge about the state-of-the-
art both in the scientific as well as the practical world.  
 
The research is to some extent carried out as part of ongoing research projects in 
cooperation with other researchers. The results presented in this thesis are directly or 
indirectly influenced by these projects;  
 
• Barrier and operational risk analysis (BORA project) [43], sponsored by The 
Norwegian Research Council, The Norwegian Oil Industry Association 
(OLF), Health and Safety Executive UK, and the Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway 
• Indicators for non-physical barriers [44], sponsored by the Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway 
• Future safety analyses for the assessment of technical and organizational 
changes [45], sponsored by Norsk Hydro  
• Guidelines for Work Permit and Safe Job Analysis [46, 47], sponsored by 
Working Together for Safety/The Norwegian Oil Industry Association 
(OLF) 
• Methods for accident investigations [48], sponsored by the Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway.  
 
Review of 
literature
Review of industry 
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Review of R&D-
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Multidisciplinary 
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Industry 
cooperation
PhD thesis
Communication of 
results 
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Another important principle is the cooperation with personnel from the industry. 
This cooperation is ensured through involvement of industry personnel in the 
research projects and accomplishment of a case study as part of the BORA project.  
 
Finally, the results from the research are communicated to the academia and the 
industry at regular intervals. The results are communicated both orally at 
conferences, seminars, workshops, and project meeting, and written in papers, 
project memos, and reports. The purpose of the communication of the research 
results is two-sided; two spread the results, and to receive comments from the 
outside world.  
 
These principles have contributed to evaluation and quality assurance of the research 
at regular intervals since the input from the “outside world” has influenced the 
research work and thus influenced the results presented in this PhD thesis. 
 
2.3 Concepts 
Use of risk-informed principles necessitates an understanding of the word risk. 
Many definitions of the word exists in the literature, and several views exist, 
illustrated by the following history [19]; “One of the first initiatives from the Society 
for Risk Analysis was to establish a committee to define the word risk. The 
committee laboured for 4 years and than gave up, saying in its final report, that 
maybe it is better not to define risk and let each author define it in his own way, 
emphasizing that each should explain clearly what way that is”. 
 
A definition of risk adopted from Kaplan [49] is applied in this thesis. Kaplan states 
that the question “What is the risk?” is really three questions; “What can happen?”, 
“How likely is that to happen?”, and “What are the consequences?”. Risk may then 
be expressed as a (complete) set of triplets (Si, Li, Xi), where Si denotes scenario i, Li 
denotes the likelihood, and Xi the consequences.  
 
Hydrocarbon release is defined as gas or oil leaks (including condensate) from the 
process flow, well flow, or flexible risers with a release rate greater than 0.1 kg/s. 
Smaller leaks are called minor releases or diffuse discharges.  
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3 Main results 
The following subsections comprise a summary of the main results from the 
research. Detailed information about the results is presented in the research papers in 
part II of the thesis. 
 
3.1 The concept of safety barriers 
No common terminology of the concept of safety barriers exist neither in the 
literature nor in practice. Based on the synthesis of some common features of the 
term, the following definitions of the terms safety barrier, barrier function, and 
barrier system are proposed as basis for further discussion and analysis of safety 
barriers (see Paper 1 for more information).  
 
 Safety barriers are physical and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, 
control or mitigate undesired events or accidents.  
 
The means may range from a single technical unit or human actions, to a complex 
socio-technical system. Planned implies that at least one of the purposes of the 
means is to reduce the risk. In line with ISO:13702 [6], prevention means reduction 
of the likelihood of a hazardous event, control means limiting the extent and/or 
duration of a hazardous event to prevent escalation, while mitigation means 
reduction of the effects of a hazardous event. Undesired events may, for example, be 
technical failures, human errors, external events, or a combination of these 
occurrences that may realize potential hazards, while accidents are undesired and 
unplanned events that lead to loss of human lives, personal injuries, environmental 
damage, and/or material damage.  
 
 A barrier function is a function planned to prevent, control, or mitigate 
undesired events or accidents.  
 
Barrier functions describe the purpose of safety barriers or what the safety barriers 
shall do in order to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. If a 
barrier function is performed successfully, it should have a direct and significant 
effect on the occurrence and/or consequences of an undesired event or accident. A 
Thesis – Part I Main Report 
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function that has at most an indirect effect is not classified as a barrier function, but 
as a risk influencing factor/function. A barrier function should preferably be defined 
by a verb and a noun, e.g., “close flow” and “stop engine”.  
 
 A barrier system is a system that has been designed and implemented to perform 
one or more barrier functions. 
 
A barrier system describes how a barrier function is realized or executed. If the 
barrier system is functioning, the barrier function is performed. A barrier element is 
a component or a subsystem of a barrier system that by itself is not sufficient, to 
perform a barrier function. A barrier subsystem may comprise several redundant 
barrier elements. In this case, a specific barrier element does not need to be 
functioning for the system to perform the barrier function. This is the case for 
redundant gas detectors connected in a k-out-of-n configuration. The barrier system 
may consist of different types of system elements, e.g., physical and technical 
elements (hardware, software), operational activities executed by humans, or a 
combination thereof.  
 
3.2 Classification of safety barriers 
A recommended way to classify barrier systems is shown in Figure 2. However, note 
that active barrier systems often are based on a combination of technical and 
human/operational elements. Even though different words are applied, the 
classification in the fourth level in Figure 2 is similar to the classification suggested 
by Hale [50], and the classification of active, technical barriers is in accordance with 
IEC:61511 [5].  
 
As regards the time aspect, some barrier systems are on-line (functioning 
continuously), while some are off-line (need to be activated). Further, some barriers 
are permanent, while some are temporary. Permanent barriers are implemented as an 
integrated part of the whole operational life cycle, while temporary barriers only are 
used in a specified time period, often during specific activities or conditions. A more 
detailed discussion of classification of safety barriers is presented in Paper 1. 
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Figure 2.  Classification of safety barriers.  
 
3.3 Performance of safety barriers 
Based on experience from several projects and a synthesis of the reviewed literature, 
it is recommended to address the following attributes to characterize the 
performance of safety barriers; a) functionality/effectiveness, b) reliability/ 
availability, c) response time, d) robustness, and e) triggering event or condition. 
Paper 1 presents more information. For some types of barriers, not all the attributes 
are relevant or necessary in order to describe the barrier performance. 
 
 The barrier functionality/effectiveness is the ability to perform a specified 
function under given technical, environmental, and operational conditions.  
 
The barrier functionality deals with the effect the barrier has on the event or accident 
sequence. The specified function should be stated as a functional requirement 
(deterministic requirement). A functional requirement is a specification of the 
performance criteria related to a function [51]. The “possible” degree of fulfilment 
may be expressed in a probabilistic way as the probability of successful execution of 
the specified function or the percentage of successful execution. For example, if the 
function is to pump water, a functional requirement may be that the output of water 
must be between 100 and 110 litres per minute. The actual functionality of a barrier 
may be less than the specified functionality due to design constraints, degradation, 
operational conditions, etc. The functionality of safety barriers corresponds to the 
Barrier function
Barrier system
ActivePassive
Human/operationalTechnicalPhysical Human/operational
Safety Instrumented 
System (SIS)
Other technology 
safety-related system
Realized by:
What to do
How to do it
External risk 
reduction facilites
Thesis – Part I Main Report 
16 
safety function requirements demanded by IEC:61511 and the effectiveness of 
safety barriers as described in the ARAMIS project [30]. 
 
 The barrier reliability/availability is the ability to perform a function with an 
actual functionality and response time while needed, or on demand.  
 
The barrier reliability/availability may be expressed as the probability of failure (on 
demand) to carry out a function. The reliability/availability of safety barriers 
corresponds to the safety integrity requirements (Safety Integrity Level (SIL)) 
demanded by IEC:61511 and the level of confidence as described in the ARAMIS 
project. Requirements to the reliability/availability may be expressed as a SIL-
requirement. 
 
 The response time of a safety barrier is the time from a deviation occurs that 
should have activated a safety barrier, to the fulfilment of the specified barrier 
function.  
 
The response time may be defined somewhat different for different types of barrier 
functions. This may be illustrated by the difference between an emergency shutdown 
system (ESD) and a deluge system. The response time for the ESD-system is the 
time required to close the ESD-valve such that the function stop flow is fulfilled, 
while the response time for a deluge system is the time to delivery of a specified 
amount of water (and not the time until the fire is extinguished).  
 
 Barrier robustness is the ability to resist given accident loads and function as 
specified during accident sequences.  
 
This attribute is relevant for passive as well as active barrier systems, and it may be 
necessary to assess the robustness for several types of accident scenarios.  
 
 The triggering event or condition is the event or condition that triggers the 
activation of a barrier.  
 
It is not itself part of a barrier, however, it is an important attribute in order to fully 
understand how a barrier may be activated.  
 
Implementation of safety barriers may also have some adverse effects like increased 
costs, need for maintenance, and introduction of new hazards. These adverse effects 
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are not discussed any further in this thesis, but should be addressed as part of a total 
analysis of the barriers.  
 
3.4 Hydrocarbon release scenarios 
A representative set of hydrocarbon release scenarios is developed and described in 
Paper 2. Each release scenario is described by an initiating event (i.e., a deviation) 
reflecting “causal factors”, the barrier functions introduced to prevent the initiating 
event from developing into a release, and how the barrier functions are implemented 
in terms of barrier systems. The development of the set of release scenarios has 
generated new knowledge about causal factors of hydrocarbon releases and safety 
barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases.  
 
The release scenarios are divided into seven main groups where some of the groups 
are divided into sub-categories: 
 
1. Release due to operational failure during normal production 
a. Release due mal-operation of valve(s) during manual operations. 
b. Release due to mal-operation of temporary hoses. 
c. Release due to lack of water in water locks in the drain system. 
2. Release due to latent failure introduced during maintenance 
a. Release due to incorrect fitting of flanges or bolts during maintenance 
b. Release due to valve(s) in incorrect position after maintenance 
c. Release due to erroneous choice or installation of sealing device  
3. Release during maintenance of hydrocarbon system (requiring 
disassembling) 
a. Release due to failure prior to or during disassembling of hydrocarbon 
system 
b. Release due to break-down of the isolation system during maintenance 
4. Release due to technical/physical failures  
a. Release due to degradation of valve sealing  
b. Release due to degradation of flange gasket 
c. Release due to loss of bolt tensioning 
d. Release due to degradation of welded pipes  
e. Release due to internal corrosion 
f. Release due to external corrosion 
g. Release due to erosion 
5. Release due to process upsets 
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a. Release due to overpressure 
b. Release due to overflow/overfilling 
6. Release due to external events 
a. Falling objects 
b. Bumping/collision. However, these are analysed together in one 
scenario. 
7. Release due to design related failures 
Design related failures are latent failures introduced during the design phase 
that cause release during normal production. This scenario is not treated any 
further in the thesis. Nevertheless, barriers preventing failures in the design 
process and barriers aimed to detect design related failures prior to start-up 
of production are very important in order to minimize the risk. 
 
A detailed description of the scenarios is presented in Paper 2 and comprises a 
description of initiating events and safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon 
releases. The event sequence in each scenario is illustrated by a barrier block 
diagram as shown in Figure 3. A barrier block diagram consists of an initiating 
event, arrows that show the event sequence, barrier functions realized by barrier 
systems, and possible outcomes. A horizontal arrow indicates that a barrier system 
fulfils its function, whereas an arrow downwards indicates failure to fulfil the 
function. In this thesis, the undesired event is hydrocarbon release (loss of 
containment). 
 
Figure 3.  Illustration of a barrier block diagram. 
 
3.5 BORA-Release 
A method, called BORA-Release, for qualitative and quantitative risk analyses of 
the platform specific hydrocarbon release frequency on oil and gas production 
Initiating event 
(Deviation from 
normal situation)
Undesired event
”Safe state”
Barrier function 
realized by a 
barrier system Functions
Fails
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platforms is developed within the BORA project1. The method is described in Paper 
3. BORA-Release makes it possible to analyse the effects on the release frequency 
of safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, and analyse how 
platform specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organisational risk 
influencing factors influence the barrier performance, and thus the risk.  
 
BORA-Release combines use of barrier block diagram/event trees, fault trees, and 
risk influence diagrams.  
 
BORA-Release comprises the following main steps: 
 
1) Development of a basic risk model including hydrocarbon release scenarios 
and safety barriers (see Paper 2 for a description of the scenarios) 
2) Modelling the performance of safety barriers  
3) Assignment of generic input data and risk quantification based on these data 
4) Development of risk influence diagrams 
5) Scoring of risk influencing factors (RIFs) 
6) Weighting of risk influencing factors  
7) Adjustment of generic input data  
8) Recalculation of the risk in order to determine the platform specific risk  
 
Each step in BORA-Release is described in detail in Paper 3.  
 
3.6 Results from the case study 
BORA-Release was applied in a case study on a specific platform in the North Sea. 
The objectives of the case study were; 1) to determine the platform specific 
hydrocarbon release frequencies for selected systems and activities, and 2) to assess 
whether or not BORA-Release is suitable for analysing the effects that risk reduction 
measures and other changes have on the release frequencies. 
 
Three release scenarios were studied in detail; 
 
                                                     
1  The aim of the BORA project [43] is to perform a detailed and quantitative modeling of 
barrier performance including barriers to prevent the occurrence of initiating events as 
well as barriers to reduce the consequences. 
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A. Release due to valve(s) in wrong position after maintenance (flowline 
inspection) 
B. Release due to incorrect fitting of flanges or bolts during maintenance 
(flowline inspection) 
C. Release due to internal corrosion 
 
The analyses of scenario A and B were carried out strictly according to the method 
description, while the analysis of scenario C differed from the method description. 
Several workshops with operational personnel from the platform, safety specialists, 
and corrosion specialists from the oil company were arranged as part of the case 
study. Detailed results are presented in Paper 4.  
 
An important question regarding the quantitative results is whether or not the 
calculated release frequencies are trustworthy. The analysis is based on a number of 
assumptions and simplifications relating to the basic risk model, the generic input 
data, the risk influence diagrams, the scoring of RIFs, the weighting of RIFs, or the 
adjustment of the input data. The quantitative results in the case study for scenario A 
and B based on generic data were assessed to be reasonable compared to release 
statistics. This view was supported by the comments from the personnel from the 
actual oil company. The confidence in the results based on the revised input data 
was not as good due to use of data from a project called Risk Level on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (RNNS) [52] for scoring of RIFs. Since the scoring 
was based on few and generic questions not originally meant to be used as basis for 
RIF-scoring, the validity2 of the scoring was assessed to be low. The main reason for 
using RNNS-data to assess the status of RIFs in the case study was the demand for 
using existing data in order to minimize the use of resources from the industry 
representatives in the steering group for the BORA project. Since the revised release 
frequency to a high degree was influenced by the results from the RNNS-survey, the 
approach chosen for scoring of RIFs should be discussed in the further work.  
 
The case study demonstrated that BORA-Release may be used to analyse the effect 
on the hydrocarbon release frequency of safety barriers, and to study the effect on 
the barrier performance of platform specific conditions of technical, organizational, 
operational, and human risk influencing factors. 
 
                                                     
2  Validity refers to whether or not it measures what it is supposed to measure [53].  
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3.7 Safety barriers and methods for accident investigation 
So far, the main focus has been on safety barriers in proactive risk analysis. 
However, analysis of the performance of safety barriers is also an element in 
accident investigations. Thus, a selection of methods for accident investigation is 
compared according to a set of characteristics. A summary of the comparison is 
presented in Table 1 (see Paper 5 for detailed description). The table comprises the 
following information. Column one contains the names of the methods. Whether or 
not the methods give a graphical description of the event sequence is assessed in 
column two. Whether or not the methods focus on safety barriers is assessed in the 
third column. The level of scope of the different analysis methods is assessed in 
column four. The levels are classified according to the socio-technical system 
involved in the control of safety (or hazardous processes) described by Rasmussen 
[54]; 
 
1. The work and technological system 
2. The staff level 
3. The management level 
4. The company level 
5. The regulators and associations level 
6. The Government level 
 
What kind of accident models that have influenced the method is assessed in column 
five. The following accident models are used (e.g., see [55, 56] for description of 
accident models); 
 
A Causal-sequence model 
B Process model 
C Energy model 
D Logical tree model 
E SHE-management models 
 
Whether the different methods are inductive, deductive, morphological or non-
system-oriented is assessed in column six. In the next column, the different 
investigation methods are categorized as primary or secondary methods. Primary 
methods are stand-alone techniques, while secondary methods provide special input 
as supplement to other methods. The last column assesses the need for education and 
training in order to use the methods. The terms "Expert", "Specialist", and "Novice" 
are used.  
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Table 1.  Comparison of methods for accident investigations. 
Method Accident 
sequence 
Focus on 
safety 
barriers 
Levels of 
analysis 
Accident 
model 
Primary / 
secondary 
Analytical 
approach 
Training 
need 
Events and 
causal factors 
charting [57] 
Yes No 1 – 4  B Primary Non-system 
oriented 
Novice 
Events and 
causal factors 
analysis [57] 
Yes Yes 1 – 4  B Secondary Non-system 
oriented 
Specialist 
Barrier 
analysis [57] 
No Yes 1 – 2  C Secondary Non-system 
oriented 
Novice 
Change 
analysis [57] 
No No 1 – 4  B Secondary Non-system 
oriented 
Novice 
Root cause 
analysis [57] 
No No 1 – 4  A Secondary Non-system 
oriented 
Specialist 
Fault tree 
analysis [51] 
No Yes 1 – 2  D Primary/ 
Secondary
Deductive Expert 
Influence 
diagram [58] 
No Yes 1 – 6  B / E Secondary Non-system 
oriented 
Specialist 
Event tree 
analysis [51] 
No Yes 1 – 3  D Primary/ 
Secondary
Inductive Specialist 
MORT [11] No Yes 2 – 4  D / E Secondary Deductive Expert 
SCAT [59] No No 1 – 4  A / E Secondary Non-system 
oriented 
Specialist 
STEP [60] Yes No 1 – 6  B Primary Non-system 
oriented 
Novice 
MTO-analysis 
[61, 62] 
Yes Yes 1 – 4  B Primary Non-system 
oriented 
Specialist/ 
expert 
AEB-method 
[17] 
No Yes 1 – 3  B Secondary Morpho-
logical 
Specialist 
TRIPOD [63] Yes Yes 1 – 4  A Primary Non-system 
oriented 
Specialist 
Acci-Map 
[64] 
No Yes 1 – 6  A/B/D/E Primary Deductive 
& inductive 
Expert 
 
The table illustrates that several of the methods include analysis of safety barriers. 
However, there is no common practice in the Norwegian oil and gas industry with 
respect to how safety barriers are treated in accident investigations.  
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3.8 Standardized procedures for Work Permits  
A result with more practical usefulness than academic usefulness, is the attendance 
in a project group within Together for Safety that developed standardised procedures 
for work permits (WP) and safe job analysis (SJA). The procedures are implemented 
on all oil and gas production installations in the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The 
WP system and the use of SJA represent essential operational safety barriers 
required in the daily management of work and safety on oil and gas installations.  
 
A process of dialogue and participation, involving the offshore community 
established the foundation for an industry wide change to improve safety and 
working conditions. A brief description of the standardized procedures is presented 
in Paper 6. The procedures are published as OLF Guidelines [46, 47].  
 
An E-learning course3 has been developed by Mintra in order to get everyone 
actively involved using the new models and new forms. More than 20.000 people 
have been through the course. 
 
 
                                                     
3  See www.samarbeidforsikkerhet.no for more information. 
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4 Conclusions, discussion, and further research 
The main contributions of this thesis are;  
 
• Clarification of the term safety barrier with respect to definitions, 
classification, and relevant attributes for analysis of barrier performance.  
• Development and discussion of a representative set of hydrocarbon release 
scenarios where each scenario includes an initiating event, barrier functions 
introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, and barrier systems realizing 
the barrier functions.  
• Development and testing of a new method, BORA-Release, for qualitative 
and quantitative risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases.  
 
The clarification of terms is helpful for the Norwegian offshore industry in order to 
fulfil the requirements to safety barriers from the Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway [1]. 
 
The development of the hydrocarbon release scenarios has generated new 
knowledge about causal factors of hydrocarbon releases and safety barriers 
introduced to prevent the releases. Collectively, the scenarios cover the most 
frequent initiating events and give an overview of the most important safety barriers 
introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases. 
 
BORA-Release may be applied to analyse the platform specific hydrocarbon release 
frequency for selected systems on a specific platform. The method may be used to 
analyse the effects on the release frequency of safety barriers introduced to prevent 
hydrocarbon releases, and to study the effects on the barrier performance of platform 
specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organisational risk 
influencing factors.  
 
Roughly assessed, the main objective of the PhD project; ”to develop concepts and 
methods that can be used to define, illustrate, analyse, and improve safety barriers 
in the operational phase of offshore oil and gas production platforms”, is fulfilled. 
However, there is still need for further research concerning several of the detailed 
objectives developed for the thesis, and each of these detailed objectives is discussed 
in the following. 
 
Thesis – Part I Main Report 
26 
 To provide definitions of the term safety barrier and related terms 
 
Definitions of the terms safety barrier, barrier function, and barrier system are 
provided in Paper 1. These definitions may be useful as basis for discussion and 
analysis of safety barriers. If the definitions are adopted by the industry, the result 
will be a common language and understanding of safety barriers. Today, the term 
safety barrier seems to be used in different ways by accident investigators, risk 
analysts, managers, and operational personnel. One of the main challenges in the 
future is to contribute to adaptation of the proposed terminology by different types 
of personnel. 
 
 To develop a framework for categorization of safety barriers 
 
A structure for classification of safety barriers is presented in Paper 1. Barrier 
systems are classified as passive or active. Passive barriers may be physical or 
human/operational, while active barriers may be technical or human/operational. In 
addition, active barriers may be based on a combination of technical and 
human/operational elements. However, safety barriers may be classified in several 
other ways. The proposed structure may not always be best suitable for the specific 
purpose of the classification. Thus, other lines of classification may be as useful in 
specific cases.  
 
Further work should be carried out to establish a common framework for assessment 
of the performance of the different classes of safety barriers in the proposed 
structure. One main challenge is to develop a framework for assessment of the 
performance of human/operational barriers. 
 
 To identify, define, and describe attributes necessary to analyse the performance 
of safety barriers  
 
The definitions of some main attributes necessary for assessment of the performance 
of safety barriers presented in Paper 1 will be useful in both risk analyses and 
accident investigations. Use of a common set of definitions and common 
understanding of safety barriers makes it easier to transfer experience from accident 
investigations to risk analyses, and vice versa. One main challenge is to provide for 
and achieve use of the proposed attributes in risk analysis as well as accident 
investigations carried out by the industry.  
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 To develop a method for analysis of the hydrocarbon release frequency on oil 
and gas platforms that can be used to analyse the effect of safety barriers 
introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases  
 
BORA-Release (see Paper 3) is a method that fulfils this objective. BORA-Release 
is a new method for qualitative and quantitative risk analysis of the hydrocarbon 
release frequency on oil and gas platforms. BORA-Release combines use of barrier 
block diagrams/event trees, fault trees, and risk influence diagrams in order to 
analyse the risk of hydrocarbon releases from a set of hydrocarbon release scenarios.  
 
BORA-Release may improve today’s quantitative risk analyses on two weak points; 
i) analysis of causal factors of the initiating event hydrocarbon release (loss of 
containment), and ii) analysis of the effect on the risk of human and organisational 
factors. 
 
However, the method should be further tested in practical analyses. So far, BORA-
Release has been applied in one case study for analysis of the platform specific 
hydrocarbon release frequencies for three hydrocarbon release scenarios on a 
specific platform. The method was used to analyse the effect on the release 
frequency of safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, and to study 
the effect on the barrier performance of platform specific conditions of technical, 
human, operational, and organisational risk influencing factors.  
 
Additional research with respect to further development of BORA-Release should 
focus on the following main areas: 
 
• To develop a suitable method for assignment of scores of the risk 
influencing factors affecting the barrier performance.  
• To evaluate whether there is need for collection of new types of data to be 
used as input in the quantitative analyses since relevant offshore data are 
lacking for some barriers (particularly human reliability data).  
• To link existing reliability analyses of technical safety systems (e.g., the 
process shutdown system) to the risk model (release scenarios) developed in 
BORA-Release.  
• To apply the principles within BORA-Release to analyse the effect on the 
total risk of both safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases 
and consequence reducing barriers. A total risk analysis by use of the 
principles within BORA-Release makes it possible to analyse the effect of 
dependencies among different safety barriers.  
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 To develop a framework for identification of risk influencing factors (RIFs) 
affecting the performance of these safety barriers  
 
A framework for identification of RIFs has been developed as part of BORA-
Release (see Paper 3 page 8 for further details). The framework consists of five 
main groups of RIFs; characteristics of the personnel, characteristics of the tasks, 
characteristics of the technical system, administrative controls, and organisational 
factors/operational philosophy. In addition, a detailed taxonomy of RIFs is 
developed. Experience from the case study indicates that the main groups in the 
framework are adequate for identification of RIFs. However, the taxonomy is not 
sufficiently tested in practice, and application of the framework in analyses of more 
scenarios should be carried out in order to assess whether some of the RIFs may be 
removed, or whether it is necessary to add some new RIFs to the detailed taxonomy.  
 
 To identify safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases on 
offshore oil and gas platforms 
 
A set of hydrocarbon release scenarios is developed and described in terms of an 
initiating event (i.e., a “deviation”) reflecting causal factors, barrier functions 
introduced to prevent the initiating events from developing into a release, and how 
the barrier functions are realized in terms of barrier systems (see Paper 2). Both 
passive physical, active technical, and active human/operational safety barriers are 
included in the release scenarios.  
 
Additional research should be carried out to investigate hydrocarbon releases and 
study the effect of the identified safety barriers on the event sequences. This 
research should also identify the risk influencing factors that affected the 
performance of the safety barriers and assess the importance of these risk 
influencing factors. Analysis of safety barriers in investigations of hydrocarbon 
releases may be input to revision of the hydrocarbon release scenarios described in 
Paper 2 or development of new, additional scenarios. 
 
Focus on safety barriers in accident investigations may fulfil the recommendation 
from Kletz [65] about avoiding the word cause in accident investigations and rather 
talk about what might have prevented the accident. 
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 To carry out a case study to test and verify the method.  
 
As mentioned above, BORA-Release is applied in a case study where three selected 
hydrocarbon release scenarios are analysed in detail. The results from the case study 
are presented in Paper 4. The case study provided useful input to the development of 
BORA-Release and demonstrated that BORA-Release may be used to analyse the 
effect on the release frequency of safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon 
releases, and to study the effect on the barrier performance of technical, human, 
operational, and organizational risk influencing factors.  
 
In addition, parts of the method have been applied in a study of hydrocarbon release 
scenarios during well interventions. The results from this study are presented in 
Paper 6. 
 
Further research should be carried out to apply BORA-Release to analyse the 
complete set of hydrocarbon release scenarios presented in Paper 2 in order to 
establish a total model for the risk of hydrocarbon releases on oil and gas production 
platforms. 
 
The total risk model may constitute the basis for analyses of; i) the importance of the 
different scenarios with respect to the total release frequency, ii) the effect on the 
release frequency of the safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, 
and iii) the effect on the barrier performance of platform specific conditions of 
technical, human, operational, and organisational risk influencing factors.  
 
Another topic that should be addressed in future research is testing and surveillance 
of different categories of safety barriers. This topic is addressed in Paper 8. Existing 
strategies for testing and surveillance of safety systems focus primarily on physical 
and technical safety barriers. Additional research is needed in order to develop 
adequate strategies for testing and surveillance of the performance of human/ 
operational barriers.  
 
The main focus of this thesis is safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon 
releases on offshore oil and gas production platforms. Thus, the results are primarily 
useful for the oil and gas industry in their effort to control and reduce the risk of 
hydrocarbon releases. The Norwegian oil and gas industry can use the results in their 
work to fulfil the requirements to safety barriers and risk analysis from the 
Petroleum Safety Authority. However, the concepts and methods may also be 
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applied in other industries (e.g., the process industry) and application areas (e.g., the 
transport sector) in their effort to reduce the risk. 
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5 Acronyms 
AEB Accident Evolution and Barrier Function 
ARAMIS Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries in the 
Context of the Seveso II Directive 
BORA Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis 
ESD Emergency Shutdown System 
ESREL The European Safety and Reliability Conference 
HC Hydrocarbon 
IEC The International Electrotechnical Commission 
ISO The International Organisation for Standardization 
MORT Management Oversight and Risk Tree 
MTO Human, Technology, and Organisation 
NCS The Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NTNU The Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
OLF The Norwegian Oil Industry Association 
PSA The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis 
R&D Research and Development 
RIF Risk Influencing Factor 
ROSS Reliability, Safety, and Security Studies  
SCAT Systematic Cause Analysis Technique 
SHE Safety, Health, and Environment 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
SINTEF The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the 
Norwegian Institute of Technology 
SIS Safety Instrumented System 
SJA Safe Job Analysis 
SPE The Society of Petroleum Engineers  
STEP Sequential Timed Events Plotting 
UiS The University of Stavanger 
WP Work Permit 
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In spite of the fact that the concept of safety barriers is applied in practice, discussed in the literature, and even required in legislation
and standards, no common terminology that is applicable across sectors have been developed of the concept of safety barriers. This paper
focuses on safety barriers and addresses the following aspects; deﬁnitions and understanding of what is a safety barrier, classiﬁcation of
safety barriers, and attributes of importance for the performance of safety barriers. Safety barriers are physical or non-physical means
planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. Barrier systems may be classiﬁed according to several dimensions,
for example as passive or active barrier systems, and as physical, technical, or human/operational barrier systems. Several attributes are
necessary to include in order to characterize the performance of safety barriers; functionality/effectiveness, reliability/availability,
response time, robustness, and ﬁnally a description of the triggering event or condition. For some types of barriers, not all the attributes
are relevant or necessary in order to describe the barrier performance.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Safety barrier; Defence-in-depth; Barrier performance; Risk analysis1. Introduction
Safety barriers have been used to protect humans and
property from enemies and natural hazards since the origin
of human beings. When human-induced hazards were
created due to the industrialism, safety barriers were
implemented to prevent accidents caused by these hazards.
The concept of safety barriers is often related to an
accident model called the energy model (see Fig. 1). Gibson
(1961) pioneered the development of the energy model,
while Haddon (1980) developed the model further as he
presented his ten strategies for accident prevention. Safety
barriers also play an important role in the Management
Oversight & Risk Tree (MORT) concept (Johnson, 1980).
During recent years, an extended perspective on safety
barriers has evolved. This is emphasized by Hollnagel
(2004) who states that ‘‘whereas the barriers used to defend
a medieval castle mostly were of a physical nature, the
modern principle of defence-in-depth combines different
types of barriers—from protection against the release ofe front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
.2005.12.004
59 29 02; fax: +47 73 59 28 96.
ess: snorre.sklet@sintef.no.radioactive materials to event reporting and safety
policies’’. This development is also supported by Fleming
and Silady (2002) who states that ‘‘the deﬁnitions of
defence-in-depth have evolved from a rather simple set of
strategies to apply multiple lines of defence to a more
comprehensive set of cornerstones, strategies, and tactics to
protect the public health and safety’’. The concept of
defence-in-depth was developed within the nuclear indus-
try, but is also used in other high risk industries (e.g., the
process industry where also the term multiple protection
layers is used; CCPS, 1993).
The focus on the use of risk-informed principles and
safety barriers in European regulations such as the Seveso
II directive (EC, 1996) and the Machinery directive (EC,
1998), national regulations as the Management regulation
from the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) (PSA,
2001), and standards such as IEC:61508 (1998), IEC:61511
(2002), and ISO:13702 (1999) demonstrates the importance
of safety barriers in order to reduce the risk of accidents.
PSA has developed requirements to safety barriers, but has
not given a clear deﬁnition of the concept. Discussions
have emerged on what is a safety barrier. Specialists do not
fully agree on this issue and it is difﬁcult for the companies
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Fig. 1. The energy model (based on Haddon, 1980).
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for the PSA to manage the regulations without a clear
deﬁnition and delimitation of the concept.
No common deﬁnition of the term safety barrier has
been found in the literature, although different aspects
of the term have been discussed, see, e.g., (CCPS, 2001;
Duijm, Andersen, Hale, Goossens, & Hourtolou, 2004;
Goossens & Hourtolou, 2003; Harms-Ringdahl, 2003;
Hollnagel, 2004; Johnson, 1980; Kecklund, Edland, Wedin,
& Svenson, 1996; Neogy, Hanson, Davis, & Fensterma-
cher, 1996; Rosness, 2005; Sklet & Hauge, 2004; Svenson,
1991), and applied in practice for several decades. Different
terms with similar meanings (barrier, defence, protection
layer, safety critical element, safety function, etc.) have
been used crosswise between industries, sectors, and
countries. Safety barriers are categorized in numerous
ways by different authors and the performance of the
barriers is described in several ways.
The extended use of the term safety barrier (and similar
terms) and the lack of a common terminology imply a need
for clarifying the terminology both in the Norwegian
offshore industry and crosswise between sectors. This need
is supported by the following statement from Kaplan
(1990); ‘‘When words are used sloppily, concepts become
fuzzy, thinking is muddled, communication is ambiguous,
and decisions and actions are suboptimal, to say the least’’.
To clarify the terms will be useful in order to avoid
misconceptions in communication about risk and safety
barriers. The results should be of general interest, and
furthermore, a clariﬁcation of the term will make it easier
for the Norwegian offshore industry to fulﬁl the require-
ments from the PSA with respect to classiﬁcation of
barriers and analysis of the performance of different types
of safety barriers and barrier elements.
The objectives of the paper are: (1) to present a survey of
how the concept safety barrier and similar concepts are
interpreted and used in various industries and various
applications, (2) to provide a clear deﬁnition of the concept
safety barrier, and associated concepts like barrier func-tion, barrier system, and barrier element, (3) to develop a
classiﬁcation system for safety barriers, (4) to deﬁne
attributes describing the performance of safety barriers,
and (5) to give recommendations on how the concept of
safety barrier should be interpreted and used in different
contexts.
The paper is based on experience from a literature survey
concerning the understanding of safety barriers in different
industries, several projects focusing on analysis of safety
barriers (e.g., the BORA project (Barrier and Operational
Risk Analysis) (Aven, Sklet, & Vinnem, 2005; Sklet, Aven,
Hauge, & Vinnem, 2005; Sklet, Vinnem, & Aven, 2005;
Vinnem, Aven, Hauge, Seljelid, & Veire, 2004) and a
project on behalf of PSA focusing on barriers during well
interventions (Sklet, Steiro, & Tjelta, 2005), and a study of
how safety barriers are analysed in different accident
investigation methods (Sklet, 2004). The literature is
identiﬁed in literature databases, from references in
reviewed literature, and by attending international con-
ferences.
The main focus in this paper is the use of the barrier
concept within industrial safety, especially as applied to
technical systems in the process and nuclear industry. Even
though the main focus is on demands for clariﬁcation of
the term safety barrier from the Norwegian offshore
industry, the discussions are also relevant for other
industries (e.g., the process industry) and application areas
(e.g., the transport sector). The focus is on the risk of major
accidents, i.e., occupational accidents have not been
discussed in detail. The attention is directed toward safety
issues, but the concepts may also be useful for security
issues.
The concept of safety barriers is brieﬂy introduced in this
section together with the purpose of the paper. The next
section discusses what a safety barrier is and gives an
overview of some deﬁnitions applicable for explanation of
the concept of safety barriers. Section three gives an
overview of some schemes for classiﬁcation of barrier
functions and barrier systems. Several measures of barrier
performance are presented and discussed in section four.
Comments, a brief discussion, and recommendations are
included in each section. Finally, some conclusions
concerning the concept of safety barriers end the paper.
2. What is a safety barrier?
2.1. Features of safety barriers
The term safety barrier and similar terms like defence
(in-depth), layer of protection, safety (critical) function,
safety critical element, and safety system are applied in
regulations, standards, and the scientiﬁc literature. A
literature review (e.g., CCPS, 2001; Duijm et al., 2004;
Goossens & Hourtolou, 2003; Harms-Ringdahl, 2003;
Hollnagel, 2004; Johnson, 1980; Kecklund et al., 1996;
Neogy et al., 1996; Rosness, 2005; SfS, 2004; Sklet &
Hauge, 2004; Svenson, 1991) shows that there is no
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in the literature. In the Oxford English Dictionary (OED,
2005) a barrier is deﬁned as a ‘‘fence of material obstruction
of any kind erected (or serving) to bar the advance of persons
or things, or to prevent access to a place’’.
The concept of defence-in-depth constitutes the basis for
the discussion of safety barriers. IAEA (1999) describes
the defence-in-depth principle in the following way:
‘‘To compensate for potential human and mechanical
failures, a defence in depth concept is implemented,
centred on several levels of protection including successive
barriers preventing the release of radioactive material to
the environment. The concept includes protection of the
barriers by averting damage to the plant and to the barriers
themselves. It includes further measures to protect the
public and the environment from harm in case these
barriers are not fully effective’’. As mentioned above, the
term safety barrier is often used in a broader meaning as a
collective term for different means used to realize the
concept of defence-in-depth.
A safety barrier is related to a hazard, an energy source
or an event sequence. This is supported by the requirement
stated by PSA (2001); ‘‘it shall be known what barriers
have been established and which function they are intended
to fulﬁl’’. This means that a barrier should be well deﬁned
or formalised and be related to a speciﬁc hazard.
Hollnagel (1999) states that in daily language the term
barrier is largely synonymous with the notion of a barrier
function. To be linguistically stringent, we should use the
term barrier function instead of only barrier. It is common
to distinguish between barrier functions and barrier
systems (see, e.g., Andersen et al., 2004; ISO:13702, 1999;
Kecklund et al., 1996; Svenson, 1991). According to
Svenson (1991), a barrier function represents a function
(and not, e.g., an object) which can arrest the accident
evolution so that the next event in the chain is never
realized, while a barrier system is maintaining the barrier
function. A barrier system may consist of several barrier
elements, and the elements may be of different types (e.g.,
technical, operational, human, and software). The different
deﬁnitions of barriers seem to cover all phases of an
accident sequence and include prevention, control, and
mitigation.
2.2. Recommendations
Based on the synthesis of some common features of the
terms, the following deﬁnitions of the terms safety barrier,
barrier function, and barrier system are proposed as basis
for further discussion and analysis of safety barriers. Safety barriers are physical and/or non-physical means
planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events
or accidents
The means may range from a single technical unit or
human action, to a complex socio-technical system.Planned implies that at least one of the purposes of the
means is to reduce the risk. In line with ISO:13702,
prevention means reduction of the likelihood of a
hazardous event, control means limiting the extent and/or
duration of a hazardous event to prevent escalation, while
mitigation means reduction of the effects of a hazardous
event. Undesired events are, e.g., technical failures, human
errors, external events, or a combination of these
occurrences that may realize potential hazards. Accidents
are undesired and unplanned events that lead to loss of
human lives, personal injuries, environmental damage,
and/or material damage. A barrier function is a function planned to prevent,
control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents
Barrier functions describe the purpose of safety barriers
or what the safety barriers shall do in order to prevent,
control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. If a
barrier function is performed successfully, it should have a
direct and signiﬁcant effect on the occurrence and/or
consequences of an undesired event or accident. A function
that has at most an indirect effect is not classiﬁed as a
barrier function, but as a risk inﬂuencing factor/function.
A barrier function should preferably be deﬁned by a verb
and a noun, e.g., ‘‘close ﬂow’’ and ‘‘stop engine’’. The verbs
avoid, prevent, control, and protect are suggested in the
ARAMIS (Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for
Industries in the Context of the Seveso II Directive) project
(Andersen et al., 2004) to describe generic barrier
functions. Sometimes it may be necessary to include a
modiﬁer describing the object of the function. A barrier system is a system that has been designed and
implemented to perform one or more barrier functions
A barrier system describes how a barrier function is
realized or executed. If the barrier system is functioning,
the barrier function is performed. A barrier system may
have several barrier functions. In some cases, there may be
several barrier systems that carry out a barrier function. A
barrier element is a component or a subsystem of a barrier
system that by itself is not sufﬁcient, to perform a barrier
function. A barrier subsystem may comprise several
redundant barrier elements. In this case, a speciﬁc barrier
element does not need to be functioning for the system to
perform the barrier function. This is the case for redundant
gas detectors connected in a k-out-of-n conﬁguration. The
barrier system may consist of different types of system
elements, e.g., physical and technical elements (hardware,
software), operational activities executed by humans, or a
combination thereof.
2.3. Comments
Even though the proposed deﬁnitions may be slightly
different from other deﬁnitions of safety barriers proposed
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2005; SfS, 2004) and protection layer proposed by CCPS
(2001) and IEC:61508/11, the interpretations of the
proposed deﬁnitions are in accordance with these deﬁni-
tions. However, CCPS and IEC:61508 stress the indepen-
dence between different protection layers as part of their
deﬁnitions. Barriers are restricted to ﬂow of energy in
MORT (Johnson, 1980) where barriers are deﬁned as ‘‘the
physical and procedural measures to direct energy in
wanted channels and control unwanted release’’. In the
ARAMIS-project (Duijm et al., 2004), the safety barriers
are limited to focus on release of hazardous agents and the
following deﬁnition is applied; ‘‘A safety barrier is a system
element that prevents, limits, or mitigates the release of a
hazardous agent’’. Another equivalent term to safety
barrier is the commonly used term defence that Reason
(1997) deﬁnes as ‘‘various means by which the goals of
ensuring the safety of people and assets can be achieved’’.
Reason describes defence-in-depth as ‘‘successive layers of
protection’’. Within the concept of MTO-analysis (Human,
Techology, and Organizations) applied in accident inves-
tigations, a safety barrier is deﬁned as ‘‘any operational,
organisational, or technical solution or system that
minimizes the probability of events to occur, and limit
the consequences of such events’’ (Bento, 2003). It seems
that almost all types of organizational risk inﬂuencing
factors are included as barriers in the MTO-diagrams
presented in the investigation reports.
The deﬁnition of a barrier function is similar to several
deﬁnitions of the term safety function. For example, as
presented by Harms-Ringdahl (2000) who states that ‘‘a
safety function is a technical, organisational or combined
function, which can reduce the probability and/or con-
sequences of a set of hazards in a speciﬁc system’’, and
IEC:61511 that deﬁnes safety function as ‘‘a function [y]
which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the
process, in respect of a speciﬁc hazardous event’’. A system
may have several functions, and the barrier function may
be one of them (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). For example,
the essential function of a pipe on an oil platform is to
transport hydrocarbons from system A to system B,
whereas the barrier function to prevent release of hydro-
carbons to the atmosphere is an auxiliary function.Corrosion
Loss of
containment
Failure during
flange
assembling
1
5
4
3
2
6
1. Condition monitoring to reveal corrosion
2. Inspection to reveal corrosion
3. Self control of work to reveal failure
4. 3rd party control of work to reveal failure
5. Leak test to reveal failure
6
7
8
9
Fig. 2. Illustration of barriers inSometimes a failure of the auxiliary function may be as
least as critical as a failure of the essential function.
Most of the authors cover both physical and non-
physical barriers as part of their deﬁnitions, but two
exceptions are Holand (1997) and IAEA (1999). Holand
deﬁnes a well barrier as a physical item only, while IAEA
distinguishes between physical barriers and other types of
protection where both types are incorporated in the
concept of defence-in-depth.
There are distinctions between the different deﬁnitions
regarding to which extent barriers should inﬂuence the
energy ﬂow or event sequence. On one hand, ISO:17776
(2000) states that a barrier should ‘‘reduce the probability’’
or ‘‘reduce the consequences’’. On the other hand, Holand
(1997) says that a barrier should ‘‘prevent the ﬂow’’ and
CCPS (2001) says that a protection layer should
be ‘‘capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding to
the undesired consequences’’. This topic is related to the
effectiveness of the barrier and is further discussed in
Section 4 about barrier performance.
Another aspect of the deﬁnition is whether such a broad
deﬁnition undermines the concept of barrier as some claim
that almost everything may be considered as a barrier.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the barrier
itself that may prevent, control, or mitigate the event
sequence or accident scenario directly (as illustrated in
Fig. 2), and the risk inﬂuencing factors that inﬂuence the
barrier performance. Examples on risk inﬂuencing factors
are competence of a third party checker and testing of gas
detectors. Thus, it is important to specify the barrier
function in order to clarify at which level different barriers
inﬂuence the accident scenario. This may be illustrated by
the following example; the containment (e.g., a pipe)
should prevent release of hydrocarbon to the atmosphere,
while inspection is executed to reveal corrosion such that
risk reducing measures may be implemented to prevent
that corrosion results in a leak.
At least two different accident models or perspectives
may be the basis for the concept of safety barriers; the
energy model and the process model. The basic principle in
the energy model is to separate hazards (energy sources)
from victims (vulnerable targets) by safety barriers
(Haddon, 1980). Process models divide the accident7 8 9 Loss of
human lifeFire
. Process shutdown to reduce size of release
. Disconnection of ignition sources to prevent ignition
. Deluge activation to extinguish fire
. Escape ways for evacuation 
ﬂuencing a process accident.
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how a system gradually deteriorates from a normal state
into a state where an accident occurs (Kjelle´n, 2000). For
process models, factors that prevent transitions between
phases in the accident sequence (or process) may be
regarded as safety barriers. While the energy model focuses
primarily on how to avoid injuries or losses due to release
of energy, process models are more focused on event
sequences or work processes.
3. Classiﬁcation of safety barriers
3.1. Classification of barrier functions
When barrier functions are related to a process model or
phases in an accident sequence, it is common to classify the
barrier functions as prevention, control, and mitigation
(IEC:61508, IEC:61511, ISO:13702). This classiﬁcation is
similar to the categorization of barrier functions used in
MORT (Johnson, 1980), where the terms prevention,
control, and minimization are used. Hollnagel (2004)
describes only two main functions for safety barriers;
prevention and protection. Barriers intended to work
before a speciﬁc initiating event takes place serve as a
means of prevention. They are supposed to ensure that the
accident does not happen, or at least to slow down the
developments that may result in an accident. Barriers
intended to work after a speciﬁc initiating event has taken
place, serve as means of protection, and are supposed to
shield the environment and the people in it, as well as the
system itself, from the consequences of the accident.
The ARAMIS-project (Andersen et al., 2004) classiﬁes
safety functions into four main categories described by the
action verbs to avoid, to prevent, to control, and to protect.
These verbs are described by Duijm et al. (2003), and the
avoid function aims at suppressing all the potential causes
of an event by changing the design of the equipment or the
type of product used, e.g., the use of a non-ﬂammable
product is a way to avoid ﬁre. The prevent function aims at
reducing the probability of an event by suppressing part of
its potential causes or by reducing their intensity, e.g., to
prevent corrosion, a better steel grade can be used. It is
probably not sufﬁcient to avoid it, but it may reduce its
probability. The control function aims at limiting the
deviation from a normal situation to an unacceptable one.Normal condition Concluding Initial phase
Lack of control ELoss of control
The acciden
Prevent Control
Prevent
Prevent ControlAvoid
Fig. 3. Generic safety functionsA pressure relief system and a computerized supervision
system perform a control function. Once an event has
occurred, it is necessary to protect the environment from its
consequences.
Another viewpoint is used by Vatn (2001) while
discussing safety critical functions within the Norwegian
railway industry. He differentiates between primary,
secondary, and tertiary safety critical functions. Primary
safety critical functions are related to technical systems for
the rolling material, the rail network, and the trafﬁc
control. Secondary safety critical functions are activities
performed in order to maintain the primary safety critical
functions. Tertiary safety critical functions are safety
management systems, maintenance management systems,
etc. Wahlstro¨m and Gunsell (1998) distinguish between
primary and secondary barriers, and as Vatn, they relate the
term secondary barriers to control/surveillance of the
primary barriers. A similar approach is presented by
Schupp (2004), where primary barriers are associated with
primary hazards, and secondary barriers with functional
hazards. Primary hazards are hazards that are directly
harmful to humans, the environment, or the economy,
while functional hazards are hazardous to functions of the
process (or plant) system. A functional hazard may
indirectly become hazardous to humans, for instance,
corrosion is a common functional hazard. Corrosion may
cause the containment system to fail, thus releasing a
primary hazard.
Leveson (1995) focuses on barriers related to software
systems and distinguishes between three types of barrier
functions, lockout, lockin, and interlock. A lockout ‘‘pre-
vents a dangerous event from occurring or prevents
someone or something from entering a dangerous area or
state’’, a lockin is ‘‘something that maintains a condition
or preserves a system state’’, while an interlock serves
‘‘to enforce correct sequencing or to isolate two events
in time’’.
In Fig. 3 the different barrier functions are related to
phases in the Occupational Accident Research Unit
(OARU) process model (Kjelle´n & larsson, 1981). The
accident sequence is divided into three phases, the initial
phase, the concluding phase, and the injury phase. The
generic safety functions prevent, control, and mitigate are
related to the transitions between the different phases in the
OARU-model. To prevent means to prevent transitionphase
nergy exposure
t sequence
Mitigate
Protect
Protect
Injury phase
(Hollnagel, 2004)
(Duijm et al., 2004)
(IEC 61508/11
ISO 13702
related to a process model.
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control means to prevent transition from lack of control to
loss of control, while to mitigate means to prevent that the
targets start to absorb energy.
According to the classiﬁcation described by Hollnagel
(2004) in prevention and protection, both control and
mitigation go into protection. As a comment to this
classiﬁcation, Sklet and Hauge (2003) emphasize that there
are two types of preventive barriers that both have to
function before the initiating event occurs; preventive
functions that are introduced to reduce the probability of
an initiating event, and preventive functions that are
introduced to reduce the probability of escalation (e.g.,
measures for reducing the probability of ignition, as area
classiﬁcation and restrictions on hot work). However,
whether safety functions are classiﬁed as preventing or
protecting, depends on the deﬁnition of the initiating event.
This topic may be illustrated by the following example; the
process shutdown function ‘‘protection against overpres-
sure’’ is preventing related to the initiating event ‘‘release’’,
but protecting (or controlling) related to the initiating
event ‘‘overpressure’’.
The classiﬁcation suggested in the ARAMIS-project
(Duijm et al., 2003) is more detailed than the tri-partition
(prevention, control, mitigation). Compared to tri-parti-
tion (see also Fig. 3), both the functions avoid and prevent
used in ARAMIS correspond to the function prevention in
Fig. 3. The function control in ARAMIS corresponds to
control in Fig. 3, while the term protect used by ARAMIS
corresponds to mitigation.
3.2. Classification of barrier systems
A commonly used categorization is to distinguish
between physical and non-physical barriers as used in
MORT (Johnson, 1980), in ISO:17776 (2000), and by DoE
(1997). Also PSA (2002) states that barriers may be
physical or non-physical, or a combination thereof. Reason
(1997) uses the terms hard and soft defences. Wahlstro¨m
and Gunsell (1998) make a similar classiﬁcation, and
differentiate between physical, technical, and administrative
barriers. Physical barriers are incorporated in the design of
a construction, technical barriers are initiated if a hazard is
realized, while administrative barriers are incorporated in
administrative systems and procedures.
Svenson (1991) classiﬁes barrier systems as physical,
technical, or human factors-organizational systems, while
Neogy et al. (1996) classify barriers as physical, procedural
or administrative, or human action. In a study of the
refuelling process in a nuclear power plant, Kecklund et al.
(1996) classify barrier functions as technical, human, or
human/organizational. The technical barrier functions are
performed by a technical barrier system, and correspond-
ingly, human barrier functions are performed by human
barrier function systems. Human/organisational barrier
functions can be seen as planned into the process but in the
end executed by humans with the support of an organisa-tion designing the refuelling work process. DoE (1997) has
a similar perspective as Kecklund et al. and distinguishes
between physical and management barriers. DoE claims
that management barriers exist at three levels within the
organisation, the activity level, the facility level, and the
institutional level.
Management barriers may be seen as a kind of
organisational control, and Hopwood (1974) describes three
types of organisational controls; administrative, social, and
self-control. Johnson and Gill (1993) deﬁne administrative
control as ‘‘those mechanisms, techniques, and processes
that have been consciously and purposefully designed in
order to try to control the organisational behaviour(s) of
other individuals, groups and organisations’’. Adminis-
trative controls may involve control of the process or the
output. By contrast, where socialization is not the result of
a planned strategy, but, instead, arises spontaneously out
of the everyday social interaction among members, we are
referring to the informed area of social control. Self-
control is deﬁned as ‘‘the control people exert over their
own behaviour’’. In order for this to happen, the norms
embodied in administrative or social control must be
‘‘either directly or indirectly [y] internalized by the
members of the enterprise and operate as personal controls
over attitudes and behaviour’’. Due to advances in
technology, Reason, Parker, and Lawton (1998) add
another control mechanism, technical controls, that include
engineered safety features.
Reason (1997) claims that administrative controls form a
major part of any hazardous system’s defences and are
of two main kinds (based on Johnson & Gill, 1993);
(a) external controls made up of rules, regulations, and
procedures that closely prescribe what actions may
be performed and how they should be carried out, and
(b) internal controls derived from the knowledge and
principles acquired through training and experience.
External controls are written down, while internal controls
seldom are written down.
In IEC:61511, risk reduction measures are categorized
as: (1) safety instrumented systems (SIS),1 (2) other
technology safety-related systems, and (3) external risk
reduction facilities. A SIS is composed of any combination
of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and ﬁnal element(s). Other
technology safety-related systems are safety-related sys-
tems based on a technology other than electrical, electro-
nic, or programmable electronic, for example, a relief
valve. External risk reduction facilities are measures to
reduce or mitigate the risk that is separate and distinct
from the SIS or other technology safety-related systems,
e.g., drain systems and ﬁrewalls.
A comparison of some terms used to classify barrier
systems according to the main division line between
‘‘physical’’ (‘‘left side’’) or ‘‘non-physical’’ (‘‘right side’’)
is shown in Table 1. As seen from the table the notations
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Table 1
Different classiﬁcations of barriers as physical or non-physical
Terms References
Physical Non-physical (Johnson, 1980; ISO:17776, 2000; DoE, 1997; PSA, 2002)
Hard defence Soft defence (Reason, 1997)
Physical Technical Administrative (Wahlstro¨m & Gunsell, 1998)
Physical Technical Human factors/organizational (Svenson, 1991)
Technical Procedural/administrative Human actions (Neogy et al., 1996)
Technical Human/organizational Human (Kecklund et al., 1996)
Technical Organizational Operational (Bento, 2003)
Physical Management (DoE, 1997)
Hardware Behavioural (Hale, 2003)
Sensor
(instrument,
mechanical or
human)
Decision making
process
(logic solver, relay,
mechanical device,
human)
Action
(instrument,
mechanical, or
human)
Fig. 4. Basic elements of active independent protection layer (CCPS,
2001).
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side’’, only Svenson (1991), and Wahlstro¨m and Gunsell
(1998) distinguish between these two terms. On the non-
physical side, different terms as soft defence, adminis-
trative, organisational, human, operational, and manage-
ment are used. A barrier may consist of physical as well as
non-physical elements.
Several authors distinguish between passive and active
barriers (see, e.g., CCPS, 2001; Hale, 2003; Kjelle´n, 2000).
CCPS (2001) distinguishes between passive and active
independent protection layers where a passive protection
layer is not required to take an action in order for it to
achieve its function in reducing risk, while active protection
layers are required to move from one state to another in
response to a change in a measurable process property
(e.g., temperature or pressure), or a signal from another
source (such as a push-button or a switch). An active
protection layer generally comprises a sensor of some type,
a decision-making process, and an action (see Fig. 4). Also
Kjelle´n (2000) differentiates between passive and active
safety barriers, and states that passive barriers are
embedded in the design of the workplace and are
independent of the operational control system. Active
barriers are, however, dependant on actions by the
operators or on a technical control system to function as
intended.
Similarly, Hale et al. (2004) distinguish between four
parts of a barrier function that all have to be fulﬁlled. They
claim that this division can form the basis of a matrix for
classifying different forms of a barrier for fulﬁlling a given
safety function. The four parts are; deﬁnition or speciﬁca-
tion of the barrier, detection mechanism, activation
mechanism, and response mechanism. Barriers are divided
into passive, active, or procedural (or human actionbarriers) in an ARAMIS-memo (Goossens & Hourtolou,
2003). Hale (2003) presents a somewhat more reﬁned
classiﬁcation of barriers with the categories: (a) passive
hardware barriers, (b) active hardware barriers, (c) passive
behavioural barriers, (d) active behavioural barriers, and
(e) mixed barriers, where both hardware and behaviour are
involved.
3.3. Other lines of classification
Hollnagel (2004) has developed a classiﬁcation of
barriers based on their nature, and describes four groups
of barriers; material or physical barriers, functional barriers,
symbolic barriers, and incorporeal barriers (called immater-
ial in another memo). Material or physical barriers are
barriers that physically prevent an action from being
carried out or an event from taking place (e.g., buildings,
walls, and railings). Functional barriers work by impeding
the action to be carried out, for instance by establishing an
interlock, either logical or temporal. Symbolic barriers
require an act of interpretation in order to achieve its
purpose, hence an ‘‘intelligent’’ agent of some kind that can
react or respond to the barrier (e.g., signs and signals).
Whereas a functional barrier works by establishing an
actual pre-condition that must be met by the system, or the
user, before further actions can be carried out, a symbolic
barrier indicates a limitation on performance that may be
disregarded or neglected. Incorporeal barriers mean that
the barrier is not physically present or represented in the
situation, but that it depends on the knowledge of the user
in order to achieve its purpose (typically rules and
guidelines).
In the description of the Safety Modelling Language
(SML), Schupp (2004) speciﬁes one dimension of barriers
called inherent versus add-on. An inherent barrier is a
barrier that is created by changing a parameter of a design,
for example, using a thicker vessel wall to withstand
internal pressure, using stainless steel or a smaller
inventory. Add-on barriers are systems or components
that are added just because of safety considerations, e.g.,
pressure valves, interlocks, and sprinkler devices.
Trost and Nertney (1995) describe the following types
of barriers within MORT; equipment design, physical
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knowledge and skill, and supervision. Another aspect
emphasized in a MORT analysis (Johnson, 1980), is the
location of the barriers. The location is divided in four
categories; on the energy source, between the energy source
and worker, on persons/objects, or separation through
time and space. This corresponds to the classiﬁcation
developed by Haddon (1980) of risk reducing measures as
strategies related to the energy source, strategies related to
barriers or strategies related to the vulnerable target.
Further, the MORT-concept differentiates between control
and safety barriers (Trost & Nertney, 1995). Control
barriers are related to control of wanted energy ﬂows,
while safety barriers are related to control of unwanted
energy ﬂows. An equivalent differentiation is made by
DoE (1997).
A distinction between global and local safety functions is
made by The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF,
2001). Global safety functions, i.e., ﬁre and explosion
hazard safety functions, are functions that typically
provide protection for one or several ﬁre cells. Examples
comprise emergency shutdown (EDS), isolation of ignition
sources and emergency blowdown. Local safety functions,
i.e., process equipment safety functions, are functions
conﬁned to protection of a speciﬁc process equipment unit.
A typical example will be protection against high liquid
level in a separator through the process shutdown system
(PSD). Further, Bodsberg (1994) distinguishes between
process control function and control of the conditions of the
equipment. The purpose of the process control function is
to prevent that a stable process deviates into a state of lack
of control (i.e., high pressure), while, for instance,
condition monitoring will measure directly the condition
of the plant equipment and may provide advance warning
on possible process equipment failures.
Goossens and Hourtolou (2003) distinguish between
permanent and activated barriers, where permanent barriers
are functioning permanently independent of the state of the
process, while activated barriers need a sequence of
detection—diagnosis—action. This classiﬁcation is similar
to the distinction between on-line and off-line functions
described by Rausand and Høyland (2004).
Hollnagel (2004) uses the terms permanent and tempor-
ary barriers to explain another aspect of barriers.
Permanent barriers are usually part of the design base,
although they also may be introduced later, for instance, as
a response to an accident. Temporary barriers are
restrictions that apply for a limited period of time only,
typically referring to a change in external conditions. In the
same way, Holand (1997) emphasizes two main types of
barriers related to well operations, static barriers and
dynamic barriers. A static barrier is a barrier that is
available over a ‘‘long’’ period of time, while a dynamic
barrier is a barrier that varies over time, and will apply for
drilling, workover, and completion operations.
Within the human reliability analysis (HRA) domain,
the term recovery of human errors is used. In THERP(Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction; Swain
& Guttmann, 1983), a recovery factor is any element
of a nuclear power plant system that acts to prevent
deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects.
Kirwan (1994) describes four types of recovery; internal
recovery, external recovery, independent human recovery,
and system recovery. Internal recovery means that the
operator, having committed an error or failed to carry
out an act, realises this immediately, or later, and
corrects the situation. External recovery means that the
operator, having committed an error or having failed
to do something that is required, is prompted by a
signal from the environment (e.g., an alarm, an error
message, some other non-usual system-event). Independent
human recovery means that another operator monitors the
ﬁrst operator, detects the error and either corrects it or
brings it to the attention to the ﬁrst operator, who then
corrects it. System recovery means that the system itself
recovers from the human error. This implies a degree of
error tolerance, or of error detection and automatic
recovery.
3.4. Recommendations and comments
A recommended way to classify barrier systems is shown
in Fig. 5. However, note that active barrier systems often
are based on a combination of technical and human/
operational elements (e.g., see (Corneliussen & Sklet, 2003)
for a discussion of human/operational and technical
elements in an ESD-system). Even though different words
are applied, the classiﬁcation in the fourth level in Fig. 5 is
similar to the classiﬁcation suggested by Hale (2003), and
the classiﬁcation of active, technical barriers is in accor-
dance with IEC:61511.
As regards the time aspect, some barrier systems are on-
line (continuously functioning), while some are off-line
(need to be activated). Further, some barriers are
permanent while some are temporary. Permanent barriers
are implemented as an integrated part of the whole
operational life cycle, while temporary barriers only are
used in a speciﬁed time period, often during speciﬁc
activities or conditions.
The physical, passive barriers (e.g., containment, fences,
and ﬁrewalls) are usually functioning continuously as they
do not need to be activated. They may also be temporary,
e.g., a temporary obstruction fencing a working area
during an activity. The passive, human operational barriers
(e.g., safety distances in accordance with Haddon’s
principle separation in time and space) may be functioning
continuously, or be implemented as part of high-risk
activities.
Active, human/operational barriers may be in a con-
tinuous mode or activated on demand. Often, these
barriers are an integrated part of a work process (e.g.,
self-control of work and third party control of work) in
order to reveal potential failures, e.g. introduced by
humans.
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Barrier function
Barrier system
ActivePassive
Human/operationalTechnicalPhysical Human/operational
Safety Instrumented
System (SIS)
Other technology 
safety-related system
Realized by:
What to do
How to do it
External risk 
reduction facilites
Fig. 5. Classiﬁcation of safety barriers.
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ways. The classiﬁcation illustrated in Fig. 5 may not always
be best suitable for the purpose of the classiﬁcation. Then,
some other lines of classiﬁcation described in Section 3 can
be used.
4. Performance of safety barriers
4.1. Performance criteria
To identify failed, missing, or functioning barriers is an
important part of a MTO-analysis (Rollenhagen, 1997),
and DoE (1999) addresses the following topics regarding
analysis of barriers in an accident investigation: Barriers that were in place and how they performed.
 Barriers that were in place but not used.
 Barriers that were not in place but were required.
The assessment of barrier performance is manageable in
accident investigations where a speciﬁc event sequence
already has occurred (Sklet, 2004). The situation is
somewhat different in proactive risk analyses. There are
several accident scenarios to analyse, and the analyses of
expected barrier performance are a vital part of the
risk analyses. As mentioned in Section 1, there are
distinctions regarding to which extent barriers should
inﬂuence the energy ﬂow or event sequence, from ‘‘reduce
the probability’’, to ‘‘prevent the ﬂow’’. This discussion
may be related to the discussion about the performance of
the barriers, and the subject is further delineated in this
section.
According to PSA (2002), performance of barriers, may,
inter alia, refer to capacity, reliability, availability, effi-
ciency, ability to withstand loads, integrity, and robustness.
Further, PSA writes in a letter to the oil companies (PSA/
RNNS, 2002) that the performance of safety barriers are
composed of three components; functionality/efficiency
(i.e., the effect the barriers has on the event sequence if it
functions according to the design intent), availability/reliability (i.e., the ability to function on demand), and
robustness (i.e., the ability to function during accident
sequences or under inﬂuence of given accident loads).
Neogy et al. (1996) use the terms reliability and
effectiveness in order to describe how successful barriers
are in providing protection. They state that the reliability
of barriers is related to the ability to resist failures, while
the effectiveness of a barrier is related to how suitable or
how comprehensive the barrier is in protecting against a
particular hazard.
Table 2 shows a summary presented by Hollnagel (2004)
of a discussion of requirements of barrier quality made by
Taylor (1988).
In another paper, Hollnagel (1995) presents a set of
pragmatic criteria that address various aspects of barrier
quality: Efficiency or adequacy: how efﬁcient the barrier is
expected to be in achieving its purpose. Resources required: the resources needed to implement
and maintain the barrier rather than the resources
needed to use it. Robustness (reliability): how reliable and resistant the
barrier is, i.e., how well it can withstand the variability
of the environment. Delay in implementation: the time from conception to
implementation of a barrier. Applicability to safety critical tasks: Safety critical tasks
play a special role in socio-technical systems. On the one
hand they are the occasions where speciﬁc barriers may
be mostly needed; on the other hand they are usually
subject to a number of restrictions from either manage-
ment or regulatory bodies. Availability: whether the barrier can fulﬁl its purpose
when it is needed. Evaluation: to determine whether a barrier works as
expected and to ensure that it is available when needed.
The evaluation can be considered with regard to how
easy it is to carry out and in terms of whether suitable
methods are available.
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Table 2
Requirements to barrier quality (Hollnagel, 2004; Taylor, 1988)
Quality/criterion Speciﬁc requirement
Adequacy Able to prevent all accidents within the design basis.
Meet requirements set by appropriate standards and norms.
Capacity must not be exceeded by changes to the primary system.
If a barrier is inadequate, additional barriers must be established.
Availability, reliability All necessary signals must be detectable when barrier activation is required.
Active barriers must be fail-safe, and either self-testing or tested regularly.
Passive barriers must be inspected routinely.
Robustness Able to withstand extreme events, such as ﬁre, ﬂooding, etc.
The barrier shall not be disabled by the activation of another barrier.
Two barriers shall not be affected by a (single) common cause.
Speciﬁcity The effects of activating the barrier must not lead to other accidents.
The barrier shall not destroy that which it protects.
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depends on humans in order to achieve its purpose.
Within the ARAMIS-project (Andersen et al., 2004),
evaluation of safety barriers is performed according to
three criteria in order to achieve a predetermined risk
reduction objective: Effectiveness
 Response time
 Level of confidenceEffectiveness of a safety barrier is the ability of a safety
barrier to perform a safety function for a duration,
in a non-degraded mode and in speciﬁed conditions. The
effectiveness is either a percentage or a probability of
the performance of the deﬁned safety function. If the
effectiveness is expressed as a percentage, it may vary
during the operating time of the safety barrier. For
example, a valve that is not able to close completely on a
safety demand will not have an effectiveness of 100%.
Response time is the duration between the straining of the
safety barrier and the complete achievement (which is
equal to the effectiveness) of the safety function performed
by the safety barrier. Level of conﬁdence of a safety barrier
is the probability of failure on demand to perform properly
a required safety function according to a given effectiveness
and response time under all the stated conditions within a
stated period of time. This notion is similar to the notion of
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) deﬁned in IEC:61511 for SIS,
but applies here to all types of safety barriers. The ‘‘design’’
level of conﬁdence means that the barrier is supposed to be
as efﬁcient as when it was installed, while the ‘‘operational’’
level of conﬁdence includes the inﬂuence of the safety
management system. The value could be lower than the
‘‘design’’ one if some problems are identiﬁed during the
audit of the safety management system.
Rollenhagen (1997, 2003) emphasizes that the following
dimensions should be focused concerning the strength ofbarrier systems; validity (the ability to handle the devia-
tions, threats, etc., meant to deal with), reliability (the
ability to fulﬁl speciﬁc properties on demand), completeness
(whether it is necessary to implement more barriers), and
maintainability (a measure of how easy it is to maintain the
barrier system).
4.2. Recommendations and comments
Based on experience from several projects and a
synthesis of the reviewed literature, it is recommended to
address the following attributes to characterize the
performance of safety barriers: Functionality/effectiveness
 Reliability/availability
 Response time
 Robustness
 Triggering event or condition
For some types of barriers, not all the attributes are
relevant or necessary in order to describe the barrier
performance. The barrier functionality/effectiveness is the ability to
perform a specified function under given technical,
environmental, and operational conditions
The barrier functionality deals with the effect the barrier
has on the event or accident sequence. The speciﬁed
function should be stated as a functional requirement
(deterministic requirement). A functional requirement is a
speciﬁcation of the performance criteria related to a
function (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). The ‘‘possible’’
degree of fulﬁlment may be expressed in a probabilistic way
as the probability of successful execution of the speciﬁed
function or the percentage of successful execution. For
example, if the function is to pump water, a functional
requirement may be that the output of water must be
ARTICLE IN PRESS
S. Sklet / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 11between 100 and 110 l/min. Functional requirements for
the performance of safety barriers may exist in regulations,
standards, design codes, etc., or as risk-informed require-
ments based on risk assessments using risk acceptance
criteria (Hokstad, Vatn, Aven, & Sørum, 2003). The actual
functionality of a barrier may be less than the speciﬁed
functionality due to design constraints, degradation,
operational conditions, etc. The functionality of safety
barriers corresponds to the safety function requirements
demanded by IEC:61511 and the effectiveness of safety
barriers as described in the ARAMIS-project (Andersen
et al., 2004). The barrier reliability/availability is the ability to perform
a function with an actual functionality and response time
while needed, or on demand
The barrier reliability/availability may be expressed as
the probability of failure (on demand) to carry out a
function. The reliability/availability of safety barriers
corresponds to the safety integrity requirements (SIL)
demanded by IEC:61511 and the level of conﬁdence as
described in the ARAMIS-project. The PDS-method
(Hokstad & Corneliussen, 2003) also focuses on various
measures of loss of safety or safety unavailability for a
safety function (the probability of not to function on
demand) and uses the term critical safety unavailability
(CSU) to quantify total loss of safety. Requirements to the
reliability/availability may be expressed as a SIL-require-
ment as illustrated in Table 3.
The difference between barrier functionality and barrier
reliability/availability may be illustrated by two examples;
an ESD-system, and gas detectors. In the former case, the
barrier function is to close ﬂow. The functionality of an
ESD-valve that closes with no internal leakage may be
100%. An internal leakage through the valve reduces the
effectiveness, but the reliability expressed as the probability
of valve closure on demand is not inﬂuenced by the internal
leakage. In the latter case, assume that the barrier function
is to detect gas and give a signal. The actual effectiveness is
inﬂuenced by, e.g., type, numbers, and location of the gas
detectors, while the reliability is the probability of signal
from the detectors if they are exposed to gas.Tab
Saf
Saf
4
3
2
1The response time of a safety barrier is the time from
a deviation occurs that should have activated ale 3
ety integrity levels (IEC:61511)
ety integrity level (SIL) Demand mode of operation
Target average probability of failure on dem
X105 to o104
X104 to o103
X103 to o102
X102 to o101safety barrier, to the fulfilment of the specified barrier
function
The response time may be deﬁned somewhat different
for different types of barrier functions. This may be
illustrated by the difference between an ESD-system and a
deluge system. The response time for the ESD-system is the
time to closure of the ESD-valve where the function ‘‘stop
ﬂow’’ is fulﬁlled, while the response time for a deluge
system is the time to delivery of the speciﬁed amount of
water (and not the time until the ﬁre is extinguished). Barrier robustness is the ability to resist given accident
loads and function as specified during accident sequences
This attribute is relevant for passive as well as active
barrier systems, and it may be necessary to assess the
robustness for several types of accident scenarios. The triggering event or condition is the event or condition
that triggers the activation of a barrier
It is not itself part of a barrier, however, it is an
important attribute in order to fully understand how a
barrier may be activated. The barriers that are functioning
continuously (e.g., passive barriers and operational restric-
tions as hot work limits), do not need a trigger to be
activated since they are implemented as a result of
deterministic requirements or risk assessments (e.g.,
restrictions on hot work that reduce the ignition prob-
ability if a hydrocarbon release occurs).
There are three main types of triggering events and
conditions that activate active barriers:1.andDeviations from the normal situation, e.g., process
disturbances and hydrocarbon release. These deviations
should be revealed by a kind of sensor (either
automatically or manually).2. Execution of speciﬁc activities, e.g., activities where
barriers are a necessary part of the activity in order to
detect possible failures introduced as part of the activity.
An example is activities where work permits, self-control
of work, and third party control of work are demanded.3. Scheduled activities, e.g., inspection aimed to reveal
corrosion.Continuous mode of operation
Target frequency of dangerous failures to perform the
SIF (per hour)
X109 to o108
X108 to o107
X107 to o106
X106 to o105
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effects like increased costs, need for maintenance, and
introduction of new hazards. These adverse effects should
be addressed as part of a total analysis of safety barriers,
but they are not further discussed in this paper. Some of
these aspects, as loss of production regularity and
maintenance, are focused in the PDS-method (Hokstad &
Corneliussen, 2003) where a measure for quantifying loss
of production regularity is the spurious trip rate.5. Conclusions
The concept of safety barriers is presented and discussed
in the paper. The results are based on experience from
several research projects focusing on safety barriers and a
review of relevant literature. No common terminology
applicable crosswise between sectors and application areas
has been found, and a set of deﬁnitions is therefore
proposed in the paper.
Safety barriers are deﬁned as physical and/or non-
physical means planned to prevent, control, or mitigate
undesired events or accidents. It is practical to distinguish
between the barrier functions and the barrier systems that
realize these functions.
Several ways for classiﬁcation of safety barriers exist.
Barrier functions may be classiﬁed as preventive, control-
ling, or mitigating. Barrier systems may be classiﬁed in
several dimensions, and some main dimensions are; active
versus passive, physical/technical versus human/opera-
tional, continuously functioning/on-line versus activated/
off-line, and permanent versus temporary.
It is recommended to address the following attributes to
characterize the performance of safety barriers: (a)
functionality/effectiveness, (b) reliability/availability, (c)
response time, (d) robustness, and (e) triggering event or
condition. For some types of barriers, not all the attributes
are relevant or necessary in order to describe the barrier
performance.
The paper improves the understanding of the concept of
safety barriers. The results are valuable as a basis for
identiﬁcation, description, development of requirements to,
and understanding of the effect of the safety barriers within
the ﬁeld of industrial safety. The results with respect to
safety barriers in the paper will primarily be useful for the
Norwegian oil industry in their effort to fulﬁl the
requirements from PSA. However, the results may also
be applied in other industries (e.g., the process industry)
and application areas (e.g., the transport sector) in their
effort to reduce the risk.References
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The main objective of this paper is to present and discuss a set of scenarios that may lead to hydrocarbon releases on offshore oil
and gas production platforms. Each release scenario is described by an initiating event (i.e., a deviation), the barrier functions introduced
to prevent the initiating event from developing into a release, and how the barrier functions are implemented in terms of barrier
systems. Both technical and human/operational safety barriers are considered. The initiating events are divided into ﬁve main categories:
(1) human and operational errors, (2) technical failures, (3) process upsets, (4) external events or loads, and (5) latent failures
from design. The release scenarios may be used as basis for analyses of: (a) the performance of safety barriers introduced to
prevent hydrocarbon releases on speciﬁc platforms, (b) the platform speciﬁc hydrocarbon release frequencies in future quantitative risk
analyses, (c) the effect on the total hydrocarbon release frequency of the safety barriers and risk reducing measures (or risk increasing
changes).
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Hydrocarbon release; Loss of containment; Safety barrier; Risk analysis; Major accident1. Introduction
Hydrocarbon releases are a main contributor to the
major accident risk on oil and gas production platforms
(e.g., see Øien, 2001). Fig. 1 shows the total number of
hydrocarbon releases with a release rate higher than 0.1 kg/s
in the process area on platforms on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf in the period 1996–2004 (PSA, 2005).
Until 1999, there was a declining trend, followed by some
years with ﬂuctuations. The total number of hydrocarbon
releases has been reduced both in 2003 and 2004. The
number of hydrocarbon releases with rate higher than 1 kg/s
has not decreased to the same degree (PSA, 2005). The
reduction from 2003 to 2004 has mainly taken place in the
lowest release rate group (0.1–1kg/s). The data shows large
variations in the frequency of hydrocarbon releases on the
various platforms, which indicates a potential for reducing
the total release frequency. Data from 2001 to 2004 showse front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
.2005.12.003
59 29 02; fax: +47 73 59 28 96.
ess: snorre.sklet@sintef.no.that about 40% of the hydrocarbon releases occur due to
errors during manual work. About 32% occur during
normal production, while the rest (27%) take place in
connection with spurious trips and start-up and shutdown
of the process.
In 2003, the operators on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf were challenged by the Petroleum Safety Authority
Norway (PSA) to set a target for reducing the frequency of
hydrocarbon releases and to identify improvement mea-
sures through a joint industry project. As a follow-up of
this initiative, the Norwegian Oil Industry Association
(OLF) initiated a project with the objective to reduce by
50% the number of hydrocarbon releases with rate higher
than 0.1 kg/s by the end of 2005 (measured against the
average in the period 2000–2002). All companies have
further established a vision of no gas releases (OLF, 2004).
The frequency of hydrocarbon releases in offshore
quantitative risk analyses (QRA) has traditionally been
determined by the use of generic frequencies of small,
medium, and large hydrocarbon releases from equipment,
systems, and areas. In some cases, platform speciﬁc release
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Fig. 1. No. of hydrocarbon releases (40.1 kg/s) on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf (PSA, 2005).
1See www.synergi.no for information about Synergi.
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QRA do not identify or analyse the different causal factors
of the releases, and thus it is very difﬁcult to give credit in
the QRA for measures introduced to reduce the release
frequency.
Few studies of safety barriers introduced to prevent
hydrocarbon releases have been published. Previous studies
of hydrocarbon releases have primarily focused on release
statistics and causes of releases (DNV and RF, 2002;
Glittum, 2001a, b; HSE, 2001, 2002; Papazoglou, Aneziris,
Post, & Ale, 2003). However, Hurst, Bellamy, Geyer, and
Astley (1991) include some prevention mechanisms in their
analysis of pipework failures, and Duijm and Goossens
(2005) include barriers in the ARAMIS model.
The objective of this paper is to present and discuss a
comprehensive and representative set of scenarios that may
lead to hydrocarbon releases on offshore oil and gas
production platforms. The scenarios include both initiating
events caused by technical, operational, and human
factors, as well as a description of barrier functions
introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, and barrier
systems that carry out these barrier functions. Hydro-
carbon release in this respect is deﬁned as gas release or oil
release (incl. condensate) from the process ﬂow, well ﬂow,
or ﬂexible risers with a release rate higher than 0.1 kg/s.
Smaller releases are called minor releases or diffuse
discharges.
In the present paper, no attempt has been made to
quantify the risk related to the various release scenarios.
The contribution from the scenarios to the total risk of
hydrocarbon release can therefore not be assessed.
The rest of this paper has the following structure. The
research process for developing the release scenarios is
described in the next section. Section 3 presents factors
contributing to the occurrence of hydrocarbon releases,
how the scenarios are described, and a barrier block
diagram method used to describe the scenarios. The release
scenarios are described in Section 4, while the results are
discussed in Section 5. Finally, conclusions and recom-
mendations for further work are presented in Section 6.2. Research process
The release scenarios were developed in ﬁve distinct
steps, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
The ﬁrst step was a review of release statistics in order to
identify causal factors and to develop a coarse categoriza-
tion of the types of releases (see Section 3.1). Release
statistics covering the British sector of the North Sea (HSE,
2001, 2002), data from the PSA covering the Norwegian
Continental Shelf (PSA, 2003), and reports from some
other studies of hydrocarbon releases (DNV and RF, 2002;
Glittum, 2001a, b) have been reviewed.
Incident investigation reports from 40 signiﬁcant hydro-
carbon releases from two oil companies have been studied
in detail. Brief descriptions of all the signiﬁcant releases
have been developed (Sklet & Hauge, 2004). In addition,
reports of several minor hydrocarbon releases from the
incident and accident reporting system Synergi1 have been
reviewed. The purpose of this study was to get a more
thorough understanding of multiple causal relationships
leading to hydrocarbon releases, both regarding initiating
events (deviations), existence of, and performance of safety
barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases.
The next step was an examination of additional
documentation to get deeper insight into which technical
systems and work processes that may inﬂuence the release
frequency, and to identify requirements and functions
related to these systems. The following documentation has
been examined; platform speciﬁc operating procedures and
drawings from one platform, the standards ISO:10418
(2003) and ISO/CD:14224 (2004) and some selected papers
(Bellamy et al., 1999; Davoudian, Wu, & Apostolakis,
1994; Hurst et al., 1991; Olson, Chockie, Geisendorfer,
Vallario, & Mullen, 1988; Papazoglou et al., 2003). The
examination resulted in knowledge about the technical
systems and how different work processes should be
performed.
Next, a set of release scenarios were developed as a draft
version based on the results from all the activities described
above. The purpose was to develop a set of scenarios that
shall:1. Reﬂect the possible causes of hydrocarbon releases.
2. Include and visualize important safety barriers that
inﬂuence the release frequency.
3. Reﬂect different activities, phases, and conditions.
4. Provide a basis for, and facilitate, installation speciﬁc
assessments to be carried out in a ‘‘simple’’ and not too
time-consuming manner.5. Form a comprehensive and representative set (related to
completeness) of scenarios that may result in hydro-
carbon releases.6. As far as possible be suitable for quantiﬁcation (both
regarding the frequency of initiating events and the
probability of failure of safety barriers).
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scenarios was performed. The main steps of this validation/
veriﬁcation process were:1.2
No
qua
pre
conComparison with the master logic diagram for ‘‘loss
of containment’’ in chemical plants developed in the
I-RISK project (Bellamy et al., 1999).2. Comparison with the description of 40 signiﬁcant
hydrocarbon releases developed by Sklet and Hauge
(2004).3. Review by personnel from an oil company and the
BORA project2 group resulting in a discussion in a
meeting where personnel from the oil company and the
BORA project group attended.
Detailed descriptions of the ﬁnal hydrocarbon release
scenarios are given in Section 4.
3. Modelling of barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon
releases
3.1. Factors contributing to the occurrence of hydrocarbon
releases
A classiﬁcation of factors contributing to hydrocarbon
releases is developed based on review of release statistics.
The release causes have been divided into ﬁve main
categories:1. Human and operational errors
2. Technical failures
3. Process upsets (process parameters out of range)The BORA project (Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis) is a
rwegian research project where the aim is to perform a detailed and
ntitative modelling of barrier performance, including barriers to
vent the occurrence of initiating events as well as barriers to reduce the
sequences (Vinnem, Aven, Hauge, Seljelid, & Veire, 2004).4. External events or loads
5. Design failures (latent failures).Hydrocarbon releases due to human and operational
errors may occur during normal production (e.g., valves
left in open position after taking samples and open valves
to the drain-system), be introduced during maintenance as
latent failures (e.g., inadequate assembling and installation
of equipment), or occur during maintenance (e.g., failure of
isolation, depressurization, draining, blinding, and purging
prior to maintenance activities). Technical or physical
failures include releases due to mechanical and material
degradation of equipment caused by ageing, wear-out,
corrosion, erosion, and fatigue. Process upsets include
releases due to overpressure, underpressure, overﬂow, and
so forth. External events/loads include releases due to
falling objects, collisions, bumping, etc., while design
related failures are latent failures introduced during design
that cause release during production.3.2. Description of scenarios
The brief scenario descriptions contain the following
information; the name of the scenario, a general descrip-
tion, a deﬁnition of the initiating event, information about
the operational mode when the error or failure is
introduced and when the release occurs, descriptions of
barrier functions introduced to prevent hydrocarbon
releases, and how these functions are implemented by
barrier systems.
The event sequence is illustrated in a barrier block
diagram as shown in Fig. 3. A barrier block diagram
consists of an initiating event, arrows that show the event
sequence, barrier functions realized by barrier systems, and
possible outcomes. A horizontal arrow indicates that a
barrier system fulﬁls its function, whereas an arrow
downwards indicates failure to fulﬁl the function. In our
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containment).
The following deﬁnition is used in order to identify
initiating events for the release scenarios:
An initiating event for a release scenario is the first
significant deviation from a normal situation that under
given circumstances may cause hydrocarbon release (loss
of containment). A ‘‘normal situation’’ is a state where the
process functions as normal according to design specifica-
tions without significant process upsets or direct interven-
tions in the processing plant.
Regarding human and operational errors, it is crucial to
deﬁne the initiating events in such a way that it is evident
what the deviation from the normal situation is.
A barrier function is deﬁned as a function planned to
prevent, control or mitigate undesired events and accidents,
and describes the purpose of the safety barriers, i.e., what
the safety barriers shall do in order to prevent, control, or
mitigate undesired events or accidents (Sklet, 2005). A
barrier system describes how a barrier function is realized
or executed, and is deﬁned as a system that has
been designed and implemented to perform one or more
barrier functions. In some cases, there may be several
barrier systems that carry out one barrier function. The
barrier system may consist of technical elements (hardware,
software), actions executed by humans, and/or combina-
tions thereof.
An active safety barrier generally comprises a sensor, a
decision-making process, and an action. Due to practical
reasons, only the detection part of some of the barriers is
described in Section 4, but a decision and an action are
necessary in order to carry out the barrier function. In this
paper, it is assumed that adequate actions are carried out
when deviations are revealed in the release scenarios.
4. Description of release scenarios
Based on the initial review of statistics, incident
investigation reports, and literature concerning loss of
containment, the release scenarios are divided into seven
main categories, and some of these categories are again
divided into sub-categories:1. Release due to operational error during normal produc-
tion
(a) Release due to mal-operation of valve(s) during
manual operations(b) Release due to mal-operation of temporary
hoses
(c) Release due to lack of water in water locks in the
drain system2. Release due to latent failure introduced during main-
tenance
(a) Release due to incorrect ﬁtting of ﬂanges or bolts
during maintenance
(b) Release due to valve(s) in incorrect position after
maintenance
(c) Release due to erroneous choice or installation of
sealing device
3. Release during maintenance of hydrocarbon system
(requiring disassembling)
(a) Release due to error prior to or during disassem-
bling of hydrocarbon system
(b) Release due to break-down of the isolation system
during maintenance
4. Release due to technical/physical failures
(a) Release due to degradation of valve sealing
(b) Release due to degradation of ﬂange gasket
(c) Release due to loss of bolt tensioning
(d) Release due to degradation of welded pipes
(e) Release due to internal corrosion
(f) Release due to external corrosion
(g) Release due to erosion5. Release due to process upsets
(a) Release due to overpressure
(b) Release due to overﬂow/overﬁlling6. Release due to external events
Release caused by structural failure of the containment
due to external loads that exceed the strength of the
material. Two types of external impact are identiﬁed as
most common: (a) falling objects and (b) bumping/
collision, but these are analysed together in one
scenario.7. Release due to design related failures
Design related failures are latent failures introduced
during the design phase that cause release during
normal production. Since this paper focuses on
barriers introduced to prevent releases during opera-
tions, this scenario will not be treated any further in
the paper. Nevertheless, barriers preventing failures
in the design process and barriers aimed to detect
design related failures prior to start-up of pro-
duction are very important in order to minimize the
risk.
Categories 1–3 belong to the cause category human
or operational error in Section 3.1, category 4 belongs
to the cause category technical failures, category 5 belongs
to the cause category process upsets/process parameters
out of range, category 6 belongs to the cause category
external events, while category 7 belongs to latent failures
from design. A brief description and a barrier
block diagram for each scenario are presented in the
following.
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during manual operation
This scenario covers releases due to all types of mal-
operation of valve(s) in hydrocarbon systems during
manual operations in the production phase. Examples are
valve(s) left in open position after taking samples
performed by an area technician or laboratory technician,
and isolation valve on the drain system left in open position
after removal of temporary connections.
The initiating event is ‘‘Valve in wrong position after
manual operation during normal production’’. The error is
introduced and the release will occur during normal
production.
The release may be prevented by the barrier function
‘‘Detection of valve(s) in wrong position’’, which is carried
out by the barrier systems ‘‘System for self control of
work’’ and ‘‘System for 3rd party control of work’’.
However, if an area technician performs the manual
operation himself, there is seldom any 3rd party control
of work. The barrier block diagram for this scenario is
illustrated in Fig. 4.
4.2. Scenario 1b. Release due to mal-operation of temporary
hoses
This scenario includes releases due to mal-operation of
temporary hoses in the process plant. Examples compriseValve in wrong position 
after manual operation
"Safe state"
Failure revealed 
and corrected
3rd party control
of work
Release
Self control of work
Barrier functions
Detection of valve(s) in
wrong positon
End eventInitiating event
Fig. 4. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 1a.
Erroneous choice or 
hook up of
temporary hose
Self control of work
3rd party control
of work
Barrier fu
Detection of erroneous 
choice of hose
Initiating event
Fig. 5. Barrier block diaguse of wrong type of hoses (e.g., wrong pressure rating) and
error during hook-up of the hoses.
The initiating event is ‘‘Erroneous choice or hook-up of
temporary hose’’. The operational mode when error is
introduced is normal production or maintenance, and the
operational mode at time of release is normal production
or maintenance.
The following barrier functions may prevent releases;
‘‘Detection of erroneous choice of hose’’ or ‘‘Detection of
erroneous hook-up’’. The former function may be fulﬁlled
by a ‘‘System for self control of work’’ and ‘‘System for 3rd
party control of work’’, while the latter may be fulﬁlled by
‘‘System for purging and pressure testing of hoses’’. The
barrier block diagram for this scenario is shown in Fig. 5.4.3. Scenario 1c. Release due to lack of water in water locks
in the drain system
This scenario includes releases due to lack of water in
water locks in the drain system resulting in hydrocarbons
escaping through the waterlock system. The initiating event
is ‘‘Water level in water locks below critical level’’. Such
releases may occur during normal production.
The release may be prevented by the barrier function
‘‘Reﬁlling of water when level is below critical level’’ that
may be realized by the ‘‘System for preventive maintenance
(PM)’’ including inspection of water level and reﬁlling if
necessary (see Fig. 6).4.4. Scenario 2a. Release due to incorrect fitting of flanges
or bolts during maintenance
This scenario includes releases due to tightening with too
low or too high tension, misalignment of ﬂange faces,
damaged bolts, etc. The initiating event is ‘‘Incorrect ﬁtting
of ﬂanges or bolts during maintenance’’, and the error is
introduced during maintenance. The release will occur
during start-up after maintenance or later during normal
production."Safe state"
Failure revealed 
and corrected
Release
Purging and press-
ure testing of hoses
nctions End event
Detection of erroneous 
hook-up
ram for Scenario 1b.
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‘‘Detection of incorrect ﬁtting of ﬂanges or bolts during
maintenance’’ or ‘‘Detection of release prior to normal
production’’ is fulﬁlled. The former function may be
carried out by ‘‘System for self control of work’’ and
‘‘System for 3rd party control of work’’. The latter function
may be carried out by ‘‘System for leak tests’’ prior to or
during start-up (after assembling the system), but will not
reveal all kinds of errors that may lead to a release later
during normal production (see Fig. 7).4.5. Scenario 2b. Release due to valve(s) in incorrect
position after maintenance
This scenario may occur due to different types of valves
in wrong position, e.g., three way valves, block valves,
isolation valves towards the ﬂare system, and valves to the
drain system. Such errors may cause an immediate release
during start-up, or it may alternatively cause a release when
blowdown is initiated (due to inadvertent connection
towards other system).
The initiating event is ‘‘Valve(s) in wrong position after
maintenance’’. The error is introduced during mainte-
nance. The release will occur during start-up after
maintenance, later during normal production, or during
shutdown (e.g., during blowdown).
The release may be prevented if the following barrier
functions are fulﬁlled; ‘‘Detection of valve(s) in wrong
position’’ or ‘‘Detection of release prior to normal"Safe state"
Failure revealed 
and corrected
Release
Water level in water
locks below critical level
Preventive
maintenance
Refilling of water
when level is below
critical level
Barrier functions End eventInitiating event
Fig. 6. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 1c.
Incorrect fitting of flanges or
bolts during maintenance
3rd party control
of work
Self control of
work
Barr
Detection of incorrec
fitting of flanges or bo
Initiating event
Fig. 7. Barrier block diagproduction’’. The former barrier function may be carried
out by ‘‘System for self control of work’’ (e.g., use of
checklist or ‘‘valve position overview’’) and ‘‘System for
3rd party control of work’’, while the latter function may
be fulﬁlled by ‘‘System for leak tests prior to start of
normal production’’. The barrier block diagram for
Scenario 2b corresponds to Fig. 7. The barrier systems
are similar to the barrier systems in Fig. 7, but the initiating
event and the description of barrier functions are different.
4.6. Scenario 2c. Release due to erroneous choice or
installation of sealing device
This category of releases include releases caused by
installation of wrong type of O-ring, selection and
installation of wrong type of gaskets (e.g., incorrect
material properties), erroneous installation of sealing
device, installation of defect sealing devices/gasket, missing
gasket/seals in ﬂanges, etc.
The initiating event is ‘‘Erroneous choice or installation
of sealing device’’. The error is introduced during main-
tenance, and the release occurs during start-up after
maintenance, during normal production, or during shut-
down (for example, due to low temperatures).
The release may be prevented if the following barrier
functions are fulﬁlled; ‘‘Detection of erroneous choice or
installation of sealing device’’ or ‘‘Detection of release
prior to normal production’’. ‘‘System for self-control of
work’’ and ‘‘System for 3rd party control of work’’ may
fulﬁl the ﬁrst function, while ‘‘System for leak test prior to
start-up of normal production’’ may fulﬁl the second
function. The barrier block diagram for Scenario 2c
corresponds to Fig. 7, however, the initiating event and
barrier functions are different.
4.7. Scenario 3a. Release due to error prior to or during
disassembling of hydrocarbon system
Releases caused by errors introduced prior to or during
disassembling of hydrocarbon system are related to failures
of the system for isolation, depressurization, draining,"Safe state"
Failure revealed 
and detected
Leak test
Release
ier functions
t 
lts
End event
Detection of release prior
to normal production
ram for Scenario 2a.
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Fig. 8. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 3a.
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to the disassembling (e.g., faulty isolation plans) or during
implementation of the isolation plan while executing
the maintenance task (e.g., insufﬁcient venting, draining,
or ﬂushing, or erroneous position of isolation valve or
blinding).
The initiating event is deﬁned as ‘‘Maintenance opera-
tions requiring disassembling of hydrocarbon system (for a
given area on the installation)’’. The release will occur
during disassembling or later during the maintenance
operation.
Development of an isolation plan (adequate isolation,
depressurization, draining, blinding, and purging) for safe
disassembling is an important part of the maintenance
planning process, and execution of the work according to a
faulty plan may cause a release. The barrier function
‘‘Detection of errors in isolation plan’’ may prevent
releases due to errors in the isolation plan and may be
fulﬁlled by ‘‘System for Work Permit (WP)’’3 and ‘‘System
for veriﬁcation of isolation plan by area technicians prior
to execution’’.
Isolation, draining, and blinding of the segment before
disassembling are vital elements of the maintenance
process. Errors during this step may be revealed by the
barrier function ‘‘Veriﬁcation of emptied segment (prior to
disassembling)’’. If the isolation plan is correct, this
function may be realized by the ‘‘System for veriﬁcation
of work according to plan’’, and ‘‘System for veriﬁcation of
emptied system’’. If the isolation plan is faulty, only the
latter system, ‘‘System for veriﬁcation of emptied system’’,
is relevant. The barrier block diagram for Scenario 3a is
shown in Fig. 8.3See Botnevik, Berge, and Sklet (2004) for a description of a
standardized procedure for work permits on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf.4.8. Scenario 3b. Release due to failure of the isolation
system during maintenance
These releases are caused by failures that occur after the
system of isolation is established. The isolation is originally
adequate, but due to a human or a technical failure, the
control system of isolation or of locked valves fails.
Examples are failures of the blinding (e.g., due to excessive
internal pressure), internal leakage through valves or
blindings, erroneous opening of a blinding, and erroneous
activation of isolation valves. In this paper, the scenario
description is limited to human or operational errors.
The initiating event is deﬁned as ‘‘Attempt to open
isolation valve or blinding during maintenance (undesir-
able activation)’’. The error is introduced during main-
tenance, and the release will also take place during the
maintenance while systems or components are taken out of
operation and isolated from the rest of the (pressurized)
process system.
The release may be prevented if the barrier function
‘‘Prevention of undesired activation of valve/blinding’’ is
fulﬁlled by the barrier systems ‘‘System for disconnection
of actuator for automatic operated valves’’, ‘‘System for
locking of actuator for manual operated valves (in order
to prevent manual operations)’’, and ‘‘System for labelling
of valves (in order to prevent manual operations)’’ (see
Fig. 9).4.9. Scenario 4a. Release due to degradation of valve sealing
Releases due to mechanical or material degradation of
valve sealing typically include loss of ﬂexibility of valve
stufﬁng box, degradation of properties of O-rings, etc. The
initiating event is ‘‘Degradation of valve sealing beyond
critical limit’’. The operational mode when error is
introduced is usually during normal production. The
release will usually happen during normal production.
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Fig. 9. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 3b.
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Fig. 10. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 4a.
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functions are fulﬁlled; ‘‘Maintain the valve sealing to
prevent degradation’’ or ‘‘Detect diffuse or minor release’’.
The following barrier systems may carry out the functions
respectively; ‘‘System for PM of equipment’’ and ‘‘System
for area based leak search’’. Fig. 10 shows the barrier block
diagram.4.10. Scenario 4b. Release due to degradation of flange
gasket
Releases due to degradation of ﬂange gasket properties
typically include releases caused by degradation of material
properties of gaskets/seals (e.g., loss of ﬂexibility). The
initiating event is ‘‘Degradation of ﬂange gasket beyond
critical limit’’, and the degradation will happen during
normal production. The operational mode at time of
release is normal production.
The release may be prevented by the barrier functions;
‘‘Maintenance of ﬂange gasket to prevent degradation’’ or
‘‘Detection of diffuse or minor release. The functions may
be carried out by the barrier systems ‘‘System for PM’’ and
‘‘System for area based leak search’’, respectively.
The barrier block diagram for this scenario correspondsto Fig. 10 with different descriptions of the initiating event
and the barrier functions.
4.11. Scenario 4c. Release due to loss of bolt tensioning
Releases due to loss of bolt tensioning include releases
from ﬂanges, valves, instrument couplings, etc., due to loss
of bolt tensioning after some time. The bolt tensioning was
originally adequate, so the release will occur after some
time (not during start-up or shortly after start-up of
production).
The initiating event for this scenario is ‘‘Loss of bolt
tensioning’’. The operational mode when the failure is
introduced and time of release are normal production.
The barrier functions ‘‘Follow-up of bolt tensioning to
prevent release’’ and ‘‘Detection of diffuse or minor
release’’ are deﬁned for this scenario. The former function
may be fulﬁlled by ‘‘System for PM (inspection and follow-
up of tensioning)’’, while the latter function may be fulﬁlled
by ‘‘System for area based leak search’’. The barrier block
diagram for Scenario 4c corresponds to Fig. 10 with
different descriptions of the initiating event and the barrier
functions.
4.12. Scenario 4d. Release due to degradation of welded pipe
This category of releases includes leaks from welds due
to degradation. Examples are releases from welded
instrument ﬁttings or valves, or from welds in pipe bends
caused for example by fatigue.
The initiating event is ‘‘Degradation of weld beyond
critical limit’’. The operational mode when failure is
introduced is normal production. The release will occur
during normal production, during start-up, or during shut
down.
The release may be prevented if the following safety
functions are fulﬁlled; ‘‘Detection of weld degradation’’ or
‘‘Detection of diffuse or minor hydrocarbon release’’. The
former function may be realized by ‘‘System for weld
inspection’’, while the latter one may be realized by
‘‘System for area based leak search’’. The barrier block
diagram for Scenario 4d corresponds to Fig. 10 with
different descriptions of the initiating event and the barrier
functions.
4.13. Scenario 4e. Release due to internal corrosion
This scenario includes releases caused by different types
of internal corrosion like local CO2-corrosion, uniform
CO2-corrosion, and microbial corrosion (MIC). The
initiating event for this scenario is ‘‘Internal corrosion
beyond critical limit’’. The corrosion works during normal
production, and the release will occur during normal
production or during process disturbances (resulting in,
e.g., increased pressure).
The release may be prevented by the barrier functions
‘‘Detection of internal corrosion to prevent release’’ or
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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following barrier systems may carry out these functions;
‘‘System for inspection’’ and ‘‘System for condition
monitoring of equipment’’ to detect potential corrosion,
and ‘‘System for area based leak search’’ to detect diffuse
or minor releases (see Fig. 11).4.14. Scenario 4f. Release due to external corrosion
Releases due to external corrosion are typically caused
by corrosion of carbon steel under insulation and corrosion
of carbon steel in marine atmosphere. The initiating event
is ‘‘External corrosion beyond critical limit’’. The opera-
tional mode when failure is introduced and time of release
are normal production. The release may be prevented if
the barrier functions ‘‘Detection of external corrosion’’ or
‘‘Detection of diffuse or minor hydrocarbon release’’ are
fulﬁlled. The ‘‘System/program for inspection’’ and ‘‘Sys-
tem for area based leak search’’ may realize these
functions. Fig. 12 illustrates the barrier block diagram.4.15. Scenario 4g. Release due to erosion
Release due to erosion is typically caused by production
of sand from the reservoir. The initiating event is ‘‘Erosion
beyond critical limit’’, and the operational mode whenInternal corrosion 
beyond critical limit
"Safe state"
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revealed
Inspection
Release
Condition
monitoring
Area based 
leak search
"Safe state"
Minor release 
revealed
Significant
Minor
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Detection of 
corrosion
End eventInitiating event
Detect diffuse or
minor release
Fig. 11. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 4e.
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Fig. 12. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 4f.failure is introduced and time of release is normal
production.
The release may be prevented by the barrier functions
‘‘Detection of erosion’’ or ‘‘Detection of diffuse hydro-
carbon release’’. The former function may be carried out
by ‘‘System/program for inspection’’ and ‘‘System for
condition monitoring of equipment’’, while the latter
function may be carried out by ‘‘System for area based
leak search’’. The barrier block diagram for this scenario
corresponds to Fig. 12 with different descriptions of the
initiating event and the barrier functions.4.16. Scenario 5a. Release due to overpressure
Releases due to overpressure describe the situations
where the internal pressure increase to such a high level
that stresses induced on the containment overcome its
strength. Overpressure may be created by increased
internal pressure or pressure shock.
The initiating event for this scenario is deﬁned as
‘‘Pressure above critical limit’’. The operational mode
when failure is introduced is during start-up, shutdown, or
normal production. The operational mode at time of
release is normal production when process disturbances
occur, during start up, or during shutdown where e.g.,
hydrate formation can cause blockage and subsequent
possibilities for overpressure.
The following barrier functions may prevent releases due
to overpressure; ‘‘Close inﬂow (stop additional supply of
hydrocarbons)’’, ‘‘Controlled hydrocarbon releases (pres-
sure relief)’’, or ‘‘Residual strength in the containment’’.
According to ISO:10418 (2003) the following barrier
systems may fulﬁl these functions; ‘‘System for primary
protection from overpressure’’ and ‘‘System for secondary
protection from overpressure’’. The former system may be
provided by a pressure safety high (PSH) protection system
to shut off inﬂow (primary protection for atmospheric
pressure components should be provided by an adequate
vent system), while the latter system may be provided by a
pressure safety valve (PSV). Secondary protection for
atmospheric pressure components should be provided by a
second vent. Depending on the pressure conditions and the
design, the residual strength of the steel may also prevent
release. Whether or not the residual strength of the steel is
sufﬁcient to prevent overpressure will depend on the
maximum obtainable pressure in the segment (i.e., max-
imum shut in pressure). Fig. 13 illustrates the barrier block
diagram for this scenario.4.17. Scenario 5b. Release due to overflow/overfilling
Release due to overﬂow/overﬁlling may occur in tanks
having some kind of connection either directly to the
atmosphere, or via another system to atmosphere (e.g.,
closed drain). Typical examples are diesel tanks, oil storage
tanks, methanol tanks, and process vessels.
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critical level’’. The operational mode when the deviation is
introduced is normal production, start-up, or shutdown.
The release will occur during normal production, start up,
or shutdown.
The release may be prevented if the following barrier
functions are fulﬁlled; ‘‘Shut off inﬂow’’ and ‘‘Release/
draining’’ (see Fig. 14). According to ISO:10418, these
functions may be realized by the following systems;
‘‘System for primary protection from liquid overﬂow’’
provided by a level safety high (LSH) sensor to shut off
inﬂow into the component, and ‘‘System for secondary
protection from liquid overﬂow to the atmosphere’’
provided by the emergency support system.Falling object or
collision
"Safe state"
Damage avoided
Passive protection 
of equipment
Release
Protection of
equipment
Fig. 15. Barrier block diagram for Scenario 6.4.18. Scenario 6. Release due to impact from falling objects
or bumping/collision
Release due to impact from falling objects may be caused
by unfastened objects on upper level decks or falling loads
from crane activities. Release due to impact from bumping/
collision may occur due to maintenance activities in a
module including transport of tools and spare parts.
Especially instrument ﬁttings may be vulnerable for
damage that may cause release.
The initiating event for this scenario is ‘‘Falling object or
collision/bumping’’. This scenario may occur during
normal production, maintenance, or modiﬁcations.
The barrier function that may prevent release due
external impact is protection of equipment that may be
realized by passive protection of equipment (permanent or
temporary). The barrier block diagram is shown in Fig. 15.5. Discussion
Six criteria that the scenarios should fulﬁl were speciﬁed
in Section 2. The ﬁrst criterion is related to ‘‘causes’’ of
hydrocarbon releases. The initiating events of the scenarios
are divided into ﬁve main categories of errors or failures:
(1) Human and operational errors, (2) Technical failures,(3) Process upsets, (4) External events or loads, and (5)
Latent failures from design. By comparing the scenarios
with published release statistics both from the Norwegian
and British sector of the North Sea (DNV and RF, 2002;
Glittum, 2001a, b; HSE, 2001, 2002; PSA, 2005), it is seen
that the main release causes are reﬂected by the set of
scenarios. The focus on the scenarios covering human and
operational errors is considered to be a step forward
compared to previous projects (e.g., the I-RISK project as
described by Papazoglou et al., 2003).
The scenarios should include and illustrate important
safety barriers that inﬂuence the release frequency. Each of
the presented scenarios includes at least one barrier
function realized by one or more barrier systems that are
illustrated in the barrier block diagrams. Several types of
barrier systems are described, from passive physical
barriers, via human/operational barriers carried out by
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systems. Collectively, the scenarios give an overview of the
most important safety barriers introduced to prevent
hydrocarbon releases. However, additional safety barriers
may be introduced to prevent the occurrence of the
initiating events in the scenarios, and these safety barriers
are not discussed in this paper. Another important aspect is
the underlying assumption in several scenarios that
corrective actions are implemented when deviations are
revealed.
The third criterion states that the scenarios should reﬂect
different activities, phases, and conditions on the platform.
Failures introduced during the operational phase (i.e.,
normal production, maintenance (incl. inspection), shut-
down and start-up of the process, and modiﬁcations) are
included in this study. Safety barriers related to these
phases are identiﬁed and described. Safety barriers
introduced to prevent releases due to latent failures
introduced during design have not been analysed as
part of this study. The focus of this paper has been releases
from the process plant, therefore, drilling and well
intervention activities are not covered in the paper (see
Sklet, Steiro, & Tjelta (2005) for a discussion of safety
barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases during
wireline operations).
Criterion four implies that the scenarios should facilitate
installation speciﬁc considerations to be performed in a
‘‘simple’’ and not too time-consuming manner. The
scenarios are as far as possible made generic, thus some
safety barriers may not exist on some platforms. All
installation speciﬁc conditions are not necessarily allowed
for, but the scenarios may constitute the basis for platform
speciﬁc adjustments and perhaps more detailed platform
speciﬁc analyses.
The next criterion is related to whether or not the set of
scenarios is comprehensive and representative (related to
completeness). The complexity of oil and gas production
platforms implies that there are a very high number of
conditions and events that may cause hydrocarbon
releases. The presented scenarios do not cover absolutely
all these causes. Nevertheless, the presented set of scenarios
is considered to constitute a comprehensive and represen-
tative set of release scenarios. The initiating events cover
the most frequent ‘‘causes’’ of hydrocarbon releases, and
the scenarios include the most important barrier functions
and barrier systems introduced to prevent releases due to
this ‘‘causes’’. It is difﬁcult to quantify the completeness,
but 36 out of the 40 analysed hydrocarbon release incidents
ﬁtted into one of the scenario descriptions. There may be
need to develop more scenarios in the future in order to
establish an even more complete set of scenarios. In some
cases, there may be need to develop platform speciﬁc
scenarios in order to allow for platform speciﬁc conditions
not included in these generic scenarios. To evaluate the
completeness for speciﬁc platforms, the generic scenarios
should be compared to hazard identiﬁcations (e.g., Hazop/
Hazid) carried out for each speciﬁc platform.The last criterion states that the scenarios should be
suitable for quantiﬁcation (both the frequency of initiating
events and the probability of failure of safety barriers).
Barrier block diagrams are similar to event trees, and
quantiﬁcation of the scenarios may be carried out as for
event trees. The initiating events are deﬁned in such a way
that quantiﬁcation is possible. The quantiﬁcation of the
initiating events should preferably be based on platform
speciﬁc data, but if not such data are obtainable, generic
data may be applied. Platform speciﬁc analysis of the safety
barriers must be carried out in order to analyse the
performance of the safety barriers.
Safety barriers will not always function as planned or
designed. In-depth analysis of safety barrier performance
should be carried out to analyse whether or not the safety
barriers are capable to prevent, control, or mitigate
hydrocarbon releases. It is recommended to address the
following attributes to characterize the performance of
safety barriers; (a) functionality/effectiveness, (b) reliabil-
ity/availability, (c) response time, (d) robustness, and
(e) triggering event or condition (see Sklet (2005) for
further details). For some types of barriers, not all the
attributes are relevant or necessary in order to describe the
barrier performance. These analyses may in some cases be
extensive and resource demanding in order to allow for
assessment of platform speciﬁc conditions.
A method for qualitative and quantitative risk analysis
of platform speciﬁc hydrocarbon release frequencies (called
BORA-Release) is described in Aven, Sklet, and Vinnem
(2005), and results from application of BORA-Release are
presented in Sklet, Vinnem, and Aven (2005). A full
quantitative risk analysis of the hydrocarbon release
frequency by use of BORA-Release enables use of a risk-
based approach for identiﬁcation of the scenarios that are
the major contributors to the total release frequency for a
system. BORA-Release may also be used to analyse the
effect on the hydrocarbon release frequency of risk
reduction measures. Other approaches may also be used
to select release scenarios for detailed analyses, ranging
from purely qualitative assessments (expert judgement), to
quantitative assessment of the damage potential and the
likelihood of occurrence (e.g., the Maximum Credible
Accident Analysis method; Khan & Abbasi, 2002).
Layer or protection analysis (LOPA) is a semi-quanti-
tative tool for analysing and assessing risk applied in the
chemical process industry (CCPS, 2001). All the safety
barriers presented in the barrier block diagrams in
Section 4 may be deﬁned as safeguards according to the
LOPA terminology. However, not all the safety barriers
may be deﬁned as independent protection layers. The
release scenarios in Section 4 may be used as basis for
detailed analysis of causal factors for the initiating event
‘‘loss of containment’’ applied in LOPA.
Several safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocar-
bon releases during the operational phase of the total life-
cycle of oil and production platforms are presented in this
paper. These barriers are not a substitute for use of
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possible scenarios (e.g., see CCPS, 1996), but rather a
supplement to this important design principle.6. Conclusions and further research
This paper presents a set of scenarios that may lead to
hydrocarbon release. Each release scenario is described in
terms of an initiating event (i.e., a ‘‘deviation’’) reﬂecting
causal factors, the barrier functions introduced to prevent
the initiating event from developing into a release, and how
the barrier functions are realized in terms of barrier
systems. The development of the release scenarios has
generated new knowledge about causal factors of hydro-
carbon release and about safety barriers introduced to
prevent hydrocarbon release.
The release scenarios may be used to identify and
illustrate barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon
release and constitute the basis for analysis of the barrier
performance. No assessment of the importance of the
different scenarios with respect to the total risk of
hydrocarbon releases is presented in this paper. A
quantitative analysis of the contribution to the total release
frequency from the different scenarios may be carried out
in order to identify the most important scenarios for
different systems. The quantitative analyses may also be
used to determine the platform speciﬁc hydrocarbon
release frequencies as input to future QRA. By including
technical, operational, human, and organizational risk
inﬂuencing factors in the analysis of barrier performance
we are able to study the effect of these factors on the
platform speciﬁc hydrocarbon release frequency.
Although qualitative analysis of the release scenarios is
useful in itself, the objective is to be able to perform
detailed quantitative analysis of the scenarios. To fulﬁl this
objective, there is a need for further research focusing on
several problem areas: (a) evaluation of the scenarios in
order to assess whether or not more safety barriers
introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases should be
included in the release scenarios, (b) assessment of whether
or not the presented set of release scenarios is sufﬁciently
complete and assess if there is need for development of
additional scenarios, (c) analysis of the frequency of the
initiating events and the relative distribution of the
different scenarios, and (d) development of a method for
analysis of the effect of technical, operational, human, and
organizational risk inﬂuencing factors on the performance
of safety barriers. This last topic is studied in the BORA
project, and a method for qualitative and quantitative
analysis of the scenarios is presented in Aven et al. (2005).
In the future, the release scenarios may constitute the
basis for analyses of the effect on the total risk of
hydrocarbon releases of the identiﬁed safety barriers, and
the effect of risk reducing measures (or risk increasing
changes) inﬂuencing the frequency of the initiating event or
the performance of safety barriers.Acknowledgements
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Abstract 
Investigations of major accidents show that technical, human, operational, as well as 
organisational factors influence the accident sequences. In spite of these facts, 
quantitative risk analyses of offshore oil and gas production platforms have focused 
on technical safety systems. This paper presents a method (called BORA-Release) 
for qualitative and quantitative risk analysis of the platform specific hydrocarbon 
release frequency. By using BORA-Release it is possible to analyse the effect of 
safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, and how platform 
specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organisational risk 
influencing factors influence the barrier performance. BORA-Release comprises the 
following main steps; 1) Development of a basic risk model including release 
scenarios, 2) Modelling the performance of safety barriers, 3) Assignment of generic 
data and risk quantification based on these data, 4) Development of risk influence 
diagrams, 5) Scoring of risk influencing factors, 6) Weighting of risk influencing 
factors, 7) Adjustment of generic input data, and 8) Recalculation of the risk in order 
to determine the platform specific risk related to hydrocarbon release. The various 
steps in BORA-Release are presented and discussed. Part II of the paper presents 
results from a case study where BORA-Release is applied. 
 
Keywords: Risk analysis, hydrocarbon release, loss of containment, safety barrier, 
organisational factors.  
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1 Introduction 
In-depth investigations of major accidents, like the process accidents at Longford [1] 
and Piper Alpha [2], the loss of the space shuttles Challenger [3] and Colombia [4], 
the high-speed craft Sleiper accident [5], the railway accidents at Ladbroke Grove 
[6] and Åsta [5], and several major accidents in Norway the last 20 years [7] show 
that both technical, human, operational, as well as organisational factors influence 
the accident sequences. In spite of these findings, the main focus in quantitative risk 
analyses (QRA) is on technical safety systems. As regards offshore QRA, one of the 
conclusions drawn by Vinnem et al [8] is that a more detailed analysis of all aspects 
of safety barriers is required.  
 
Several models and methods for incorporating organisational factors in QRA or 
probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) have been proposed. Among these are Manager 
[9], MACHINE (Model of Accident Causation using Hierarchical Influence 
NEtwork) [10], ISM (Integrated Safety Method) [11], WPAM (The Work Process 
Analysis Model) [12, 13], I-RISK (Integrated Risk) [14-16], the ω-factor model 
[17], SAM (System Action Management) [18, 19], ORIM (Organisational Risk 
Influence Model) [20, 21], and ARAMIS [22]. These models/methods have been 
developed and described in the literature the last 15 years. However, none of them 
are so far used as an integrated part of offshore QRA. 
 
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) gives several requirements to risk 
analysis and safety barriers in their regulations [23]: QRA shall be carried out to 
identify contributors to major accident risk and provide a balanced and 
comprehensive picture of the risk. The operator, or the one responsible for the 
operation of a facility, shall stipulate the strategies and principles on which the 
design, use, and maintenance of safety barriers shall be based, so that the barrier 
function is ensured throughout the lifetime of the facility. It shall be known which 
safety barriers that have been established, which function they are intended to fulfil, 
and what performance requirements have been defined with respect to the technical, 
operational or organisational elements that are necessary for the individual barrier to 
be effective. 
 
In spite of these requirements, the QRA of offshore platforms are still limited to 
analysis of consequence reducing barriers with no, or limited analysis of barriers 
introduced to reduce the probability of hydrocarbon release. Therefore, a method 
that may be applied to analyse safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon 
releases is required. The method ought to be used for qualitative and quantitative 
analyses of the effect on the barrier performance, and thus the risk, of plant specific 
conditions of technical, human, operational, as well as organisational risk 
Barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release); 
Part I Method description 
3 
influencing factors (RIFs). With this background, the BORA-project (Barrier and 
Operational Risk Analysis) was initiated in order to perform a detailed and 
quantitative modelling of barrier performance, including barriers to prevent the 
occurrence of initiating events (e.g., hydrocarbon release), as well as barriers to 
reduce the consequences [24].  
 
The main objective of this paper is to present and discuss a new method for 
qualitative and quantitative analyses of the platform specific hydrocarbon release 
frequency, called BORA-Release. BORA-Release makes it possible to analyse the 
effect on the hydrocarbon release frequency of safety barriers introduced to prevent 
release, and how platform specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and 
organisational RIFs influence the barrier performance. The paper is limited to 
analysis of hydrocarbon release (or loss of containment). However, the principles in 
BORA-Release are relevant for analysis of the consequence barriers as well.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the process for development 
of the method. Section 3 describes BORA-Release. Section 4 discusses critical 
issues of the method. The discussion is divided in three parts; a discussion of the 
different steps in BORA-Release, a discussion of the extent of fulfilment of a set of 
criteria, and a discussion of application areas. Some conclusions and ideas for 
further work are presented in section 5. Part II presents some results from a case 
study where BORA-Release is applied.  
 
2 Research approach 
The research process for development of BORA-Release consists of the following 
main steps: 
 
1. Development of a set of criteria the method should fulfil  
2. Literature review  
3. Selection of modelling approach  
4. Development of a preliminary (draft) version of the method  
5. Application of the method in case studies  
6. Revision of the method  
 
Several criteria the BORA-Release should fulfil were developed. The criteria were 
developed as a result of discussions of the purpose of the analysis method. The aim 
was to develop a method that: 
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1. Facilitates identification and illustration of safety barriers introduced to 
prevent hydrocarbon releases  
2. Contributes to an understanding of which factors that influence the 
performance of the safety barriers, including technical, human, operational, 
as well as organisational factors 
3. Reflects different causes of hydrocarbon releases 
4. Is suitable for quantification of the frequency of initiating events and the 
performance of the safety barriers 
5. Allows use of available input data as far as possible, or allows collection of 
input data in not a too time consuming manner 
6. Allows consideration of different activities, phases, and conditions  
7. Enables identification of common causes and dependencies 
8. Is practically applicable regarding use of resources 
9. Provides basis for “re-use” of the generic model in such a way that 
installation specific considerations may be performed in a simple and not 
too time-consuming manner  
 
To what extent BORA-Release fulfils these criteria are discussed in subsection 4.2. 
 
A literature review was carried out in order to identify existing methods 
incorporating the effect of organisational factors in QRA. Several models and 
methods for quantification of the influence of organisational factors on the total risk 
are described in the literature. Among these are Manager [9], MACHINE) (Model of 
Accident Causation using Hierarchical Influence NEtwork) [10], ISM (Integrated 
Safety Model) [11], the ω-factor model [17], WPAM (The Work Process Analysis 
Model) [12, 13], SAM (System Action Management) [18, 19], I-RISK (Integrated 
Risk) [14-16], ORIM (Organisational Risk Influence Model) [20, 21], and ARAMIS 
[22]. 
 
These models and methods were reviewed and compared in view of criteria 1 – 9 
above. The review was partly based in the framework for evaluation of 
models/methods for this type of risk analyses introduced by Øien [25]. The 
conclusion was that none of the models/methods were directly applicable for 
analysis of platform specific release frequencies allowing for analysis of the effect 
of safety barriers introduced to prevent release, and analysis of how platform 
specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organisational RIFs 
influence the barrier performance. However, the comparison resulted in knowledge 
about the existing methods used as basis for development of BORA-Release.  
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An assessment of the suitability of some existing risk analysis methods was carried 
out in order to select an approach for analyses of the release scenarios. The 
following methods were assessed; a) the current practice in QRA, b) fault tree 
analysis, c) barrier block diagram (corresponds to event tree analysis), and d) an 
overall influence diagram. The assessment was based on a discussion of advantages 
and disadvantages of the different methods and an attempt to “score” the different 
modelling techniques according to fulfilment of the former described criteria. The 
assessment is shown in Table 1 where a score of 1 indicates “not suitable”, and a 
score of 5 indicates “very suitable”.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of various modelling approaches. 
No. Criteria Current 
QRA 
Fault 
tree 
Barrier 
block 
diagram 
Overall 
Influence 
diagram 
1 Facilitate identification and illustration of safety 
barriers 
1 3 5 2 
2 Contribute to an understanding of which factors 
that influence the performance of the barrier 
functions 
1 3 4 3 
3 Reflect different causes of hydrocarbon release 1 4 4 4 
4 Be suitable for quantification of the frequency of 
initiating events and the performance of safety 
barriers 
5 3 3 2 
5 Allow use of relevant data  5 3 3 2 
6 Allow consideration of  different activities, 
phases, and conditions 
2 3 4 2 
7 Enable identification of common causes and 
dependencies 
1 4 5 5 
8 Be practically applicable regarding use of 
resources 
5 2 3 2 
9 Provides “re-use” of the generic model 1 3 5 4 
 Total score of modelling approach 22 28 36 26 
 
Based on this suitability assessment and the literature review, it was concluded to 
apply barrier block diagrams to model the hydrocarbon release scenarios and fault 
tree analyses and/or risk influence diagrams to model the performance of different 
barrier functions (“blocks” in the barrier block diagram). 
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Next, a preliminary version of BORA-Release was developed. This version was 
discussed in the BORA project group and led to some modifications. Further, the 
method was reviewed by the steering committee. A case study carried out in order to 
test BORA-Release in practice is described in part II of this paper [26]. The 
experience from the case study led to some adjustments of the method and this paper 
presents the revised version. 
 
3 Description of BORA-Release  
BORA-Release consists of the following main steps: 
 
1) Development of a basic risk model including hydrocarbon release scenarios 
and safety barriers 
2) Modelling the performance of safety barriers  
3) Assignment of generic input data and risk quantification based on these data 
4) Development of risk influence diagrams 
5) Scoring of risk influencing factors (RIFs) 
6) Weighting of risk influencing factors  
7) Adjustment of generic input data  
8) Recalculation of the risk in order to determine the platform specific risk 
 
3.1 Development of a basic risk model 
The first step is to develop a basic risk model that covers a representative set of 
hydrocarbon release scenarios. The purpose is to identify, illustrate, and describe the 
scenarios that may lead to hydrocarbon release on a platform. The basic risk model 
forms the basis for the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the risk of 
hydrocarbon release and the safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon 
release. A representative set of 20 hydrocarbon release scenarios has been developed 
and described [27]. Examples are “Release due to mal-operation of valve(s) during 
manual operations”, “Release due to incorrect fitting of flanges or bolts during 
maintenance”, and “Release due to internal corrosion”.  
 
The basic risk model is illustrated by barrier block diagrams as shown in Figure 1. 
A barrier block diagram consists of an initiating event, arrows that show the event 
sequence, barrier functions realized by barrier systems, and possible outcomes. A 
horizontal arrow indicates that a barrier system fulfils its function, whereas an arrow 
downwards indicates failure to fulfil the function. In our case, the undesired event is 
hydrocarbon release (loss of containment). A barrier block diagram corresponds to 
an event tree and can be used as a basis for quantitative analysis. 
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Figure 1. Barrier block diagram – general principles. 
 
An initiating event for a release scenario is the first significant deviation from a 
normal situation that under given circumstances may cause a hydrocarbon 
release (loss of containment). A “normal situation” is a state where the process 
functions as normal according to design specifications without significant 
process upsets or direct interventions into the processing plant. 
 
A barrier function is defined as a function planned to prevent, control or mitigate 
undesired events or accidents [28]. A barrier system is a system that has been 
designed and implemented to perform one or more barrier functions. A barrier 
system may consist of different types of system elements, for example, technical 
elements (hardware, software), operational activities executed by humans, or a 
combination thereof. In some cases, there may be several barrier systems that carry 
out one barrier function. 
 
Hydrocarbon release in this context is defined as gas or oil leaks (incl. condensate) 
from the process flow, well flow or flexible risers with a release rate greater than 0,1 
kg/s. Smaller leaks are called minor release or diffuse discharges.  
 
3.2 Modelling the performance of safety barriers 
The next step is to model the performance of safety barriers. The purpose of this 
modelling is to analyse the plant specific barrier performance and allow for platform 
specific analysis of the conditions of human, operational, organisational, and 
technical factors. The safety barriers are described as separate “boxes” in the barrier 
block diagrams. According to Sklet [28], the following attributes regarding 
performance of safety barriers should be allowed for in the analysis; a) the triggering 
event or condition, b) functionality or effectiveness, c) response time, d) 
reliability/availability, and e) robustness. 
 
Fault tree analysis is used for analysis of barrier performance in BORA-Release. The 
“generic” top event in the fault trees in BORA-Release is “Failure of a barrier 
Initiating event 
(Deviation from 
normal situation)
Undesired event
”Safe state”
Barrier function 
realized by a 
barrier system Functions
Fails
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system to perform the specified barrier function”. This generic top event needs to be 
adapted to each specific barrier in the different scenarios. The results from the 
qualitative fault tree analyses are a list of basic events and an overview of (minimal) 
cut sets. Basic events are the bottom or “leaf” events of a fault tree (e.g., component 
failures and human errors), while a cut set is a set of basic events whose occurrence 
(at the same time) ensures that the top event occurs [29]. A cut set is said to be 
minimal if the set cannot be reduced without loosing its status as a cut set. 
 
3.3 Assignment of generic input data and risk quantification based on these 
data 
In step three, the purpose is to assign data to the initiating events and the basic 
events in the fault trees and carry out a quantitative analysis of the risk of 
hydrocarbon release by use of these data (quantitative analysis of fault trees and 
event trees). In practice, extensive use of industry average data are necessary to be 
able to carry out the quantitative analysis. Several databases are available presenting 
industry average data like OREDA [30] for equipment reliability data, and THERP 
[31] and CORE-DATA [32, 33] for human reliability data (see [34] for an overview 
of data sources). If possible, plant specific data should be applied. Plant specific data 
may be found in, e.g., incident databases, log data, and maintenance databases. In 
some cases, neither plant specific data nor generic data may be found, and it may be 
necessary to use expert judgment to assign probabilities. 
 
The quantification of the risk of hydrocarbon release is carried out by use of the 
assigned data. The results of this calculation may to some degree reflect plant 
specific conditions, however, most of the data are based on generic databases. 
 
3.4 Development of risk influence diagrams 
Step four is to develop risk influence diagrams. The purpose of the risk influence 
diagram is to incorporate the effect of the plant specific conditions as regards 
human, operational, organisational, and technical RIFs on the occurrences 
(frequencies) of the initiating events and the barrier performance. 
 
An example of a risk influence diagrams for the basic event “Failure to detect leak in 
the leak test” which is influenced by four RIFs is shown in Figure 2. If necessary, 
we have to develop one risk influence diagram for each basic event. The number of 
RIFs influencing each basic event is limited to six in order to reduce the total 
number of RIFs in the analysis. 
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Figure 2. Example on a risk influence diagram. 
 
Due to the complexity and variation in the types of events considered, a combined 
approach is preferred in order to identify RIFs; 1) a top-down approach where a 
generic list of RIFs is used as a basis, and 2) a bottom-up approach where the events 
to be assessed are chosen as a starting point. This implies that specific RIFs are 
identified for each initiating event and each basic event from the generic list of RIFs. 
The generic list may be supplemented by new RIFs when necessary. 
 
A framework for identification of RIFs has been developed. The framework consists 
of the following main groups of RIFs: 
 
• Characteristics of the personnel performing the tasks 
• Characteristics of the task being performed 
• Characteristics of the technical system 
• Administrative control (procedures and disposable work descriptions) 
• Organisational factors / operational philosophy 
 
A more detailed taxonomy of generic RIFs as shown in Table 2 has been developed. 
A brief explanation of each RIF is also included in the last column in the table. The 
proposed RIF framework and the taxonomy of generic RIFs are based on a review, 
comparison, and synthesis of several schemes of classification of human, technical, 
and organisational (MTO) factors:  
 
• Classification of causes in methods for accident investigations, like MTO-
analysis [35], and TRIPOD [36]. 
• Classification of organisational factors in models for analysis of the 
influence of organisational factors on risk, like I-RISK [14], and WPAM 
[12, 37]. 
• Classification of performing shaping factors (PSFs) in methods for human 
reliability analysis (HRA), like THERP [31], CREAM [38], SLIM-MAUD 
[39], and HRA databases CORE-DATA [40].  
 
Failure to detect leak in 
the leak test
Communication Procedures for leak testMethodology Competence
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A draft version of the taxonomy of RIFs was applied and discussed in the case study 
[26] and three specific RIFs were added to the list of RIFs in Table 2 based on 
discussions in a workshop with platform personnel. 
 
Table 2. Descriptions of risk influencing factors. 
RIF group RIF RIF description 
Competence Cover aspects related to the competence, experience, system 
knowledge and training of personnel 
Working load / stress Cover aspects related to the general working load on persons 
(the sum of all tasks and activities) 
Fatigue Cover aspects related to fatigue of the person, e.g., due to night 
shift and extensive use of overtime 
Personal 
characteristics 
Work environment Cover aspects related to the physical working environment like 
noise, light, vibration, use of chemical substances, etc. 
Methodology Cover aspects related to the methodology used to carry out a 
specific task. 
Task supervision Cover aspects related to supervision of specific tasks by a 
supervisor (e.g., by operations manager or mechanical 
supervisor)  
Task complexity Cover aspects related to the complexity of a specific task. 
Time pressure Cover aspects related to the time pressure in the planning, 
execution and finishing of a specific task 
Tools Cover aspects related to the availability and operability of 
necessary tools in order to perform a task. 
Task 
characteristics 
Spares Cover aspects related to the availability of the spares needed to 
perform the task. 
Equipment design Cover aspects related to the design of equipment and systems 
such as flange type (ANSI or compact), valve type, etc.  
Material properties Cover aspects related to properties of the selected material with 
respect to corrosion, erosion. fatigue, gasket material 
properties, etc. 
Process complexity Cover aspects related to the general complexity of the process 
plant as a whole 
HMI (Human 
Machine Interface)  
Cover aspects related to the human-machine interface such as 
ergonomic factors, labelling of equipment, position feedback 
from valves, alarms, etc. 
Maintainability/ 
accessibility 
Cover aspects related to the maintainability of equipment and 
systems like accessibility to valves and flanges, space to use 
necessary tools, etc.  
System feedback Cover aspects related to how errors and failures are 
instantaneously detected, due to alarm, failure to start, etc. 
Characteristics 
of the technical 
system 
Technical condition Cover aspects related to the condition of the technical system 
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RIF group RIF RIF description 
Procedures Cover aspects related to the quality and availability of 
permanent procedures and job/task descriptions 
Work permit Cover aspects related to the system for work permits, like 
application, review, approval, follow-up, and control 
Administrative 
control 
Disposable work 
descriptions 
Cover aspects related to the quality and availability of 
disposable work descriptions like Safe Job analysis (SJA) and 
isolation plans 
Programs  Cover aspects related to the extent and quality of programs for 
preventive maintenance (PM), condition monitoring (CM), 
inspection, 3rd party control of work, use of self 
control/checklists, etc. One important aspect is whether PM, 
CM, etc., is specified 
Work practice Cover aspects related to common practice during 
accomplishment of work activities. Factors like whether 
procedures and checklists are used and followed, whether 
shortcuts are accepted, focus on time before quality, etc. 
Supervision Cover aspects related to the supervision on the platform like 
follow-up of activities, follow-up of plans, deadlines, etc. 
Communication Cover aspects related to communication between different 
actors like area platform manager, supervisors, area technicians, 
maintenance contractors, CCR technicians, etc.  
Acceptance criteria Cover aspects related to the definitions of specific acceptance 
criteria related to for instance condition monitoring, inspection, 
etc. 
Simultaneous 
activities 
Cover aspects related to amount of simultaneous activities, 
either planned (like maintenances and modifications) and 
unplanned (like shutdown) 
Organisational 
factors / 
operational 
philosophy 
Management of 
changes 
Cover aspects related to changes and modifications 
 
3.5 Scoring of risk influencing factors 
We need to assess the status of the RIFs on the platform. The aim is to assign a score 
to each identified RIF in the risk influence diagrams. Each RIF is given a score from 
A to F, where score A corresponds to the best standard in the industry, score C 
corresponds to industry average, and score F corresponds to worst practice in the 
industry (see Table 3). The six-point scale is adapted from the TTS2 project [41].  
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Table 3. Generic scheme for scoring of RIFs. 
Score Explanation 
A Status corresponds to the best standard in industry 
B Status corresponds to a level better than industry average 
C Status corresponds to the industry average 
D Status corresponds to a level slightly worse than industry average 
E Status corresponds to a level considerably worse than industry average 
F Status corresponds to the worst practice in industry 
 
Several methods for assessing organisational factors are described in the literature 
(e.g., see [37]). Three approaches for assignment of scores of the RIFs are described 
in this paper; 1) Direct assessment of the status of the RIFs, 2) Assessment of status 
by use of results from the TTS projects, and 3) Assessment of status by use of results 
from the RNNS3 project.  
 
Direct assessment of the status of the RIFs in the risk influence diagrams may be 
carried out in a RIF audit. Usually, a RIF audit is carried out by structured 
interviews of key personnel on the plant and observations of work performance. 
Useful aids are behavioural checklists and behaviourally anchored rating scales 
(BARS) [37]. In addition, surveys may be used as part of the RIF audit as 
supplement to the other techniques. 
 
The TTS project proposes a review method to map and monitor the technical safety 
level on offshore platforms and land-based facilities based on the status of safety 
critical elements, safety barriers, and their intended function in major accidents 
prevention [41]. The TTS project is based on a review technique using defined 
performance requirements. The condition of safety barriers is measured against best 
practices as well as minimum requirements. A number of examination activities are 
defined and used to check each performance requirement, including document 
reviews, interviews, visual inspections, and field tests. Performance standards are 
developed for 19 areas, including the containment function, and each performance 
standard contains a set of performance requirements divided in the four groups 
function, integrity, survivability, and management. A six point scoring scheme is 
used in the TTS project that may be directly transformed to the scores in Table 3. 
 
Finally, the assessment of the status of the RIFs may be based on results from the 
RNNS project [42] and accident investigations. The RNNS project includes a broad 
                                                     
3  Risk Level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf [42]. 
Barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release); 
Part I Method description 
13 
questionnaire survey which addresses general health, environmental, and safety 
(HES) aspects, risk perception, and safety culture. The surveys are conducted once 
every second year. Data may be provided as average values for the entire industry, 
as well as on platform specific basis. By selecting relevant questions from the 
survey, these data may provide input to scoring of the RIFs for different platforms. 
However, the data should be further analysed to get scores of the RIFs according to 
the scheme in Table 3 [43]. Results from accident investigations may be used as a 
supplement to the results from the RNNS project in order to assess the scores of the 
RIFs.  
 
3.6 Weighting of risk influencing factors 
Weighting of the RIFs is an assessment of the effect (or importance) the RIFs has on 
the frequency of occurrence of the basic events. The weights of the RIFs correspond 
to the relative difference in the frequency of occurrence of an event if the status of 
the RIF is changed from A (best standard) to F (worst practice). 
 
The weighting of the RIFs is done by expert judgment. In practice, the assessment of 
the weights is based on a general discussion of the importance with platform 
personnel and the analysts where the following principles are applied: 
 
1. Determine the most important RIF based on general discussions 
2. Give this RIF a relative weight equal to 10 
3. Compare the importance of the other RIFs with the most important one, and 
give them relative weights on the scale 10 – 8 – 6 – 4 – 2  
4. Evaluate if the results are reasonable  
 
The weights then need to be normalized as the sum of the weights for the RIFs 
influencing a basic event should be equal to 1. 
 
3.7 Adjustment of generic input data 
Further, the generic input data used in the quantitative analysis is adjusted. The 
purpose is to assign platform specific values to the input data allowing for platform 
specific conditions of the RIFs. The generic input data are revised based on the risk 
influence diagrams through an assessment of the weights and the status of the RIFs. 
The following principles for adjustment are proposed:  
 
Let Prev(A) be the “installation specific” probability (or frequency) of occurrence of 
event A. The probability Prev(A) is determined by the following procedure; 
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where Pave(A) denotes the industry average probability of occurrence of event A, wi 
denotes the weight (importance) of RIF no. i for event A, Qi is a measure of the 
status of RIF no. i, and n is the number of RIFs. Here,  
 
 
The challenge is now to determine appropriate values for Qi and wi.  
 
To determine the Qi’s we need to associate a number to each of the status scores A - 
F. The proposed way to determine the Qi’s is;  
 
• Determine Plow(A) as the lower limit for Prev(A) by expert judgment. 
• Determine Phigh(A) as the upper limit for Prev(A) by expert judgment. 
• Then put for i =1, 2, … n; 
 
 
where s denotes the score or status of RIF no i. 
 
Hence, if the score s is A, and Plow(A) is 10 % of Pave(A), then Qi is equal to 0.1. If 
the score s is F, and Phigh(A) is ten times higher than Pave(A), then Qi is equal to 10. If 
the score s is C, then Qi is equal to 1. Furthermore, if all RIFs have scores equal to 
C, then Prev(A) = Pave(A), if all RIFs have scores equal to A, then Prev(A) = Plow(A), 
and if all RIFs have scores equal to F, then Prev(A) = Phigh(A).  
 
To assign values to Qi for s = B, we assume a linear relationship between Qi (A) and 
Qi (C), and we use sA = 1, sB = 2, sC = 3, sD = 4, sE = 5, and sF = 6. Then,  
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To assign values to Qi for s = D and E, we assume a linear relationship between Qi 
(C) and Qi (F). Then,  
 
 
Qi (E) is calculated as Qi (D) by use of sE instead of sD in formual (5). Figure 3 
shows different values of Qi depending on different values of Plow and Phigh;  
 
1. Plow = Pave / 10, and Phigh = 10 · Pave, 
2. Plow = Pave / 5, and Phigh = 5 · Pave, 
3. Plow = Pave / 3, and Phigh = 3 · Pave, 
4. Plow = Pave / 5, and Phigh = 2 · Pave, 
 
Figure 3. Different values of Qi.. 
 
3.8 Recalculation of the risk 
The final step of BORA-Release is to determine the platform specific risk of 
hydrocarbon release by applying the platform specific input data (Prev(A)) for all 
events in the risk model. Use of these revised input data results in an updated risk 
picture including analysis of the effect of the performance of the safety barriers 
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introduced to prevent hydrocarbon release. The revised risk picture takes the 
platform specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organisational 
RIFs into consideration. 
 
4 Discussion 
The discussion is divided in three main parts. The first part contains a discussion of 
the different steps in BORA-Release. Part two contains a discussion to what extent 
the criteria presented in section 2 are fulfilled, while application areas of BORA-
Release are discussed in part three.  
 
4.1 Discussion of BORA-Release 
Development of a basic risk model  
The basic risk model developed as part of BORA-Release may be seen as an 
extended QRA-model compared to the current status of QRA for three reasons:  
 
1. It facilitates a detailed modelling of loss of containment including initiating 
events reflecting different causal factors of hydrocarbon release and safety 
barriers introduced to prevent release  
2. The risk model incorporates different operational barriers such as use of self 
control of work/checklists, 3rd party control of work, and inspection to detect 
corrosion  
3. Event trees and fault trees are linked together in one common risk model  
 
No analysis of causal factors of hydrocarbon release is carried out in existing QRA, 
but the calculation of the release frequency is based on a combination of counting of 
process equipment and historic leak frequencies for the different equipment 
categories. In some cases, platform specific release statistics are used for updating of 
the QRA. Development of a risk model with a set of hydrocarbon release scenarios 
and RIFs answers the criticism formulated by e.g., Kafka [44] that the existing QRA 
are not suitable for analysing the effect of the most effective safety measures to 
avoid initiating events.  
 
Combination of barrier block diagrams/event trees and fault trees is an attractive 
modelling technique as barrier block diagrams makes it possible to give a clear and 
consistent representation and illustration of the different barrier systems that fulfil 
the defined barrier functions introduced to prevent hydrocarbon release. The 
approach enables a separate analysis of each barrier at the desired level of detail. 
The barrier block diagrams may be generic for several platforms, however, the 
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detailed analysis of the different safety barriers may be platform specific. A 
challenge for some scenarios is to define the initiating events in such a way that they 
are suitable for quantitative analysis.  
 
 
Modelling the performance of safety barriers  
BORA-Release is based on a broad view on safety barriers, which means that the 
performance of different types of safety barriers like the process shutdown system, 
3rd party control of work, and the inspection program need to be analysed.  
 
The chosen method for analysis of the performance of safety barriers is fault tree 
analysis. The fault trees are linked to the event trees in one common risk model. The 
fault tree analysis will not necessarily cover all attributes relevant for analysis of the 
barrier performance, and there may be need to carry out other analysis (e.g., human 
reliability analysis (HRA), analysis of fire and explosion loads, impairment analysis, 
and qualitative assessments of barrier functionality). As part of the case study, 
another approach was used to analyse the effectiveness of the inspection barrier (see 
[26] for further details).  
 
Assignment of generic input data and risk quantification based on these data 
Assignment of generic input data implies use of generic databases in addition to 
extraction of platform specific information regarding operational conditions, 
experience from surveillance of operational activities, and testing of technical 
systems. Recovery of data from internal databases or surveillance systems may 
require extensive manual work and often some interpretations of the recorded data 
may be necessary. Due to the novelty of the modelling of the containment, relevant 
data are lacking for some barriers. The availability of relevant human reliability data 
are low, as there is need for collection of data to support the analysis. Alternatively, 
some expert judgment sessions may be carried out in order to generate relevant data. 
 
Development of risk influence diagrams 
A combination of a top-down approach and a bottom-up approach is used to develop 
risk influence diagrams. The top-down approach by using a predetermined 
framework for identification of RIFs ensures that the RIFs are identified and defined 
in the same manner in different analysis, while the bottom-up approach ensures that 
unique RIFs for specific plants are identified and assessed. To reduce the total 
number of RIFs in the overall analysis, a maximum of six RIFs are allowed for each 
basic event. 
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The framework used to identify RIFs and develop risk influence diagram consists of 
characteristics of the personnel, the task, the technical system, administrative 
control, and organisational factors/operational conditions. The framework is based 
on a review, comparison, and synthesis of several schemes of classification of MTO-
factors. While traditional performance influence factors (PIFs) as reviewed by Kim 
and Jung [45] focuses on factors influencing human failure events, the RIF 
framework presented in subsection 3.4 also includes factors influencing hardware 
(system/component) failure events (e.g., material properties and program for 
preventive maintenance). 
 
However, the main groups in the RIF framework are similar to a model of the task 
context of nuclear power plants described by Kim and Jung [45]. The main 
difference is that we have defined an additional group called administrative control 
including for example procedures, as Kim and Jung [45] include as part of the task. 
Further, we have defined organisational factors/operational conditions as a separate 
group (and not as part of the environment). 
 
Experience from the case study indicates that the main groups in the framework are 
adequate for identification of RIFs. But the list of generic RIFs in Table 2 may be 
supplemented by more RIFs to cover all the basic events included in the analyses of 
barrier performance. This implies that the list of generic RIFs may be a “living” 
document that may be revised due to more experience by use of the list. 
 
Scoring of risk influencing factors 
A six-point score scheme is used for assignment of scores to the RIFs and the scores 
are related to different levels in the industry. Three anchor points are defined where 
score A corresponds to the best standard in the industry, score C corresponds to the 
industry average standard, and score F corresponds to the worst practice in the 
industry. The rationale behind is that industry average data reflects the industry 
average standard as regards status of the RIFs. The argument for the misalignment 
of the scores (A and B better than average, and D, E, and F worse than average) is 
that the existing safety level within the industry is so high that the potential for 
declining in the status is greater than the improvement potential. 
 
Three approaches for giving scores to the RIFs are described. The approaches may 
be used separately, or combined in order to assign scores. The first approach, direct 
assessment of the status of the RIFs by a RIF-audit is the most resource demanding 
approach. However, this approach may ensure a high validity4 of the assignment of 
                                                     
4  Validity refers to whether or not it measures what it is supposed to measure. [46] 
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scores since the assessment of the specific RIFs is based on the risk influence 
diagrams developed for each basic event. There is demand for development of aids 
for execution of RIF audits, e.g., BARS with description of the reference levels for 
scoring. Such aids will contribute to better consistence of the assignment of scores. 
 
The second approach, assessment of status by use of results from the TTS projects, 
uses existing data from a project carried out for several platforms on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) so the use of resources will be limited. The scoring scheme 
used in the TTS project also consists of a six-point scale, but the scores are related to 
some performance criteria and not to the industry average level. However, the TTS 
scores may be transformed to the BORA scores. There are some disadvantages of 
this approach. The TTS projects are not carried out for all platforms on the NCS. 
The main focus in the project is the status of technical aspects of the consequence 
reducing barriers so limited knowledge may be collected about the organisational 
factors. The TTS assessment may be carried out several years before the actual 
analysis as the time aspect may cause that the data to be out-of-date. Finally, the 
relevance of the data may be questionable since the original assessments have been 
performed for another purpose. Thus, the results should be interpreted prior to use.  
 
The third approach, use of results from the RNNS survey and accident investigations 
has been applied during the case study. The main advantage is the availability of 
platform specific results form the survey on all platforms on the NCS. However, 
there are several disadvantages with this approach. The main disadvantage is the low 
validity since the scores are assigned based on questions from a questionnaire not 
developed for this purpose where the questions are rather general and not specific 
for the specific RIFs. As an example, the RIF “Time pressure” will be given the 
same score for all activities on the platform regardless of who, when, or where the 
activity is carried out. The survey is carried out every second year as the results from 
the last survey may not be up to date when the data are applied. The last aspect is 
that the answers in the survey may be influenced by other factors, e.g., general 
dissatisfaction with the working conditions not relevant for the analysed RIF.  
 
The credibility of the status assessment is one important aspect to consider when 
selecting approach for scoring of RIFs. As a rule of thumb, we may say that more 
specific, detailed, and resource demanding the assessment of the RIF status are, the 
more credible are the results. However, the use of resources should be balanced 
against the argument from the representatives from the oil companies that it is 
important to use existing data in order to minimize the use of resources. 
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Weighting of risk influencing factors  
A rather simple technique for weighting of RIFs by use of expert judgment is 
proposed. The weighting process is easy to carry out in practice. The results from 
the weighting process are unambiguous, and the traceability is good.  
 
An important aspect of the identification, scoring, and weighting of RIFs is the 
involvement of operational personnel working on the platform. Nobody is as 
competent as the operational personnel to carry out these steps. However, a risk 
analyst knowing the methodology should guide the operational personnel through 
the weighting process.  
 
Adjustment of average data 
The revised probabilities of occurrences of the basic events are calculated as a sum 
of products of the scores and the normalized weights of the relevant RIFs for each 
basic event multiplied with the generic input data. The upper (Phigh) and lower (Plow) 
values act as anchor values and contribute to credibility of the results. A wide range 
implies the possibility for major changes in the risk level, while a small range 
implies minor changes in the risk level. The upper and lower limits may be 
established by expert judgment or by use of the upper and lower limits presented in 
the generic databases (e.g., OREDA and THERP). 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3, a linear relationship is assumed between Qi(A) and Qi(C), 
and Qi(C) and Qi(F) respectively. Other relationships may be assumed here. Figure 3 
illustrates another important aspect of the method, that the risk improvement 
potential is less than the risk worsening potential. This aspect may be explained by 
the existing low risk level due to high focus on risk reduction measures for several 
years.  
 
Recalculation of the risk 
The final step of BORA-Release, recalculation of the risk in order to calculate the 
platform specific risk by use of revised platform specific data, is easy to execute 
when the other steps have been carried out. The revised hydrocarbon release 
frequency takes platform specific conditions as regards technical, human, 
operational, as well as organisational RIFs into consideration. In addition, the effect 
of the performance of safety barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases is 
included in the results. 
 
The recalculated risk picture gives valuable input to decision-makers. Some areas of 
application of BORA-Release are discussed in subsection 4.3. The improved 
knowledge about existing and non-existing safety barriers, and better understanding 
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of the influence of RIFs (i.e., the qualitative analysis) are important results in itself 
independent of the quantitative results. 
 
4.2 Fulfilment of criteria  
The extent of fulfilment of the set of criteria presented in section 2 is discussed in 
the following. The first criterion treated identification and illustrations of safety 
barriers introduced to prevent hydrocarbon release. Use of barrier block diagrams 
evidently facilitates identification and illustration of safety barriers. During the case 
studies, the illustrations of the safety barriers by barrier block diagrams were very 
useful in the discussions with operational personnel.  
 
A risk model that consists of a combination of barrier block diagrams/event trees, 
fault trees, and risk influence diagrams allows inclusion of technical, human, 
operational, as well as organisational elements. Further, graphical illustrations are 
important elements of barrier block diagrams/event trees, fault trees, as well as risk 
influence diagrams that make them well suited for use in presentations and 
discussions that will increase the understanding of RIFs and criterion two is fulfilled. 
The qualitative analysis of the scenarios is an important result from the total 
analysis.  
 
BORA-Release fulfil criterion three because it allows for analysis of technical 
failures and human errors as initiating events, as well as analysis of technical, 
human, and operational barriers. For further illustrations of analysis of different 
causes reference is made to the overview of release scenarios presented by Sklet 
[27].  
 
Use of event trees, fault trees, and risk influence diagram also fulfil the fourth 
criterion regarding quantification of the frequency of initiating events and the 
performance of the safety barriers. Rather small fault trees were developed for 
quantitative analysis of the barrier performance in the release scenarios analysed in 
the case study. However, it may be necessary to develop larger and more complex 
fault trees for safety barriers included in other release scenarios. With respect to use 
of other methods, see the discussion of step three of BORA-Release. 
 
A problem may arise in respect to the availability of relevant input data (criterion 
five). To be able to use relevant input data it may be necessary to collect new types 
of data. Especially within the field of human reliability data it seems to lack relevant 
data from the offshore field. Some data on a limited set of activities has been 
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collected on the British sector [32, 33], but it has been necessary to use data from the 
nuclear industry in the case study.  
 
The focus of the next criterion is consideration of different activities, phases, and 
conditions in the analysis. So far, the focus has been on failures introduced during 
normal production, maintenance, shutdown, and start-up within the operational 
phase of the life-cycle of a platform, and safety barriers introduced to prevent 
releases due to such failures. Latent failures from the design phase and safety 
barriers aimed to prevent such failures has not been analysed.  
 
Criterion seven states that the method should enable identification of common 
causes and dependencies. This aspect is taken into account in Section 5.  
 
Criterion eight deals with practical applicability with respect to use of resources. 
Unfortunately, to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the complex reality in a 
process plant is resource demanding. If the analysis shall give adequate support 
during the decision-making process the level of detail of the analysis need to reflect 
the reality on the platform. However, it may be possible to carry out less 
comprehensive analysis of specific problem areas on the platform with less use of 
resources. 
 
The last criterion states that the method shall provide a basis for “re-use” of the 
generic model. If a generic risk model is developed, it will be manageable to carry 
out some installation specific considerations about the status on each platform, and 
to carry out simple comparisons with other platforms (e.g., practice regarding 
operational barriers as third party control of work or status of the RIFs).  
 
4.3 Application of BORA-Release 
BORA-Release is a method for qualitative and quantitative analysis of the platform 
specific hydrocarbon release frequency on oil and gas production platforms. BORA-
Release makes it possible to analyse the effect of safety barriers introduced to 
prevent hydrocarbon release and allows considerations of platform specific 
conditions of technical, human, operational, and organisational RIFs. The method 
may be used to analyse the plant specific frequency of loss of containment in other 
types of process plants. Application of BORA-release to analyse the frequency of 
loss of containment gives a more detailed risk picture than traditional QRA where no 
analysis is made of causal factors of loss of containment.  
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The qualitative analysis of the release scenarios including the safety barriers 
generates knowledge about factors influencing the frequency of hydrocarbon release 
within the process plant even though no quantitative analysis is carried out. This 
knowledge may support decisions of importance for the future performance of the 
safety barriers. 
 
Although BORA-Release may be used to calculate platform specific hydrocarbon 
release frequencies, the main area of application is not the release frequency itself, 
but use of the model to assess the effect of risk reducing measures and risk 
increasing changes during operations. Sensitivity analysis may be carried out in 
order to analyse the effect of changes in technical, human, operational, as well as 
organisational RIFs. Focus on relative changes in the release frequency instead of 
absolute numbers may increase the credibility to the results. In addition, the effect of 
introduction of new safety barriers may be analysed. The results from a case study 
where BORA-Release was used to analyse several release scenarios showed that the 
model is useful to analyse the effect of different risk reducing measures [26]. 
 
5 Conclusions and further work 
This paper presents BORA-Release, a method for qualitative and quantitative 
analyses of the platform specific hydrocarbon release frequency. The method makes 
it possible to analyse the effect on the release frequency of safety barriers introduced 
to prevent hydrocarbon release, and platform specific conditions of technical, 
human, operational, and organisational RIFs.  
 
The case study [26] demonstrates that the method is useful in practice. Personnel 
from the actual oil company considered the results from some of the scenarios useful 
since they got more knowledge about safety barriers introduced to prevent 
hydrocarbon releases and the RIFs influencing the performance of these barriers. 
The results from the qualitative analysis were considered to be as useful as the 
quantitative results. BORA-Release ought to be applied in additional case studies in 
order to conclude whether or not it is cost-effective to apply the method in an overall 
analysis. It is resource demanding to perform such an analysis due to the complexity 
of oil and gas production platforms.  
 
There is still need for further research focusing on some of the steps in BORA-
Release. The main challenge is the scoring of the RIFs. Further work will be carried 
out in order to assess whether the results from the TTS project may be used, or if it 
is necessary to perform specific RIF-audits. In the latter case, it may be necessary to 
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develop behaviourally anchored rating scales (BARS) or similar aids that may be 
used as basis for the RIF-audits.  
 
Lack of relevant data, especially for human error probabilities on offshore platforms 
is a challenge. There may be need for collecting new types of data that are not 
available in existing databases. However, collection of data are resource demanding 
and it may be difficult to initiate such projects.  
 
A high number of RIFs are listed in Table 2. Further work should be initiated in 
order to improve the descriptions and assess whether the total number of RIFs may 
be reduced, e.g., by combining two of the RIFs into one new RIF.  
 
Events in BORA-Release are considered independent conditional of the RIFs. 
Independence could be questioned, however, it is likely to be sufficiently accurate 
from a practical point of view.  
 
There may be interaction effects among the RIFs influencing one basic event. 
Interaction effects mean that a RIF will have a different effect on the basic event, 
depending on the status of another RIF (positive correlation), e.g., if the competence 
of personnel is poor, it will be even more serious if the quality of procedures also is 
poor. A simple approach is suggested for analysis of interaction effects among RIFs 
in BORA-Release. If two or more RIFs are assumed to interact, and the status are 
worse than average (D, E, or F), the score of one of them is reduced one category 
(e.g., from D to E). Similarly, if the scores of two interacting RIFs are better than 
average, the score of one of the RIFs is increased one category (from B to A). 
However, more sophisticated methods should be assessed as part of future research, 
e.g., use of Bayesian belief networks to more accurately model the interactions 
between the RIFs (see e.g., [20]). 
 
Development of a risk model including safety barriers that may prevent, control, or 
mitigate accident scenarios with in-depth modelling of barrier performance allows 
explicit modelling of functional common cause failures (e.g., failures due to 
functional dependencies on a support system). However, further research will be 
carried out to assess the effect of residual common cause failures that may lead to 
simultaneous failures of more than one safety barrier, for example errors introduced 
during maintenance (e.g., calibration) that may cause simultaneous failures of 
several types of detectors (e.g., gas detectors and fire detectors).  
 
One basis for BORA-Release is the assumption that the average standard of RIFs 
corresponds to generic input data and better standard on the RIFs than average lead 
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to a lower probability of occurrence of the basic events. This assumption seems to be 
realistic where generic data from the offshore industry exists. However, there are 
needs for further discussions whether the adjustment of human error probabilities 
should be based on scores of the RIFs related to the average standard in the North 
Sea or whether traditional assessment of performance shaping factors applied in 
human reliability analysis should be applied (adjustment of nominal human error 
probabilities by assessment of task specific performance shaping factors).  
 
Only a limited sample of the release scenarios described by Sklet [27] have been 
analysed quantitatively so far. Further work will be carried out in the BORA-project 
in order to analyse quantitatively some of the release scenarios not included in the 
first case study. In addition, further work will be carried out in order to link the 
model of the hydrocarbon release scenarios to the traditional QRA model that 
includes analysis of the consequence reducing barriers. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents results from a case study carried out on an oil and gas 
production platform with the purpose to apply and test BORA-Release, a method for 
barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases. A description of the 
BORA-Release method is given in part I of the paper. BORA-Release is applied to 
express the platform specific hydrocarbon release frequencies for three release 
scenarios for selected systems and activities on a specific platform. The method is 
used to analyse the effect on the release frequency of safety barriers introduced to 
prevent hydrocarbon releases, and to study the effect on the barrier performance of 
platform specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organisational risk 
influencing factors (RIFs). BORA-Release is also used to analyse the effect on the 
release frequency of several risk reducing measures.  
 
Keywords: Risk analysis, hydrocarbon release, loss of containment, safety barrier, 
organisational factor. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) focuses on safety barriers in their 
regulations relating to management in the petroleum activities [1] and requires that it 
shall be known what barriers have been established, which function they are 
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intended to fulfil, and what performance requirements have been defined with 
respect to technical, operational, and organisational elements that are necessary for 
the individual barrier to be effective.  
 
These requirements and a recognition of the insufficient modelling of human, 
operational, and organisational factors in existing quantitative risk analyses (QRA) 
were the background for the BORA project [2]. The aim of the BORA project is to 
perform a detailed and quantitative modelling of barrier performance, including 
barriers to prevent the occurrence of initiating events (like hydrocarbon release) as 
well as consequence reducing barriers. One of the activities in the BORA project has 
been to develop BORA-Release, a method suitable for qualitative and quantitative 
analyses of hydrocarbon release scenarios [3, 4]. The method has been tested in a 
case study on a specific oil and gas producing platform. The purpose of the case 
study was to determine the platform specific hydrocarbon release frequencies for 
selected systems and activities for selected release scenarios and assess whether or 
not BORA-Release is suitable for analyzing the effect of risk reduction measures 
and changes that may increase the release frequency.  
 
The main objective of the present paper is to present and discuss the results from a 
case study on an oil and gas production platform on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf applying BORA-Release. BORA-Release has been used to analyse the release 
frequency considering the effect of safety barriers introduced to prevent 
hydrocarbon release and analyse the effect on the barrier performance of platform 
specific conditions of technical, human, operational, as well as organisational risk 
influencing factors (RIFs).  
 
This paper contains four main sections where this first section describes the 
background and the purpose of the paper. The next section explains how the case 
study was carried out, the basis for the case study with respect to selection of release 
scenarios for detailed analysis, and relevant descriptions of the technical systems, 
operational activities, and conditions. Section three presents the results from the 
qualitative and quantitative analyses of the selected scenarios and the overall results. 
A discussion of the results and experiences from the case study, and some 
conclusions are presented in section four.  
 
2 Case study description 
In BORA-Release, the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the risk related to 
hydrocarbon releases comprise the following main steps [3]: 
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1) Development of a basic risk model including hydrocarbon release scenarios 
and safety barriers 
2) Modelling the performance of safety barriers  
3) Assignment of generic input data and quantification based on these data 
4) Development of risk influence diagrams 
5) Scoring of risk influencing factors (RIFs) 
6) Weighting of risk influencing factors  
7) Adjustment of generic input data  
8) Recalculation of the risk in order to determine the platform specific risk. 
 
The basis for development of the basic risk model in the case study was 20 
hydrocarbon release scenarios described in [5]. Initially, two scenarios were selected 
for detailed analyses. Later on, one additional scenario was selected such that the 
following three release scenarios have been analysed in detail: 
 
A. Release due to valve(s) in wrong position after maintenance (flowline 
inspection) 
B. Release due to incorrect fitting of flanges or bolts during maintenance 
(flowline inspection) 
C. Release due to internal corrosion. 
 
Flowline inspection was selected as activity for analysis of scenario A and B. A 
flowline is a line segments between an automatic flow valve (AFV) in the valve tree 
and the production or test header. There may be up to 30 – 40 flanges on each 
flowline, and between 5 and 15 of them are disassembled during a flowline 
inspection. Flowline inspections are performed by visual inspections in order to 
reveal corrosion in the pipes, flanges, and instrument fittings on the flowlines. Each 
flowline is inspected at least twice a year. The inspector plans the inspection and 
identifies inspection points. The area technician is responsible for shutdown of the 
actual well and isolation, depressurization, and draining of the actual flowline. The 
inspections are carried out while the other wells are producing. The mechanics 
disassemble and assemble the flowlines zone by zone and install new bolts and 
gaskets in the flanges after each inspection. The inspector carries out the inspection 
and decides whether or not some pipe spools need to be changed due to degradation. 
Findings from the inspection are documented in a specific database. The area 
technician is responsible for execution of a leak test prior to start-up of normal 
production, while a central control room (CCR) technician monitors the pressure. 
Two service point valves (SP1/SP2) are used during the leak test and may be left in 
wrong position after the inspection. The valves are operated by a single area 
technician and there is no isolation plan or valve list showing the valve positions for 
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a flowline inspection. The leak test is a routine operation for the area technicians as 
no procedure describes the activity, but the result from the final (successful) leak test 
is documented in the platform log book.  
 
A hierarchical task analysis (HTA) was performed for the flowline inspection 
activity in order to get an understanding of the work process. The top structure of the 
HTA is shown in Figure 1. The detailed HTA was reviewed by operational 
personnel and discussed in a workshop.  
 
Figure 1.  Hierarchical task analysis (top structure) of flowline inspection. 
 
The process segment between the separator and the pipeline was selected as analysis 
object for the corrosion scenario. This segment is mainly made of carbon steel and 
the pipes are not insulated. The pressure is 13 – 20 bars upstream of the production 
pump, and 23 – 35 bars on the downstream side of the pump. The temperature varies 
from 70 ºC in the main flow pipes to 10 ºC in the dead legs. 
 
In order to develop and make detailed descriptions of the release scenarios, two 
workshops were arranged. Draft descriptions of the release scenarios based on 
review of documentation were developed prior to the workshops as basis for 
discussion. Scenario A and B were discussed in the first workshop and scenario C 
was discussed in the second workshop. Operational personnel from the platform and 
safety specialists from the company attended the first workshop while corrosion 
specialists from the oil company also attended the second workshop. 
 
The analyses of scenario A and B were carried out strictly according to the general 
method description and are described in the following. The analysis of scenario C 
differed somewhat from the general method description and is described afterwards. 
 
Two additional workshops, with operational personnel from the platform and safety 
specialists from the oil company, were arranged in order to model the performance 
of the safety barriers, and to identify and weight the RIFs for scenarios A and B. The 
RIF-framework described in [3] was used as basis for the identification of RIFs. The 
weights were established by common agreement from discussions in the workshop. 
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The most important RIF for each basic event was identified and assigned a relative 
weight equal to 10. Thereafter, the other RIFs were given weights relative to the 
most important one on the scale 10 – 8 – 6 – 4 – 2.  
 
The generic input data were discussed in the workshops and some input data were 
established based on discussions during the workshops. The assignment of industry 
average data for human errors was primarily based on data from THERP ([6]).  
 
The scoring of the RIFs was based on secondary analysis of answers on a 
questionnaire from a survey of the risk level on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(RNNS-project) [7]. Further information about the scoring is given in [8]. 
 
Revised input data were established by the analysts as described in the method 
description [3] using the formula: 
 
 
where Pave(A) is the industry average probability of occurrence of event A, wi is the 
weight of RIF no. i for the event, Qi is a measure of the status of RIF no. i, and n is 
the number of RIFs for each basic event. The calculation of Qi is described in detail 
in [3]. In formula (1),  
 
 
The revised platform specific data were used as input in the risk model in order to 
recalculate the release frequencies for the selected scenarios.  
 
The analysis of scenario C was carried out somewhat different. The two main 
differences were; 1) An overall RIF-analysis was not carried out, but the effects of 
changes were studied based on sensitivity analyses, and 2) Fault tree analysis was 
not used for quantitative analysis of the inspection effectiveness. The performance 
of the safety barrier inspection was analysed based on a method described by API 
[9], and assessment of the practice on the platform. Several workshops were 
arranged to discuss the model used for analysis of the corrosion scenario and the 
current status of corrosion and inspection on the platform. In addition, results from 
the last inspection were reviewed in order to predict the corrosion rate within the 
system.  
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3 Results from the case study 
3.1 Scenario A  
The following form contains a description of scenario A. 
 
Scenario name  
Release due to valve(s) in wrong position after flowline inspection 
General description  
Release due to valve(s) set in wrong position after flowline inspection may occur if the area 
technician forget to close some SP valves prior to start up of production.  
Initiating event  
Valve(s) in wrong position after flowline inspection 
Operational mode when failure is introduced  
During maintenance, i.e., while disconnecting hoses after the leak test. 
Operational mode at time of release  
Release may occur during start-up after maintenance. 
Barrier functions  
The release may be prevented if the 
following barrier functions are fulfilled: 
• Detection of valve(s) in wrong position 
 
Barrier systems  
The release may be prevented if the 
following barrier systems function: 
• System for self control / use of checklist 
in order to detect possible valve(s) in fail 
position. 
• System for 3rd party control of work 
(actually, no 3rd party control of work is 
required in this scenario). 
Assumptions 
• On the flowline system, SP1- and SP2-valves may be in wrong position after the flowline 
inspection. In addition, the two valves on the closed drain system connected to the hoses 
may be in wrong position after the inspection.  
• The area technician operates these valves (depressurization, draining, and pressurization 
during the leak test). 
• There is no 3rd party control of the work performed by the area technician. 
• It is assumed that corrective action is carried out if a valve is revealed in wrong position.  
• These valves are used during the leak test where the purpose is to test the tightness of the 
flanges, and the valves may be left in open position after the leak test.  
• A leak due to an open valve on the flowline system will most probably be detected during 
start-up of normal production, either manually by the area technician, or automatically by 
gas detectors in the area. The area technician will stay in the wellhead area during start up 
of production and may manually close the open SP-valve, or close the choke valve. 
 
The barrier block diagram for scenario A is shown in Figure 2. The fault trees for the 
safety barriers “Self control of work” (A1) and “3rd party control of work” (A2) are 
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illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Further, the risk influence diagrams for the basic 
events A02 (see Table 1), A11, A12, and A13 are shown in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2.  Barrier block diagram for scenario A. 
 
Figure 3.  Fault tree for barrier A1. 
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Figure 4.  Fault tree for barrier A2. 
 
Figure 5.  Risk influence diagram for basic event A02. 
 
Figure 6.  Risk influence diagram for basic event A11. 
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Figure 7.  Risk influence diagram for basic event A12. 
 
Figure 8.  Risk influence diagram for basic event A13. 
 
Table 1 summarizes all input data, weights, scores for all RIFs, and the adjustment 
factors (MF) for scenario A.  
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Table 1.  Scenario A – Generic input data, weights, scores, and revised input data. 
Basic 
event 
Pave Plow Phigh Basic event / 
RIF 
wi si 1) MF 2) Prev 
A01 nA = 28 No. of flowline inspections per year     
A02 0.003 0.001 0.009 P(valve(s) in wrong position after maintenance) 1.29 0.0039 
    A021 Process complexity 2 C   
    A022 Maintainability/accessibility 2 C   
    A023 HumanMachine interface 
(HMI) 
2 D   
    A023 Time pressure 10 D   
    A024 Competence of area technician 10 C   
    A025 Work permit 2 C   
A11 0 3)   P(Failure to specify self control)   
    A11 Program for self control     
A12 0.010 0.003 0.030 P(Failure to perform self control when specified) 1.51 0.015 
    A121 Work practice 10 D   
    A122 Time pressure 10 D   
    A123 Work permit 6 C   
A13 0.33 0.066 0.66 P(Failure to detect valve in wrong pos. by self 
control) 
1.13 0.37 
    A131 HMI 2 D   
    A132 Maintainability/accessibility  2 C   
    A133 Time pressure 10 D   
    A134 Competence of area technician 10 C   
    A135 Procedures for self control 2 C   
    A136 Work permit 4 C   
A21 1.0 4)   P(Failure to specify 3rd party control)   
    A211 Program for 3rd party control     
A22 0.01 0.002 0.05 P(Failure to perform 3rd party control of work) 2.03 0.02 
    A221 Work practice 10 D   
    A222 Time pressure 10 D   
    A223 Work permit 6 C   
A23 0.1 0.02 0.5 P(Checker fails to detect valve in wrong position)  1.53 0.15 
    A231 HMI 2 D   
    A232 Maintainability/accessibility 2 C   
    A233 Time pressure 10 D   
    A234 Competence of area technician 10 C   
    A235 Procedures for self control 2 C   
    A236 Work permit 4 C   
 
1) si denotes the status of the RIF no i.  
2) MF denotes the modification factor calculated by use of formula (1). 
3) Self control is specified in this case as the probability of failure to specify self control is 0.  
4) 3rd party control of work is not specified as the probability of failure to specify 3rd party control is 1.  
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The results from the quantitative analysis of the release frequency due to valve(s) in 
incorrect position after flowline inspection are shown in Table 2. The release 
frequency due to valve(s) in wrong position after flowline inspection by use of 
generic input data is 0.028 per year, while the corresponding frequency by use of 
adjusted input data allowing for platform specific conditions of the identified RIFs is 
0.041 per year. This implies an increase in the release frequency by 46 % from 
scenario A by use of the revised input data. The frequency of the initiating event has 
increased by 28 % (from 0.084 to 0.11 per year), while the probability of failure of 
barrier A1 (self control) has increased by 14 % (from 0.34 to 0.38).  
 
Table 2.  Scenario A – Results from calculations. 
Event Generic data Revised data 
f(A0) 1) 0.084 0.11 
PFailure(A1) 2) 0.34 0.38 
PFailure(A2) 3) 1.0 1.0 
λA 4) 0.028 0.041 
 
1) Frequency of valves in incorrect position after inspection per year. 
2) Probability of failure to detect release by self control. 
3) Probability of failure to detect release by 3rd party control. 
4) Release frequency from scenario A per year. 
 
3.2 Scenario B 
Scenario B, release due to incorrect fitting of flanges or bolts during flowline 
inspection, includes leaks due to tightening with too low or too high tension, 
misalignment of flange faces, damaged bolts, etc. The initiating event is incorrect 
fitting of flanges or bolts after flowline inspection. The operational mode when 
failure is introduced is during maintenance, and the release will occur during start-up 
after maintenance, or later during normal production. The release may be prevented 
if the following safety functions are fulfilled; detection of incorrect fitting of flanges 
or bolts during maintenance, and detection of release prior to normal production. 
The following barrier systems fulfil these functions; 
 
• System for self-control (visual inspection by mechanic) may detect incorrect 
fitting of flanges or bolts prior to start up of normal production. 
• System for 3rd party control of work (by inspector or area technician) may 
reveal failures prior to assembling of the system or prior to start up of 
production. 
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• System for leak tests may reveal potential failures prior to start up of 
production. The leak test may be carried out in two ways: 1) by use of 
glycol/water or 2) by use of injection water. 
 
The results from scenario B are not described as detailed as the results from scenario 
A since the principles in the method already is illustrated, but the barrier block 
diagram for scenario B is shown in Figure 9. Neither the fault trees of the barriers, 
nor the risk influence diagrams are shown since the principles are similar as used in 
scenario A. 
 
Figure 9.  Barrier block diagram for scenario B. 
 
Table 3 summarizes all input data, weights, scores for all RIFs, as well as the 
adjustment factors for scenario B. 
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Table 3.  Scenario B – Generic input data, weights, scores, and revised input data. 
Basic 
event 
Pave Plow Phigh Basic event/ 
RIF 
wi si MF Prev 
B01 nB = 28 No. of flowline inspection per year     
B02 0.03 0.006 0.15 P(Incorrect fitting of flange or bolts) 1.27 0.038 
    B021 Process complexity 2 C   
    B022 Maintainability/accessibility 2 C   
    B023 Task complexity 10 C   
    B024 Time pressure 6 D   
    B025 Competence of mechanician 10 C   
B11 1.0 1)   P(Failure to specify self control)   
    B111 Program for self control     
B12 0.010 0.003 0.030 P(Failure to perform self control when specified) 1.51 0.015 
    B121 Work practice 10 D   
    B122 Time pressure 10 D   
    B123 Work permit 6 C   
B13 0.33 0.066 0.66 P(Failure to reveal incorrect fitting by self control) 1.09 0.36 
    B131 HMI 2 D   
    B132 Maintainability/accessibility 2 C   
    B133 Time pressure 6 D   
    B134 Competence of mechanician 10 C   
    B135 Procedures for self control 10 C   
B21 1.0 2)   P(Failure to specify 3rd party control of work)   
    B211 Program for 3rd party control     
B22 0.01 0.002 0.05 P(Failure to perform 3rd party control of work) 2.03 0.02 
    B221 Work practice 10 D   
    B222 Time pressure 10 D   
    B223 Work permit 6 C   
B23 0.1 0.02 0.5 P(Checker fails to detect incorrect fitting) 1.31 0.13 
    B231 HMI 2 D   
    B232 Maintainability/accessibility 2 C   
    B233 Time pressure 4 D   
    B234 Competence of checker 10 C   
    B235 Procedures for 3rd party control 4 C   
    B236 Work permit 4 C   
B31 1.0 3)   P(Failure to specify leak test)   
    B311 Program for leak test     
B32 0.01 0.002 0.05 P(Failure to perform leak test when specified) 2.03 0.02 
    B321 Work practice 10 D   
    B322 Time pressure 10 D   
    B323 Work permit 6 C   
B33 0.03 0.006 0.15 P(Failure to detect incorrect fitting by leak test) 1.56 0.047 
    B331 Communication 10 D   
    B332 Methodology 2 C   
    B333 Procedures for leak test 2 C   
    B334 Competence of area technician 10 C   
 
1) Self control is specified in this case as the probability of failure to specify self control is 0. 
2) 3rd party control of work is not specified as the probability of failure to specify 3rd party control is 0.  
3) Leak test is specified in this case, as the probability of failure to specify leak test is 0. 
 
Barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release); 
Part II Results from a case study 
14 
The results from the quantitative analysis of scenario B are shown in Table 4. The 
release frequency due to incorrect fitting of flanges or bolts during flowline 
inspection is 0.0012 per year by use of generic input data. The corresponding release 
frequency by use of adjusted input data allowing for platform specific conditions of 
the RIFs is 0.0038 per year. Consequently, the release frequency due to scenario B 
has increased by 214 %. The frequency of the initiating event (No. of valves in 
incorrect position after inspection) has increased by 27 % from 0.84 to 1.064 per 
year. The probability of failure to detect release by self control has increased by 10 
% (from 0.34 to 0.37) and the probability of failure to detect release by 3rd party 
control has increased by 36 % from 0.11 to 0.15. Finally, the probability of failure to 
detect release by leak test has increased by 66 % from 0.040 to 0.066. 
 
Table 4.  Scenario B – Results from calculations. 
 Generic data Revised data 
f(B0) 1) 0.84 1.064 
PFailure(B1) 2) 0.34 0.37 
PFailure(B2) 3) 0.11 0.15 
PFailure(B3) 4) 0.040 0.066 
λB 5) 0.0012 0.0038 
 
1) Frequency of valves in incorrect position after inspection per year. 
2) Probability of failure to detect release by self control. 
3) Probability of failure to detect release by 3rd party control. 
4) Probability of failure to detect release by leak test. 
5) Release frequency from scenario B per year. 
 
3.3 Scenario C 
The general description of scenario C is as follows; 
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Scenario name 
Release due to internal corrosion  
General description 
Releases caused by internal corrosion. The relevant types of internal corrosion within the 
actual system on the platform are: 
a) CO2-corrosion (local and uniform)  
b) Microbial Influenced Corrosion (MIC) 
Other types of corrosion like H2S-corrosion are not considered to be a problem on the 
platform. 
Two corrosion groups (CG) are defined within the actual system; CG1) Main flow pipes and 
CG2) Dead legs.  
Initiating event 
The initiating event for this scenario is “Corrosion rate due to internal corrosion beyond 
critical limit”. Quantitatively, the initiating event is defined as “Number of leaks per year due 
to corrosion if no safety barriers or corrective actions are implemented”. 
Factors influencing the initiating event 
Corrosion resistance of material, corrosion coating, chemical injection/corrosion 
inhibitor/biocid, internal fluid properties, CO2-concentration, allowances/safety margins, 
platform age, etc. 
Operational mode when failure is introduced 
During normal production  
Operational mode at time of release 
During normal production or during process disturbances (resulting in e.g., increased 
pressure) 
Barrier functions  
The release may be prevented if the following 
safety functions are fulfilled: 
• Detection of internal corrosion to prevent 
release 
 
 
• Detection of diffuse or minor hydrocarbon 
release 
 
Barrier systems 
The release may be prevented if the following 
safety barriers function: 
• System for inspection to detect potential 
corrosion. 
• System for condition monitoring of 
equipment to detect potential corrosion. 
• System for area based leak search may 
detect diffuse discharges before they 
develop into significant leaks. 
• System for detection of minor 
hydrocarbon (HC) releases (automatic or 
manual gas detection) may detect minor 
releases before they develop into 
significant leaks. 
Assumptions 
• Critical limit is defined as damage rate (d) greater than critical damage rate (dcritical). This 
damage rate will result in wall thickness (t) less than wall thickness when release is 
expected (trelease) before next inspection.  
• A rate model is applied for both CO2-corrosion and MIC. 
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• Uniform CO2-corrosion is not assessed to be a problem at the actual platform. 
• Corrosion coupons and MIC sample testing are used for condition monitoring. Corrosion 
coupons are used only in the main flow pipes, while MIC sample testing is performed in 
both the main flow pipes and the dead legs. 
• It is assumed that detection of critical corrosion rate by condition monitoring lead to 
revision of the inspection programme and the assumptions for the analysis of the release 
frequency due to corrosion. Due to the revisions of the assumptions, a new analysis should 
be carried out, and this revision of assumption may lead to higher release frequency due to 
e.g., higher frequency of the initiating event or lower inspection efficiency. 
• Two methods are used for inspection, ultrasonic and radiographic inspection. The 
inspection method depends on the thickness of the pipe and it is assumed that the most 
suitable method is used in the case study. 
• Area based leak search is performed in two ways; 1) Daily generic area inspection 
performed by the area technician, and 2) Daily system specific leak search performed by 
the area technician. The probability of detection of a leak is assumed to be higher for the 
second type of leak search. 
• Minor releases may be detected automatically by gas detectors or manually by people in 
the area. 
• It is assumed that corrective actions are implemented when “critical” corrosion is detected. 
Detection of critical corrosion therefore leads to a “safe state”.  
 
Figure 10 shows a barrier block diagram for the release scenario “Release due to 
internal corrosion”.  
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Figure 10.  Barrier block diagram for scenario C. 
 
Figures 11 – 13 show the basic fault tree modelling of the safety barriers inspection 
(C1), condition monitoring (C2), and area based leak search (C3) illustrated in the 
barrier block diagram in Figure 10. The system for detection of hydrocarbons has 
not been analysed any further in the case study. In principle, the barriers are equal 
for both corrosion groups, however, the quantitative analysis is different. 
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Figure 11.  Fault tree for barrier no. C1, inspection. 
 
Figure 12.  Fault tree for barrier no. C2, condition monitoring. 
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Figure 13.  Fault tree for barrier no. C3, area based leak search. 
 
The barrier block diagram in Figure 10 is transformed to an event tree in order to 
calculate the expected release frequency due to corrosion. The event tree is 
illustrated in Figure 14. The frequency of the initiating event ( 0Cλ ) expresses a 
prediction of the hydrocarbon release frequency per year due to corrosion if no 
safety barriers are functioning or no corrective actions are implemented from today. 
The categorization of releases as diffuse, minor, or significant releases is based on a 
judgment of the relation between hole sizes caused by the relevant corrosion 
mechanisms and pressure conditions in the system [10], together with input from 
personnel from the oil company. 
 
Success of inspections implies that the predicted damage rate is equal to or less than 
the actual damage rate, thus no release will occur before the next inspection. Implicit 
in the definition of success of inspection is an assumption of implementation of 
corrective actions if the remaining time to release is very short. Further, it is 
assumed that diffuse discharges and minor releases will mitigate into significant 
releases if not revealed. 
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Figure 14.  Event tree used for quantification2. 
 
Findings from condition monitoring usually imply revision of inspection intervals 
and the assumptions for the analysis of the release frequency due to corrosion.  
 
The fault trees for the safety barriers (C1, C2, and C3) are shown in Figures 11, 12, 
and 13. Note that the quantitative analysis of the inspection node was not made 
strictly according to the fault tree in Figure 11. Quantification of the expected 
release frequency due to corrosion and the effect of inspection is build on the 
principles that corrosion exists in the system with a damage rate3 D. The damage 
rate may be modelled as a gamma stochastic process [11]. To simplify, only the 
mean damage rate d is used in the further calculations. If no preventive maintenance 
or corrective action is performed, the mean time to hydrocarbon release is trelease. 
 
The wall thickness at time t is denoted Qt. Further, q0 denotes the wall thickness at 
time t0, and qrelease denotes the wall thickness when release is expected to occur. 
Then; 
 
                                                     
2  Safe state means that the damage rate is “under control” and corrective actions will be 
implemented before a release occurs. 
3  The damage rate is often denoted as corrosion rate. 
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The damage rate d is unknown, but may be predicted e.g., by using measurements 
from inspections. 
 
If dˆ  denotes the predicted damage rate, a prediction of trelease, tˆ release may be 
determined from the following; 
 
 
However, safety barriers are implemented in order to prevent release of 
hydrocarbons. Inspections are planned to be executed at time ti approximately equal 
to 0.5 × tˆ release in order to measure the wall thickness and calculate updated damage 
rates ( dˆ ). When the wall thickness is less than a critical limit, corrective actions are 
implemented. 
 
Hydrocarbon releases may occur if the damage rate d is greater than dcritical, i.e., the 
damage rate that will result in release prior to execution of next inspection (at 
planned time (ti) or delayed). If the inspection ti is cancelled, the next planned 
inspection will be carried out at time ti+1. 
 
For further quantification, a simplification is made; the corrosion rate is categorized 
in three damage rate states si (according to [9]): 
 
s1 Predicted rate or less  d ≤ dˆ   
In this case we will not have release before tˆ release (because trelease ≥ tˆ release).  
As ti ≈ 0.5 × tˆ release , we have trelease ≥ ti+1 . Thus, even if the first inspection (ti) is 
cancelled, an inspection (ti+1) will take place before release will occur. 
s2 Predicted rate to two times rate d ∈  ( dˆ , 2 dˆ ] 
In this case trelease > ti, but ti+1 ≥ trelease. A release may occur if an inspection is 
delayed or cancelled. 
s3 Two to four times predicted rate d > 2 dˆ  
 In this case, trelease < ti , and a release will occur prior to the first inspection.  
 
)4(ˆ
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d
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Hence, the probability of failure to reveal that the actual damage rate is greater than 
the critical damage rate (d > dcritical) by inspection may as an approximation be 
expressed as;  
 
 
where P(delayed) expresses the probability that the planned inspection at time ti is 
delayed or cancelled. In formula (5), P(delayed) corresponds to the probability of 
occurrence of basic event C12 in Figure 11, while P(s3) denotes the probability of 
occurrence of basic event C13. The effect of poor inspection reliability (basic event 
C14 and basic event C15) is not included in the quantification process in this case 
study. However, this may be included as part of further work. 
 
Our confidence in the predicted damage rate ( dˆ ) is important by use of this formula. 
API [9] describes how to calculate the effect of the inspection program on the 
confidence level in the damage rate and presents data for the confidence in predicted 
damage rates prior to an inspection, the likelihood that the inspection results 
determine the true damage state, and the confidence in damage rate after inspections. 
 
As mentioned above, the frequency of the initiating event ( 0Cλ ) in Figure 14 
expresses a prediction of the release frequency per year due to corrosion if no safety 
barriers are functioning or corrective actions are implemented from today. The 
frequency 0Cλ  is calculated as the number of segments with tˆ release less than 10 years 
divided by 10 years. The time limit has been set to 10 years since the maximum 
permissible inspection interval is 5 years and ti ≈ 0.5 × tˆ release. The prediction of 0Cλ  
is based on results from the last inspection on the platform and is calculated to be 2.2 
per year. This frequency is based on a prediction of the damage rate ( dˆ ). Therefore, 
a consequence of changes in dˆ  is that 0Cλ  must be recalculated. We need to 
calculate 0Cλ  for each of the defined corrosion groups, where 0 1CGCλ  relates to 
corrosion group 1 Main flow pipes, and 0
2CGCλ  related to corrosion group 2 Dead 
legs. Based on a rough calculation, the following numbers were used in this case 
study: 
 
0
1CGCλ  = 0.8 leaks/year, 0 2CGCλ  = 1.4 leaks/year 
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In order to quantify the expected release frequency per year due to internal 
corrosion, quantitative numbers should be assigned to the input in formula (1) and 
all basic events in the fault trees in Figure 12 and Figure 13. The assigned numbers 
are presented in Table 5 both for corrosion group 1 and corrosion group 2. 
 
Table 5.  Corrosion; Summary of generic input data. 
Event 
notation 
Event description Assigned 
data CG 1
Assigned 
data CG 2
Data source 
0
2/1CGCλ  “Initial” frequency of release due to corrosion  
0.8 1.4 Prediction based on 
data from inspections 
P (BC11) Probability of failure to specify 
inspection 
0 1) 0 Expert judgment  
P (BC12)/ 
P(delayed) 
Probability of failure to perform 
inspection as planned 
0.1 0.1 Rough calculation  
P (BC13)/ 
P (d=s3) 
Probability of damage rate in state 3 0.11 2) 0.047 3) [9] (Expert judgment) 
P (BC14)/ 
P (d=s2) 
Probability of damage rate in state 2 0.24 0.14 [9] (Expert judgment) 
P (BC21) Probability of failure to specify 
condition monitoring 
0 4) 0 Expert judgment 
P (BC22) Probability of failure to perform 
condition monitoring when specified 
0.1 0.1 Rough calculation  
P (BC23) Probability of failure to detect internal 
corrosion by corrosion coupons 
0.4 1.0 5) Expert judgment 
P (BC24) Probability of failure to detect internal 
corrosion by MIC sampling 
0.6 0.6 Expert judgment 
P (BC31) Probability of failure to specify daily 
area inspection 
0 6) 0 Expert judgment 
P (BC32) Probability of failure to perform daily 
area inspection when specified 
0.1 0.1 Rough calculation  
P (BC33) Probability of failure to detect a diffuse 
discharge by daily area inspection 
0.9 0.9 Expert judgment 
P (BC34) Probability of failure to specify area 
based leak search 
0 7) 0 Expert judgment 
P (BC35) Probability of failure to perform area 
based leak search when specified 
0.1 0.1 Rough calculation  
P (BC36) Probability of failure to detect a diffuse 
discharge by area based leak search 
0.75 0.75 Expert judgment 
P (BC4) Probability of failure to detect a minor 
release by HC detection system  
0.2 8) 0.2 8) Rough calculation  
 
1) Inspection is specified in this case as P (BC11) = 0. 
2) Basis (prior) is low reliability data and execution of a fairly effective inspection for CG1. 
3) Basis (prior) is low reliability data and execution of a usually effective inspection for CG2. 
4) Condition monitoring is specified in this case as P (BC2) = 0. 
5) No use of corrosion coupons in dead legs today. 
6) Daily area inspection is specified in this case as P (BC31) = 0. 
7) Area based leak search is specified in this case as P (BC34) = 0. 
8) The barrier “System for detection of HC” is not analysed any further in this case study.  
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Based on the described models and the data in Table 5, the probabilities of failures 
of the different barriers and expected release frequencies per year are calculated as 
shown in Table 6. The annual hydrocarbon release frequency due to internal 
corrosion in the system is 0.043 releases per year. 
 
Table 6.  Scenario C – results from calculations. 
Event CG 1 CG 2 
0
Cλ  1) 0.8 1.4 
PFailure(C1) 2) 0.12 0.056 
PFailure(C2) 3) 0.32 0.64 
PFailure(C3) 4) 0.71 0.71 
PFailure(C4) 5) 0.2 0.2 
λC 6) 0.016 0.027 
 
1) Predicted release frequency with no safety barriers or corrective actions 
2) Probability of failure to reveal critical corrosion by inspection 
3) Probability of failure to reveal critical corrosion by condition monitoring 
4) Probability of failure to detect diffuse discharge 
5) Probability of failure to detect minor release 
6) Release frequency due to corrosion (per corrosion group) 
 
The main approach in order to analyse the effect of RIFs (technical conditions, 
human factors, operational conditions and organisational factors) is use of risk 
influence diagrams as applied for scenario A and B. Qualitative analyses by 
developing risk influence diagrams has been carried out for a sample of basic events 
in the fault trees for scenario C in order to carry out sensitivity analysis for 
assessment of the effect of risk reducing measures, but there has not been performed 
a complete quantitative analysis of all the risk influence diagrams. A somewhat 
different approach has been used to analyse the efficiency of inspection programs 
quantitatively. As previously described, the expected release frequency due to 
corrosion depends on our confidence to the predicted damage rate. The confidence 
to the predicted damage rate depends on the inspection efficiency; a highly efficient 
inspection program will give a higher confidence than a fairly efficient inspection 
program. The relation between the inspection program and its efficiency for local 
CO2 corrosion and MIC are described in the literature [9, 10]. The confidence will 
also depend on the inspection reliability (basic events C14 and C15 in Figure 11). 
C14 was not analysed any further in the case study, while C15 was analysed 
qualitatively by a risk influence diagram (see Figure 15). Risk influence diagrams 
for basic event C33 and C36 is shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17 respectively. 
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Figure 15.  Risk influence diagram for basic event C15. 
 
Figure 16.  Risk influence diagram for basic event C33. 
 
Figure 17.  Risk influence diagram for basic event C36. 
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3.4 Sensitivity analyses 
One of the purposes of the case study was to analyse the effect of changes and assess 
whether BORA-Release is suitable to analyse the effect of risk reducing measures 
and changes that may increase the hydrocarbon release frequency.  
 
The following risk reducing measures was analysed for scenario A and B in order to 
calculate the effect on the release frequency: 
 
1. Implementation of an additional barrier, 3rd party control of work (control of 
closed valves) for scenario A. The probability of failure to specify 3rd party 
control is 0.1.  
2. Improvement of the score of all RIFs by one grade (from D to C, from C to B, 
etc.). 
3. Improvement of the score of the RIF Communication (from D to C). This RIF 
influences basic event B33 in scenario B. 
4. Improvement of the RIF Time pressure (from D to C). This RIF influences 
several basic event in scenario A as well as scenario B. 
 
The results of the sensitivity analyses for scenario A and B are shown in Table 7. 
The sum of the release frequency for scenario A and B (λA + λB from Table 2 and 
Table 4) is used as base case frequency. 
 
Table 7.  Results from sensitivity analyses for scenario A and B. 
Sensitivity 
no. 
Input 
data 
Base case 
frequency 
Sensitivity 
frequency 
Change 
(%) 
Generic 0.0295 0.0068 -76.9 1 
Revised 0.0453 0.0143 -68.3 
Generic 0.0295 0.0295 0.0 2 
Revised 0.0453 0.0179 -60.5 
Generic 0.0295 0.0295 0.0 3 
Revised 0.0453 0.0443 -2.1 
Generic 0.0295 0.0295 0.0 4 
Revised 0.0453 0.0326 -27.9 
 
The following sensitivity analyses have been executed for scenario C in order to 
analyze the effect on the release frequency due to changes in RIFs influencing the 
corrosion scenario: 
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5. Use of corrosion coupons in dead legs. The probability of failure to detect 
critical internal corrosion by corrosion coupons in dead legs is set to 0.4 (similar 
to main flow lines). 
6. Change of efficiency of inspection programs 
a. From fairly effective to usually effective for corrosion group 1 
b. From fairly effective to highly effective for corrosion group 1 
c. From usually effective to highly effective for corrosion group 2 
d. From usually effective to fairly effective for corrosion group 2  
7. Change in the status of RIFs 
a. Worsening of the RIFs Programs (for inspection) and Supervision. The 
status is changed from C to D. These RIFs influence basic event C21.  
b. Improvement of the RIFs Painting and Tidiness and cleaning. The status is 
changes from C to A. These RIFs influence the basic events C33 and C36 
(see Figure 16 and Figure 17). 
c. Improvement of the RIFs influencing the barrier System for detection of 
hydrocarbon releases. Since this barrier is not further analysed, the 
sensitivity analysis is carried out directly by changing the probability of 
failure to detect minor release by system for HC detection from 0.2 to 0.1. 
d. Changes in RIFs influencing the distribution between diffuse, minor, and 
significant releases. The sensitivity analysis is carried out directly by 
changing the distribution to 10 % as diffuse, 40 % as minor, and 50 % as 
significant. 
 
The results from the recalculation of the release frequencies due to corrosion based 
on the revised input data are shown in Table 8. The sum of the release frequency due 
to corrosion ( 0
1CGCλ  + 0 2CGCλ  from Table 6) is used as base case frequency for 
assessment of the change in %. 
 
Table 8.  Results from sensitivity analyses for scenario C. 
Release frequency Sensitivity 
no. Original  Revised  Change (%)
5 0.043 0.029 - 31.3 
6 a 0.043 0.034 - 20.7 
6 b 0.043 0.028 - 35.3 
6 c 0.043 0.021 - 51.8 
6 d 0.043 0.074 73.3 
7 a 0.043 0.050 15.5 
7 b 0.043 0.037 - 13.2 
7 c 0.043 0.039 - 9.5 
7 d 0.043 0.053 23.6 
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The main results from the sensitivity analyses are: 
 
• Implementation of an additional barrier (3rd party control of work) in scenario A 
reduces the release frequency from scenario A and B with 77 % by use of 
generic data, and 68 % by use of revised data.  
• Improvement of the scores of all RIFs by one grade reduces the release 
frequency from scenario A and B with 61 %. 
• Improvement of the score of the RIF Communication (from D to C) reduces the 
release frequency from scenario A and B with 2 %.  
• Improvement of the RIF Time pressure (from D to C) reduces the release 
frequency from scenario A and B with 28 %.  
• Implementation of condition monitoring by use of corrosion coupons in dead 
legs reduce the expected release frequency due to corrosion by 31 %. 
• Improvement of the efficiency of the inspection program has a relative high 
influence on the release frequency due to corrosion (see sensitivity 6a, 6b, and 
6c). Changing from fairly effective to usually effective for corrosion group 1 
reduces the expected release frequency by 21 %. Changing from fairly effective 
to highly effective for corrosion group 1 reduces the expected release frequency 
by 35 %. Changing from usually effective to highly effective for corrosion 
group 2 reduces the release frequency by 52 %. 
• Reduction of the efficiency of the inspection program increases the expected 
release frequency due to corrosion. Changing from usually effective to fairly 
effective for corrosion group 2 increases the release frequency by 73 %. 
• Increased probability of occurrence of basic event C12 (Inspection specified, but 
not performed as planned) from 0.1 to 0.2 (i.e., even more of the planned 
inspections are delayed or cancelled) leads to an increase in the release 
frequency due to corrosion by 16 %. 
• Improvement of the status of the RIFs Painting, and Tidiness and cleaning has 
positive impact on the expected release frequency due to corrosion (reduction by 
13 %). 
• Changing the probability of failure to detect minor release by system for HC 
detection from 0.2 to 0.1 reduces the release frequency by 10 %. 
• Changes in the distribution between diffuse, minor and significant releases to 10 
% as diffuse, 40 % as minor, and 50 % as significant, increase the release 
frequency 24 %. 
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4 Discussion and conclusions 
BORA-Release has been used to analyse three hydrocarbon release scenarios on one 
specific oil and gas production platform on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
Application of BORA-Release for analysis of the loss of containment barrier 
evidently presents a more detailed risk picture than traditional QRA since no 
analyses of causal factors of hydrocarbon release are carried out in existing QRA. 
Analysis of consequence reducing barriers on the platform has not been within the 
scope of the case study. 
 
The qualitative modelling of the release scenarios by use of barrier block diagrams 
has raised the question of which type of barriers that most effectively may prevent 
hydrocarbon release among personnel in the oil company. One example is the 
discussions of whether 3rd party control of work to reveal potential valve(s) in wrong 
position should be implemented as part of the flowline inspection. This discussion 
was supported by the results from the sensitivity analyses that showed that 
implementation of an additional barrier (3rd party control of work) in scenario A 
reduced the release frequency from scenario A and B with 77 % by use of generic 
data and 68 % by use of revised data. Similarly, the qualitative modelling of barrier 
performance by use of fault trees and risk influence diagrams raised the 
consciousness of different RIFs that influenced the barrier performance.  
 
A main question as regards the quantitative results is whether the calculated release 
frequencies are trustworthy (i.e., we have confidence to the frequencies being able to 
provide good predictions of the actual number of releases) since the analysis is based 
on a number of assumptions and simplifications. These relate to the basic risk 
model, the generic input data, the risk influence diagrams, the scoring of RIFs, the 
weighting of RIFs, or the adjustment of the input data. The quantitative results in the 
case study for scenario A and B based on generic data were assessed to be 
reasonable compared to release statistics. This view was supported by the comments 
from the personnel from the actual oil company. The confidence in the results based 
on the revised input data was not as good due to use of the RNNS-data for scoring of 
RIFs. Since the scoring was based on few and generic questions not originally meant 
to be used as basis for RIF-scoring, the validity4 of the scoring was assessed to be 
low. The main reason for use of RNNS-data to assess the status of RIFs in the case 
study was the demand for use of existing data in order to minimize the use of 
resources from the industry representatives in the steering group for the BORA 
project. Since the revised release frequency to a high degree was influenced by the 
                                                     
4  Validity refers to whether or not it measures what it is supposed to measure [12].  
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results from the RNNS-survey, the approach chosen for scoring of RIFs should be 
discussed in the further work.  
 
Another aspect of the scoring is how specific the assessment of the status of RIFs 
needs to be. This may be illustrated by an example; is it sufficient to assess the 
competence in general for all groups of personnel on a platform, or is it necessary to 
assess the competence for each group in order to reflect differences between the 
groups? As far as possible, the level of detail should be sufficiently detailed and 
specific to reflect scenario specific factors, but in practice, it may be necessary to be 
somewhat more general.  
 
The confidence in the quantitative results from the corrosion scenario by personnel 
from the actual oil company is lower than for scenario A and B. The corrosion 
phenomenon is a complex and dynamic scenario and several assumptions made 
during the work should be further discussed. The present version is a test model and 
further research is required to better reflect how more aspects of the corrosion 
scenario influence the release frequency, e.g., the effect of the inspection reliability 
(see [13] for a discussion of attributes characterizing barrier performance). 
 
The case study has demonstrated that BORA-Release is a useful tool for analysing 
the effect on the hydrocarbon release frequency of safety barriers introduced to 
prevent hydrocarbon releases, and to study the effect on the barrier performance of 
platform specific conditions of technical, human, operational, and organizational 
RIFs. One of the main application areas of BORA-Release may be to study the 
effect on the release frequency of risk reducing measures or risk increasing changes. 
 
When it comes to further work, BORA-Release should be applied for analysis of the 
other release scenarios described in [5]. This set of release scenarios is considered to 
constitute a comprehensive and representative set of hydrocarbon release scenarios 
where the initiating events cover the most frequent “causes” of hydrocarbon 
releases. The scenarios include the most important barrier functions and barrier 
systems introduced prevent hydrocarbon release. A detailed analysis of these 
scenarios will increase the knowledge about how safety barriers influence the release 
frequency, and how technical, human, operational, and organisational RIFs influence 
the barrier performance on a platform. 
 
The main focus on the further development of BORA-Release should be on other 
methods for assessment of the status of RIFs. Two possible ways are use of results 
from the TTS project [14], or to develop specific scoring schemes for the different 
RIFs similar to BARS as described in Jacobs and Haber [15]. Since the main focus 
Barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release); 
Part II Results from a case study 
31 
of the TTS project is on technical aspects of technical barriers, a combination of 
these two methods may be a possible approach. However, TTS projects are not 
carried out on all platforms on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. A more detailed 
discussion of BORA-Release in general and the different steps is presented in [3]. 
 
As stated, this case study has focused on analysis of the loss of containment. Further 
development of BORA-Release should also make an attempt to apply the method on 
consequence reducing barriers in order to test how suitable the method is for an 
overall risk analysis. An overall risk model including preventive, controlling, and 
protective barriers will also make it possible to analyse the effect of potential 
dependencies (common-cause failures) between different barriers in the event 
sequence.  
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Abstract
Even if the focus on risk management is increasing in our society, major accidents resulting in several fatalities seem to be unavoidable
in some industries. Since the consequences of such major accidents are unacceptable, a thorough investigation of the accidents should be
performed in order to learn from what has happened, and prevent future accidents.
During the last decades, a number of methods for accident investigation have been developed. Each of these methods has different areas of
application and different qualities and deficiencies. A combination of several methods ought to be used in a comprehensive investigation of a
complex accident.
This paper gives a brief description of a selection of some important, recognised, and commonly used methods for investigation of accidents.
Further, the selected methods are compared according to important characteristics.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Accident investigation; Risk management; Accidents
1. Introduction
Even if the frequency is low, major accidents seem to
be unavoidable in some low-frequency, high consequence
industries. The process industry accidents at Longford
[1] and on the Piper Alpha platform [2], the loss of the
space-shuttles Challenger [3] and Colombia [4], the high
speed craft Sleipner-accident [5], and the railway accidents
at Ladbroke Grove [6] and Åsta [7] are all tragic examples
on major accidents in different industries. The consequences
of such major accidents are not accepted in our society,
therefore major accidents should be investigated in order
to prevent them from reoccurring (called organisational
learning by [8]). This is also in accordance with the evolu-
tionary strategy for risk management (one out of three main
strategies) described by [9].1
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1 [9] described the following three strategies for risk management:
• The empirical strategy, which is related to occupational safety (frequent,
but small-scale accidents), and safety is typically controlled empirically
from epidemiological studies of past accidents.
• The evolutionary strategy, where protection against medium size, in-
frequent accidents evolve from design improvements in response to
analysis of the individual, latest major accidents.
• The analytical strategy, where protection against very rare and un-
acceptable accidents must be based on reliable, predictive models of
accident processes and probability of occurrences (probabilistic risk/
safety analysis.
The accident investigation process is described somewhat
different by different authors. DOE [10] divides the process
in three (partially overlapping) main phases: (i) collection
of evidence and facts; (ii) analysis of evidence and facts and
development of conclusions; and (iii) development of judge-
ments and need and writing the report. Other authors, like
Kjellén [11], also include the implementation and follow-up
of recommendations as part of the investigation. The focus
in this paper is on phase (ii), more specifically on methods
available for analysis of evidence and facts helpful for de-
velopment of conclusions.
CCPS [12] describes three main purposes of techniques
for accident investigation. The first purpose is to organise
information about the accident once evidence has been col-
lected. The second is to help in describing accident causa-
tion and developing hypothesis for further examination by
experts, and the last is to help with the assessment of pro-
posed corrective actions. In addition, the analytical tech-
niques may also ensure that the results are transparent and
verifiable.
During the last decades, a number of methods for acci-
dent investigation have been developed and described in the
literature. Authors like Johnson [13], Handrick and Benner
[14], Groeneweg [15] and Svensson [16] have developed
and described their own investigation method, while CCPS
[10], DOE [12] and [17] have reviewed and described sev-
eral methods. In addition, a lot of companies and authorities
0304-3894/$ – see front matter © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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in different countries have developed their own manuals for
investigation of accidents.
Each of these methods has different areas of application
and different qualities and deficiencies. Therefore, a com-
bination of several methods ought to be used in a compre-
hensive investigation of a complex accident. There are two
main objectives of the paper. The first objective is to give a
brief description of some important, recognised, and com-
monly used methods for investigation of accidents, and the
second is to compare and discuss these methods according
to some characteristics.
The accident investigation process is briefly introduced
in this section. The next section outlines the characteristics
which the different methods for accident investigation are
compared according to. Further, a brief description of the
selected methods is given, and the methods are compared
according to the described characteristics. In the last section
the discussion is concluded.
2. Framework for comparison of accident
investigation methods
Within the field of accident investigation, there is no
common agreement of definitions of concepts, but tend
to be a little confusion of ideas. Especially the notion of
cause has been discussed in the literature. While some in-
vestigators focus on causal factors [18], others focus on
determining factors [19], contributing factors [1], active
failures and latent conditions [20], or safety problems [14].
Kletz [21] recommends avoiding the word cause in acci-
dent investigations and rather talk about what might have
prevented the accident. Despite different accident investi-
gators may use different terms, frameworks and methods
during the investigation process, their conclusions about
what happened, why it happened and what may be done
in order to prevent future accidents ought to be the same.
Use of formal methods for investigation of major acci-
dents may support the investigators during the investigation
process and in the presentation of results and recommen-
dations. Further in this section, some important charac-
teristics of these methods are considered. The selected
methods will be compared to these properties later in the
paper.
Regardless of the purpose of an accident investigation,
any conclusion should be based on a complete understanding
of the events leading to the accident. Whether the methods
give a graphical description of the event sequence or not is
the first characteristic discussed. A graphical description of
the accident sequence may be useful during the investigation
process because it gives an easy understandable overview
of the events leading to the accident and the relation be-
tween different events. Further, it facilitates communication
among the investigators and the informants and makes
it easy to identify eventually “missing links” or lack of
information.
An important principle for prevention of major accidents
is the principle of defence-in-depth [20,22,23] (also denoted
as multiple safety barriers or multiple layers of protection).
Analysis of major accidents should therefore include an anal-
ysis of how safety barriers influenced the accident. To what
degree the methods focus on safety barriers is therefore the
second feature compared.
The level of scope of the different analysis methods
(from the work and technological system to the Government
level) is the third attribute discussed due to the arguments
presented by Rasmussen [9] who states that all actors
or decision-makers influencing the normal work process
might also influence accident scenarios, either directly or
indirectly. This complexity should also be reflected in ac-
cident investigations. The selected methods are compared
according to a classification of the socio-technical system
involved in the control of safety (or hazardous processes)
[9], comprising the following levels:
1. The work and technological system.
2. The staff level.
3. The management level.
4. The company level.
5. The regulators and associations level.
6. The Government level.
The next characteristic considered, is what kind of acci-
dent models that have influenced the method. This charac-
teristic is assessed because the investigators’ mental models
of the accident influence their view of accident causation.
The following accident models are used (further description
of the models is given by Kjellén [11]):
A. Causal-sequence model.
B. Process model.
C. Energy model.
D. Logical tree model.
E. SHE-management models.
Whether the different methods are inductive, deductive,
morphological or non-system-oriented is also discussed. The
deductive approach involves reasoning from the general to
the specific, the inductive approach means reasoning from
individual cases to a general conclusion, while the morpho-
logical approach is based on the structure of the system be-
ing studied.
Further, the different investigation methods are cate-
gorised as primary or secondary methods. Primary methods
are stand-alone techniques, while secondary methods pro-
vide special input as supplement to other methods.
The last attribute discussed, is the need for education and
training in order to use the methods. The terms “Expert”,
“Specialist” and “Novice” are used. Expert indicates that
formal education and training are required before people are
able to use the methods in a proper way. Novice indicates that
people are able to use the methods after an introduction to the
methods without hands-on training or experience. Specialist
is somewhere between expert and novice.
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3. Methods for accident investigation
A number of methods for accident investigation have been
developed, with their own strengths and weaknesses. Some
methods of great importance are selected for further exami-
nation in this paper. The selection of methods is based on the
following selection criteria: The methods should be widely
used in practice, well acknowledged, described in the liter-
ature and some of the methods should be relatively recently
developed. Based on these criteria, the following methods
were selected for comparison:
• Events and causal factors charting and analysis.
• Barrier analysis.
• Change analysis.
• Root cause analysis.
• Fault tree analysis.
• Influence diagram.
• Event tree analysis.
• Management and Oversight Risk Tree (MORT).
• Systematic Cause Analysis Technique (SCAT).
• Sequential Timed Events Plotting (STEP).
• Man, Technology and Organisation (MTO)-analysis.
• The Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB)-
method.
• TRIPOD.
• Acci-Map.
3.1. Events and causal factors charting (ECFC) and
events and causal factors analysis
Events and causal factors charting [10] is a graphical dis-
play of the accident’s chronology, and is used primarily for
compiling and organising evidence to portray the sequence
of the accident’s events. The events and causal factors chart
consists of the primary events sequence, secondary events
sequences and conditions influencing the events.
The primary sequence of events that led to an accident
is drawn horizontally, chronologically, from left to right in
the diagram. Secondary events are then added to the events
and causal factors chart, inserted where appropriate in a line
above the primary sequence line. Events are active and are
stated using one noun and one active verb. Conditions that
affect either the primary or secondary events are then placed
above or below these events. Conditions are passive and
describe states or circumstances rather than occurrences or
events.
Events and causal factors analysis is the application of
analysis to determine causal factors by identifying signifi-
cant events and conditions that led to the accident. As the
results from other analytical techniques are completed, they
are incorporated into the events and causal factors chart.
“Assumed” events and conditions may also be incorporated
in the chart.
The events and causal factors chart are used to determine
the causal factors of an accident, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Causal factor
Causal factor
Condition
Condition
Event EventEventEvent
How did the
conditions originate?
Why did the system
allow the conditions
to exist?
Why did this event
happen?
Ask questions to
determine causal
factors (why, how,
what, and who)
Event chain
Fig. 1. Events and causal factors analysis [10].
This process is an important first step in later determining
the root causes of an accident. Events and causal factors
analysis requires deductive reasoning to determine which
events and/or conditions that contributed to the accident.
3.2. Barrier analysis
Barrier analysis [10] is used to identify hazards associated
with an accident and the barriers that should have been in
place to prevent it.
A barrier is any means used to control, prevent, or im-
pede the hazard from reaching the target. Two main types
of barriers are described: physical barriers and management
barriers. To analyse management barriers, investigators may
need to obtain information about barriers at three organisa-
tional levels responsible for the work: the activity, facility
and institutional levels.
The barrier analysis addresses:
• Barriers that were in place and how they performed.
• Barriers that were in place but not used.
• Barriers that were not in place but were required.
• The barrier(s) that, if present or strengthened, would pre-
vent the same or similar accidents from occurring in the
future.
The basic steps in a barrier analysis are:
1. Identify the hazard and the target.
2. Identify each barrier.
3. Identify how the barrier performed.
4. Identify and consider probable causes for the barrier fail-
ure.
5. Evaluate the consequences of the failure in this accident.
3.3. Change analysis
Change analysis [10] examines planned or unplanned
changes that caused undesired outcomes. Change is any-
thing that disturbs the “balance” of a system operating as
planned. Changes are often the sources of deviations in sys-
tem operations. In an accident investigation, this technique
is used to examine an accident by analysing the difference
between what has occurred before or was expected and the
32 S. Sklet / Journal of Hazardous Materials 111 (2004) 29–37
actual sequence of events. The investigator performing the
change analysis identifies specific differences between the
accident–free situation and the accident scenario. These dif-
ferences are evaluated to determine whether the differences
caused or contributed to the accident.
3.4. Root cause analysis
DOE [10] describes Root cause analysis as any analysis
that identifies underlying deficiencies in a safety manage-
ment system that, if corrected, would prevent the same and
similar accidents from occurring. Root cause analysis is a
systematic process that uses the facts and results from the
core analytic techniques to determine the most important
reasons for the accident. While the core analytic techniques
should provide answers to questions regarding what, when,
where, who, and how, Root cause analysis should resolve the
question why. Root cause analysis requires a certain amount
of judgement.
A rather exhaustive list of causal factors must be devel-
oped prior to the application of root cause analysis to ensure
that final root causes are accurate and comprehensive. One
method for Root cause analysis described by DOE is TIER-
diagramming. TIER-diagramming is used to identify both
the root causes of an accident and the level of line manage-
ment that has the responsibility and authority to correct the
accident’s causal factors.
3.5. Fault tree analysis
Fault tree analysis is a method for determining the causes
of an accident (or top event) [24]. The fault tree is a graphic
model that displays the various combinations of normal
events by use of logic gates, equipment failures, human er-
rors, and environmental factors that can result in an acci-
dent. A fault tree analysis may be qualitative, quantitative,
or both. Possible results from the analysis may be a listing of
the possible combinations of environmental factors, human
errors, normal events and component failures that may re-
sult in a critical event in the system and the probability that
the critical event will occur during a specified time interval.
The strengths of the fault tree, as a qualitative tool are its
ability to break down an accident into root causes.
3.6. Influence diagram
Influence diagram may also be used to analyse the hierar-
chy of root causes of system failures: management decisions,
human errors, and component failures (see Fig. 2) [25].
First, the elements (basic events and the dependencies
among them) of the accident sequence (noted Ei) are system-
atically identified. The “failure path” or accident sequence
in the Piper Alpha accident included: (1) initiating events;
(2) intermediate developments and direct consequences of
these initiating events; (3) final systems’ states; and (4) con-
sequences (i.e., the losses of the accident).
Ok
Aij
Ei
Organizational
level
Decisions and
actions level
Basic events
(component failures
and operator errors)
Effects
on component reliability
Decisions in
specific cases
Meta decisions
Process, procedures,
structure, culture
Fig. 2. Hierarchy of root causes of system failures [25].
Second, for each of these basic events, the human deci-
sions and actions (noted Aij) influencing these basic events
are identified and classified in meaningful categories (in the
case of Piper Alpha, these categories were: (i) design de-
cisions; (ii) production and expansion decisions; (iii) per-
sonnel management; and (iv) inspection, maintenance, and
correction of detected problems).
The third step is to relate the decisions, human errors,
and questionable judgements that contribute to the acci-
dent to a certain number of basic organisational factors.
These factors may be rooted in the characteristics of the
company, the industry or even the government authori-
ties.
Both the basic events (accident scenario), the decisions
and actions influencing these basic events, the basic organ-
isational factors, and the dependencies among them, are il-
lustrated in an influence diagram.
3.7. Event tree analysis
An event tree is used to analyse event sequences follow-
ing after an initiating event [26]. The event sequence is in-
fluenced by either success or failure of numerous barriers or
safety functions/systems. The event sequence leads to a set
of possible consequences. The consequences may be con-
sidered as acceptable or unacceptable. The event sequence
is illustrated graphically where each safety system is mod-
elled for two states, operation and failure.
An Event tree analysis is primarily a proactive risk analy-
sis method used to identify possible event sequences, but the
event tree may also be used to identify and illustrate event
sequences and to obtain a qualitative and quantitative rep-
resentation and assessment. In an accident investigation we
may illustrate the accident path as one of the possible event
sequences.
3.8. MORT
MORT [13] provides a systematic method (analytic tree)
for planning, organising, and conduction a comprehensive
accident investigation. Through MORT analysis, investi-
gators identify deficiencies in specific control factors and
in management system factors. These factors are eval-
uated and analysed to identify the causal factors of the
accident.
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Lack of
control LossIncident
Immediate
causes
Basic
causes
Inadequate:
Program
Program
standards
Compliance
to standards
Personal
factors
Job factors
People
Property
Product
Environment
Service
Contact with
energy,
substance
or people
Substandard
acts
Substandard
conditions
Fig. 3. The ILCI Loss Causation Model [27].
Basically, MORT is a graphical checklist in which con-
tains generic questions that investigators attempt to answer
using available factual data. This enables investigators to fo-
cus on potential key causal factors.
3.9. Systematic Cause Analysis Technique (SCAT)
The International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) developed
SCAT [12] for the support of occupational incident investi-
gation. The ILCI Loss Causation Model [27] is the frame-
work for the SCAT system (see Fig. 3).
The Systematic Cause Analysis Technique is a tool to
aid an investigation and evaluation of accidents through the
application of SCAT chart. The chart acts as a checklist to
ensure that an investigation has looked at all facets of an
accident. There are five blocks on a SCAT chart. Each block
corresponds to a block of the Loss Causation Models.
3.10. Sequential Timed Events Plotting (STEP)
The STEP-method [14] proposes a systematic process for
accident investigation based on multi-linear sequences of
events and a process view of the accident phenomena. STEP
builds on four concepts:
1. Neither the accident nor its investigation is a single linear
sequence of events. Rather, several activities take place
at the same time.
2. The event Building Block format for data is used to de-
velop the accident description in a worksheet. A building
block describes one event, i.e., one actor performing one
action.
3. Events flow logically during a process. Arrows in the
STEP worksheet illustrate the flow.
4. Both productive and accident processes are similar and
can be understood using similar investigation procedures.
They both involve actors and actions, and both are capa-
ble of being repeated once they are understood.
A STEP-worksheet provides a systematic way to organ-
ise the building blocks into a comprehensive, multi-linear
description of the accident process. The STEP worksheet is
simply a matrix, with one row for each actor and events (an
action performed by an actor) along a horizontally timescale.
Arrows are used to link tested relationships among events in
the accident sequence. The STEP methodology also includes
a recommended method for identification of safety problems
and development of safety recommendations. Safety prob-
lems are marked with diamonds in the STEP worksheet.
3.11. MTO-analysis
The basis for the MTO-analysis is that human, organisa-
tional, and technical factors should be focused equally in
an accident investigation [28,29].2 The method is based on
Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) which
is not described further in this paper.
The MTO-analysis is based on three methods:
1. Structured analysis by use of an event- and cause-
diagrams.
2. Change analysis by describing how events have deviated
from earlier events or common practice.
3. Barrier analysis by identifying technological and admin-
istrative barriers in which have failed or are missing.
Fig. 4 illustrates the MTO-analysis worksheet. The first
step in an MTO-analysis is to develop the event sequence
longitudinally and illustrate the event sequence in a block
diagram. The next step is to identify possible technical and
human causes of each event and draw these vertically to
each event in the diagram. Further, analyse which techni-
cal, human or organisational barriers that have failed or
was missing during the accident progress and illustrate all
missing or failed barriers below the events in the diagram.
Assess which deviations or changes in which differ the ac-
cident progress from the normal situation. These changes
are also illustrated in the diagram (see Fig. 4).
A checklist for identification of failure causes is also
part of the MTO-methodology [29]. The checklist con-
tains the following factors: Work organisation, Work
practice, Management of work, Change procedures, Er-
gonomic/deficiencies in the technology, Communication,
Instructions/procedures, Education/competence, and Work
environment. For each of these failure causes, there is a
detailed checklist for basic or fundamental causes.
2 The MTO-analysis has been widely used in the Norwegian offshore
industry recently, but it has been difficult to obtain a comprehensive
description of the method.
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Fig. 4. MTO-analysis worksheet.
3.12. Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB)
method
The Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB) [16]
model provides a method for analysis of incidents and acci-
dents that models the evolution towards an incident–accident
as a series of interactions between human and technical sys-
tems. The interaction consists of failures, malfunctions or
errors that could lead to or have resulted in an accident. The
method forces analysts to integrate human and technical sys-
tems simultaneously when performing an accident analysis
starting with the simple flow chart technique of the method.
The flow chart initially consists of empty boxes in two
parallel columns, one for the human systems and one for the
technical systems. During the analysis these error boxes are
identified as the failures, malfunctions or errors that consti-
tute the accident evolution. In general, the sequence of er-
ror boxes in the diagram follows the time order of events.
Between each pair of successive error boxes there is a pos-
sibility to arrest the evolution towards an incident/accident.
Barrier function systems (e.g., computer programs) that are
activated can arrest the evolution through effective barrier
functions (e.g., the computer making an incorrect human in-
tervention modelled in the next error box impossible through
blocking a control).
3.13. TRIPOD Beta
The idea behind TRIPOD [15] is that organisational fail-
ures are the main factors in accident causation. These factors
AccidentFailed controls
or defences
Latent
failure(s) Precondition(s)
Active
failure(s)
Fig. 6. TRIPOD Beta Accident Causation Model.
Hazard
Accident/
event
Victim or
target
Failed control
Failed defence
Fig. 5. “Accident mechanism” according to HEMP.
are more “latent” and, when contributing to an accident, are
always followed by a number of technical and human errors.
The TRIPOD Beta-tool is a computer-based instrument
that provides the user with a tree-like overview of the acci-
dent that is investigated. It is a menu driven tool that will
guide the investigator through the process of making an elec-
tronic representation of the accident.
The BETA-tool merges two different models, the Haz-
ard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) model and
the TRIPOD model. The merge has resulted in an incident
causation model that differs conceptually from the original
TRIPOD model. The HEMP model is presented in Fig. 5.
The TRIPOD Beta accident causation model is presented
in Fig. 6. The latent failures are related to 11 defined Basic
Risk Factors (BRF). This string is used to identify the causes
that lead to the breaching of the controls and defences pre-
sented in the HEMP model.
Although the model presented in Fig. 6 looks like the orig-
inal TRIPOD model [31], its components and assumptions
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are different. In the Beta-model the defences and controls are
directly linked to unsafe acts, preconditions and latent fail-
ures. Unsafe acts describe how the barriers were breached
and the latent failures why the barriers were breached.
3.14. Acci-map
Rasmussen and Svedung [30] described a recently de-
veloped methodology for proactive risk management in a
dynamic society. The methodology is not a pure accident
investigation tool, but a description of some aspects of their
methodology is included because it gives some interesting
and useful perspectives on risk management and accident
investigation not apparent in the other methods.
They call attention to the fact that many nested levels
of decision-making are involved in risk management and
regulatory rule making to control hazardous processes. Low
risk operation depends on proper co-ordination of decision
making at all levels.
4. Comparison and discussion
The methods briefly described above are compared ac-
cording to the following characteristics (described in an ear-
lier section):
• Whether the methods give a graphical description of the
event sequence or not?
• To what degree the methods focus on safety barriers?
• The level of scope of the analysis.
• What kind of accident models that has influenced the
methods?
• Whether the different methods are inductive, deductive,
morphological or non-system-oriented?
• Whether the different methods are primary or secondary
methods?
Table 1
Characteristics of different accident investigation methods
Method Accident
sequence
Focus on
safety barriers
Levels of
analysis
Accident
model
Primary/secondary Analytical approach Training need
Events and causal factors charting Yes No 1–4 B Primary Non-system oriented Novice
Events and causal factors analysis Yes Yes 1–4 B Secondary Non-system oriented Specialist
Barrier analysis No Yes 1–2 C Secondary Non-system oriented Novice
Change analysis No No 1–4 B Secondary Non-system oriented Novice
Root cause analysis No No 1–4 A Secondary Non-system oriented Specialist
Fault tree analysis No Yes 1–2 D Primary/Secondary Deductive Expert
Influence diagram No Yes 1–6 B/E Secondary Non-system oriented Specialist
Event Tree analysis No Yes 1–3 D Primary/Secondary Inductive Specialist
MORT No Yes 2–4 D/E Secondary Deductive Expert
SCAT No No 1–4 A/E Secondary Non-system oriented Specialist
STEP Yes No 1–6 B Primary Non-system oriented Novice
MTO-analysis Yes Yes 1–4 B Primary Non-system oriented Specialist/expert
AEB-method No Yes 1–3 B Secondary Morpho-logical Specialist
TRIPOD Yes Yes 1–4 A Primary Non-system oriented Specialist
Acci-Map No Yes 1–6 A/B/D/E Primary Deductive & inductive Expert
• The need for education and training in order to use the
methods.
A summary of this comparison is shown in Table 1.
The first characteristic is whether the methods give a
graphical description of the event sequence or not. The meth-
ods ECFC, STEP and MTO-analysis all give a graphical il-
lustration of the whole accident scenario. By use of ECFC
and MTO-analysis, the events are drawn along a single hori-
zontal axis, while the STEP diagram in addition includes the
different actors along a vertical axis. My subjective opinion
is that STEP gives the best overview of the event sequence.
This method makes it easy to illustrate simultaneous events
and the different relationships between events (one-to-one,
one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-many). The “single
axis” approach used by ECFC and MTO-analysis is not able
to illustrate these complex relationships that may lead to
major accidents, as well as STEP.
The graphical illustrations used by ECFC and MTO-
analysis also include conditions that influenced the event se-
quence and causal factors that lead to the accident. In STEP,
safety problems are illustrated only by triangles or diamonds
and are analysed separately. A strength of the MTO-analysis
is that both the results from the change analysis and the
barrier analysis are illustrated in the graphical diagram.
Some of the other methods also include graphical sym-
bols as part of the method, but none of them illustrate
the total accident scenario. The fault tree analysis uses
predefined symbols in order to visualise the causes of an
initiating event, while the event tree uses graphical anno-
tation to illustrate possible event sequences following after
an initiating event influenced by the success or failure of
different safety systems or barriers. Dependencies between
different events in the accident scenario are illustrated in the
influence diagram. The AEB method illustrates the different
human and technical failures or malfunctions leading to an
accident (but not the total event sequence). The TRIPOD
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Beta illustrates graphically a target (e.g., worker), a hazard
(e.g., hot pipework) and the event (e.g., worker gets burned)
in addition to the failed or missing defences caused by ac-
tive failures, preconditions and latent failures (BRF) (“event
trios”).
Several of the methods focus on safety barriers. First of
all, the only purpose of barrier analysis is analysis of safety
barriers. The results from the barrier analysis may also be
included in the Events and Causal Factor Analysis as causal
factors. The fault tree analysis is suitable for analysis of fail-
ures of barriers, while the Event tree analysis may be used
to analyse the effect of failure or success of different safety
barriers. Failure or loss of safety barriers may be illustrated
directly in an influence diagram. In a STEP-analysis, miss-
ing, or failures of barriers may be illustrated as safety prob-
lems and investigated further in separate analyses. Analyses
of barriers are separate parts of both MTO-analysis and the
AEB-method. Both failed and functioning barriers are illus-
trated in the schemes. TRIPOD Beta used the term defence,
and identification and analysis of missing defences is a vital
part of the tool. An assessment of whether barriers are less
than adequate (LTA) is also a part of MORT. Acci-Map does
not focus directly on safety barriers, but indirectly through
the effects of decisions made by decision-makers at all lev-
els of the socio-technical system.
Concerning the scope of the methods, it seems as the
scope of most of the methods is limited to Level 1 (the work
and technological system) to Level 4 (the company level) of
the socio-technical system involved in the control of safety
(or hazardous processes). Although STEP was originally
developed to cover Level 1–4, experience from SINTEF’s
accident investigations show that the method also may be
used to analyse events influenced by the regulators and the
Government. In addition to STEP, only influence diagram
and Acci-Map put focus on Level 5 and 6. This means that
investigators focusing on the Government and the regulators
in their accident investigation to a great extend need to base
their analysis on experience and practical judgement, more
than on results from formal analytical methods.
The investigation methods are influenced by different ac-
cident models. Both the Root cause analysis, SCAT and
TRIPOD are based on causal-sequence models. Events and
causal charting and analysis, change analysis, STEP, MTO-
analysis, and the AEB-method are all based on process
models. The barrier analysis is based on the energy model,
while fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis and MORT are
based on logical tree models. MORT and SCAT are also
based on SHE-management models. The influence diagram
is based on a combination of a process model and a SHE-
management model, while the Acci-map is based on a com-
bination of a causal-sequence model, a process model, a
logical tree model, and a SHE-management model.
There is also made an assessment whether the methods are
a primary method or a secondary method. Primary methods
are stand-alone techniques, while secondary methods pro-
vide special input as supplement to other methods. Events
and Causal Factors Charting and Analysis, STEP, MTO-
analysis, TRIPOD and Acci-map are all primary methods.
The fault tree analysis and Event tree analysis might be both
primary and secondary methods. The other methods are sec-
ondary methods that might give valuable input to the other
investigation methods.
The different methods may have a deductive, inductive,
morphological, or non-system oriented approach. Fault tree
analysis and MORT are deductive methods while event three
analysis is an inductive method. Acci-map might be both
inductive and deductive. The AEB-method is characterised
as morphological, while the other methods are non-system
oriented.
The last characteristic assessed, is the need of educa-
tion and training in order to use the methods. The terms
“Expert”, “Specialist” and “Novice” are used in the table.
Fault tree analysis, MORT and Acci-map enter into the
“expert”-category. ECFC, barrier analysis, change analysis
and STEP enter into the category “novice”. “Specialist” is
somewhere between “expert” and “novice”, and Events and
Causal Factors Analysis, Root cause analysis, Event tree
analysis, SCAT, MTO-analysis, AEB-method and TRIPOD
enter into this category.
5. Conclusion
Seen from a safety scientist’s view, the aim of accident
investigations should be to identify the event sequences and
all (causal) factors influencing the accident scenario in or-
der to be able to suggest risk reducing measures suitable for
prevention of future accidents. Experience from accidents
shows that major accidents almost never result from one sin-
gle cause, but most accidents involve multiple, interrelated,
causal factors. All actors or decision-makers influencing the
normal work process might also influence accident scenar-
ios, either directly or indirectly. This complexity should be
reflected in the accident investigation process, and there may
be need for analytical techniques to support the investigators
to structure information and focus on the most important
features.
Several methods for accident investigation have been de-
veloped during the last decades. Each of the methods has
different areas of application and qualities and deficiencies,
such that a combination of methods ought to be used in a
comprehensive investigation of a complex accident. A selec-
tion of methods is described in this paper and the methods
are compared according to some characteristics. This com-
parison is summarised in Table 1.
Some of the methods may be used to visualise the ac-
cident sequence, and are useful during the investigation
process because it provides an effective visual aid that sum-
marises key information and provide a structured method
for collecting, organising and integrating collected evidence
to facilitate communication among the investigators. Graph-
ical illustrations also help identifying information gaps.
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Most of the examined methods include an analysis of
safety barriers, but it seems that most of the methods are lim-
ited to focus on Level 1 (the work and technological system)
to Level 4 (the company level) of the socio-technical system
involved in the control of safety (or hazardous processes).
This means that investigators focusing on the Government
and the regulators in their accident investigation to a great
extend need to base their analysis on experience and practi-
cal judgement, more than on results from formal analytical
methods.
During the investigation process, different methods might
be used in order to analyse arising problem areas. Among
a multi-disciplinary investigation team, there should be at
least one member having good knowledge about the different
accident investigation methods, being able to choose the
proper methods for analysing the different problems. Just
like the technicians have to choose the right tool on order
to repair a technical system, an accident investigator has to
choose proper methods analysing different problem areas.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
There has been established a common goal 
to reduce the number of major hydrocarbon 
(HC) releases by 50 % in the Norwegian oil 
and gas industry. Several initiatives have 
been established including initiatives focus-
ing on barriers to improve the safety stan-
dards. It has been stressed that leakages 
could serve as the most leading indicator 
with regards to major accidents (Øien & 
Sklet, 2001).  
Traditionally a lot of attention has been 
directed towards leakages from the topside 
process equipment on the platforms. How-
ever, in order to meet the overall objectives 
of the industry, focus should also be put on 
the risk of release due to well interventions. 
The operator company is responsible for 
running the continuous process on the plat-
form, whereas well interventions are inter-
rupted activities mainly performed as short-
time projects by contractor companies (well 
service companies). This means that the in-
terfaces between the operator company and 
the contractors are of great interest as re-
gards planning, co-operation, communica-
tion, etc. Well interventions are often the 
subject of time pressure from both the proc-
ess side and the drilling side that may lead 
to conflict of interest between productivity 
and safety.  
The Petroleum Safety Authorities Nor-
way (PSA) consider control of safety barri-
ers as an important means in order to control 
the risk on oil and gas production platforms, 
and focus on control of safety barriers in 
their safety regulations (PSA, 2001). 
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barriers aimed to prevent release of hydrocarbons during wireline operations. 
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In 2002, PSA initiated a project that fo-
cused on the risk of release of hydrocarbons 
during well interventions. The main objec-
tive of this project has been to ensure a bet-
ter and more systematic understanding of 
human, technological and organizational as-
pects of the risk associated with well inter-
ventions.  
Further, the objectives may be summa-
rized as:  
− To improve planning (both onshore and 
offshore) and improve the co-operation 
between onshore and offshore personnel. 
− To identify both physical and non-
physical barriers aimed to prevent release 
of hydrocarbons during wireline opera-
tions (WL).  
− To ensure transfer of experience between 
companies.  
− To improve the understanding of well in-
terventions for the authorities by per-
forming a case study focusing on wire-
line operations.  
One way to achieve these objectives has 
been to establish contact and cooperation 
between risk analysts, accident investigators 
and operational personnel in oil companies 
and wireline contractors. 
1.2 Purpose of the paper 
This paper presents some main results from 
the previously mentioned project, and the 
purposes of the paper are; a) to give a short 
descriptions of some characteristics of wire-
line operations and well barriers, b) to pre-
sent some findings from a review of wire-
line incident reports, and c) to present a set 
of release scenarios that may lead to release 
of hydrocarbons during wireline operations. 
These scenarios include safety barriers 
aimed to prevent or reduce the size of the re-
leases during wireline operations. 
1.3 Wireline operations 
There are three types of well interventions; 
coiled tubing operations, wireline opera-
tions, and snubbing operations. Our project 
focused on wireline operations, and wireline 
operations are also treated in this paper. 
However, the same methodology may be 
used in order to analyze the risk of release 
of hydrocarbons associated with coiled tub-
ing and snubbing operations. 
Wireline operations are performed in or-
der to maintain the wells and are applied in 
all phases of a well's life. The tools and 
equipment are conveyed into wells either 
through an "open hole" without surface 
pressure, or through special pressure control 
equipment which allows the toolstrings to 
be conveyed into live wells with full pro-
duction pressure. Wireline services encom-
pass slick, braided or electric line. Typical 
operational objectives are; mechanical op-
erations like setting plugs, well clean up like 
removal of sand or debris, explosive ser-
vices like punching or perforation, and data 
acquisition like production logging (MWS, 
2004).  
The wireline equipment is assembled on 
the top of the valve tree, and the main ele-
ments are the well head adaptor, wireline 
riser, wireline blowout preventing valve(s) 
(BOP), lubricator, stuffing box, grease in-
jection system, wireline, winch, depth indi-
cator, weight indicator and systems for pres-
sure control (Jørgensen, 1998). 
A wireline operation is made up of the 
following main steps; 
1 Develop well operation plan 
2 Spot wireline equipment 
3 Hand-over of well from the production 
department to the well and drilling de-
partment 
4 Hook-up and test wireline riser/BOP 
equipment 
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5 Rig-up wireline equipment with pressure 
control equipment 
6 Run in hole, perform wireline opera-
tion(s), and pull out of hole 
7 Hand-over of well from the well and 
drilling department to the production de-
partment  
8 Rig-down wireline equipment 
The total number of wireline operations 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf is sev-
eral hundreds per year. Due to maturing oil 
fields and the need to maintain the wells, the 
number of wireline operations will increase 
the next years. This is also explained by 
technological innovations, the market for 
wireline operations are expanded and eating 
market shares from both snubbing opera-
tions and coiled tubing operations.  
1.4 Well barriers 
In most hazardous industries there have 
been long traditions using barriers to control 
the release of energy. The barrier concept 
can be traced back to Haddon (1970, 1980) 
who developed Gibson´s (1961) energy and 
barrier perspectives for accident prevention. 
Reason (1997) extended this model to in-
clude the principle of defences in depth, 
meaning that a whole set of barriers were 
needed to control the release of energy or to 
prevent an accident or to reduce the impact 
of an accident.  
In the nuclear industry the IAEA (1999) 
describes the defence-in-depth principle in 
the following way: "To compensate for po-
tential human and mechanical failures, a de-
fence in depth concept is implemented, cen-
tred on several levels of protection including 
successive barriers preventing the release of 
radioactive material to the environment. The 
concept includes protection of the barriers 
by averting damage to the plant and to the 
barriers themselves. It includes further 
measures to protect the public and the envi-
ronment from harm in case these barriers are 
not fully effective". 
Traditionally, the focus on barriers 
within the “drilling and well intervention 
sphere” has been rather technical or physical 
which is illustrated by the following defini-
tion of well barrier in a NORSOK standard; 
well barrier is defined as well envelope of 
one or several dependent barrier elements 
preventing fluids or gases from flowing un-
intentionally from the formation, into an-
other formation or to surface (NORSOK, 
2004). The defined well barriers in this 
standard for wireline operations are illus-
trated in Figure 1. 
The well barrier elements are classified 
as primary well barriers or secondary well 
barriers as shown in Table 1, and from this 
table we see that all the well barrier ele-
ments are physical. Furthermore, we see that 
most of the elements are placed down in the 
well, but the subject of interest in our pro-
ject has been the wireline equipment assem-
bled on top of the valve tree. 
However, experience from well interven-
tion incident reports shows that it is impor-
tant not only to focus on the technical as-
pects of the barriers. The incident reports 
show that it is also important to include hu-
man and organizational aspects to enable the 
physical barriers to function and be main-
tained. Operational activities as leak tests 
functions as barriers against failure of the 
physical envelope preventing fluids or gas 
from flowing from the formation. 
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Legend;  
BLR – wireline BOP cable ram 
SLR – wireline BOP slick line ram 
SSR – wireline BOP cut valve, integrated in 
wireline BOP 
 
Figure 1. Well barrier elements (NORSOK, 
2004). 
 
Table 1: Well barrier elements (NORSOK, 
2004). 
Well barrier elements  Comments 
Primary well barrier  
1. Casing cement  
2. Casing Below production packer 
3. Production packer  
4. Completion string  
5. Tubing hanger  
6. Surface production tree Including kill and PWVs 
7. Wireline BOP Body only. Act as back up ele-
ment to the wireline stuffing 
box/grease head 
8. Wireline lubricator  
9. Wireline stuffing box/ 
grease injection head 
 
Secondary well barrier  
1. Casing cement Common WBE with primary 
well barrier 
2. Casing Common WBE with primary 
well barrier below production 
packer 
3. Wellhead Including casing hanger and ac-
cess lines with valves 
4. Tubing hanger Common WBE with primary 
well barrier 
5. Surface production tree Common WBE with primary 
well barrier 
6. Wireline safety head Common WBE with primary 
well barrier 
 
In relation to the above mentioned defi-
nition of well barriers, it may be debatable 
whether human and operational aspects 
themselves are barriers because they cannot 
stop or reduce flow of hydrocarbons. How-
ever, an extended use of the term safety bar-
rier as PSA does in their regulations and the 
definitions proposed by a working group 
within the Together for Safety initiative 
(SfS, 2004), it is obviously that operational 
activities that detect and correct a deviation 
and therefore prevent escalation of an unde-
sired event sequence may be classified as 
safety barriers. 
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2 METHOD FOR DEVELOPMENT OF 
RELEASE SCENARIOS 
In order to answer our research questions, 
i.e., to ensure a better and more systematic 
understanding of human, technological and 
organizational aspects of the risk associated 
with well interventions and the development 
of a set of release scenarios describing bar-
riers aimed to prevent release of hydrocar-
bons during wireline operations, a triangula-
tion of methods have been applied:  
− Document analysis; review of standard 
textbooks, research papers, and opera-
tional procedures.  
− Hierarchical task analysis of wireline op-
erations.  
− Review of investigation reports from in-
cident/accidents occurred during wireline 
operations the last five years from all op-
erator companies operating on the Nor-
wegian Continental Shelf. 
− Interviews with key personnel onshore 
from both operator companies and a 
wireline contractor. 
− Workshop with experts in wireline op-
erations. 
− Observation of a wireline operation and 
interviews of offshore personnel on a 
four days visit to an oil and gas installa-
tion. 
All the methods used are qualitative 
methods. The numbers of incident/ accident 
reports investigated are too few to undergo 
any statistical analysis.  
3 RESULTS  
The main results presented in this paper are; 
a) some findings from the review of incident 
reports, and b) a set of release scenarios that 
may lead to undesired release of hydrocar-
bons during wireline operations. 
3.1 Review of incident reports 
21 incident reports were reviewed as part of 
the project. The sample of incidents was 
based on reported incidents to PSA. The 
main focus was incidents that had resulted 
in release of hydrocarbons, but three other 
types of incidents were also reviewed due to 
the consequence potential. Table 2 summa-
rizes when the incidents occurred during the 
wireline operations. 
 
Table 2.  Incidents related to phase of wireline 
operation.    
Phase of wireline operation No. of 
incidents
During spotting of equipment and 
pressure testing 
3 
During execution of wireline opera-
tion 
6 
During pulling out of hole 3 
During rig-down of wireline equip-
ment 
5 
During start-up of normal production 1 
Event not leading to release 3 
Sum of events 21 
 
As seen in Table 2, incidents have oc-
curred during all the phases of the wireline 
operations. The analysis of the event se-
quences and the causes of the incidents 
showed that both technical and human fail-
ures caused the incidents. These facts were 
allowed for during the development of the 
release scenarios. 
Three of the most serious incidents were 
analyzed in more detail, and one important 
finding was the importance of a good under-
standing of the risk associated with each 
specific wireline operation in order to obtain 
an adequate situational awareness. This em-
phasizes the importance of an adequate risk 
analysis of the operation that is allowed for 
in the detailed planning of each wireline op-
eration. 
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3.2 Hydrocarbon release scenarios 
Eight release scenarios were developed 
based on the review of incident reports and 
documents, interviews, and workshops. The 
scenarios are; 
 
1 Release of hydrocarbons due to insuffi-
cient depressurization/draining of hydro-
carbons. 
2 Release of hydrocarbons due to leakage 
in stuffing box/ grease injection head. 
3 Release of hydrocarbons due to leakage 
in lubricator over wireline BOP.  
4 Release of hydrocarbons due to leakage 
in the riser between the wireline BOP 
and the valve tree. 
5 Release of hydrocarbons due to cable 
breakage 
6 Release of hydrocarbons due to error in 
coupling to closed drain. 
7 Release of hydrocarbons due to valve in 
open position to closed drain after ended 
wireline operation.  
8 Release of hydrocarbons due to external 
damage on wireline equipment. 
 
The scenarios were described by the fol-
lowing characteristics: 
− Name of the scenario 
− General description 
− Initiating event 
− Factors influencing the initiating event 
− Operational mode 
− Barrier functions and barrier systems 
− Potential size of  the release 
− Comments. 
 
In the following subsections, examples 
on description of scenario 2, scenario 3, and 
scenario 5 are given. 
 
3.2.1 Release of hydrocarbons due to 
leakage in stuffing box/ grease injec-
tion head 
Release through the stuffing box/grease in-
jection head may be caused by wear and tear 
in the gaskets or the cable, failure during as-
sembling of stuffing box, or loss of hydrau-
lic pressure.  
The initiating event is a “diffuse” release 
of hydrocarbons in the stuffing box or 
grease injection head. Factors influencing 
the initiating event are the procedure for as-
sembling and control of the stuffing 
box/grease injection head, competence, time 
pressure, wear and tear on cable, pulling out 
of hole speed, etc. 
Operational mode when release occurs is 
during the wireline operation. 
The existing barrier functions are; 
− Recovery of pressure control in stuffing 
box/ grease injection head by increasing 
the hydraulic pressure in stuffing 
box/grease injection head.  
− To close flow of hydrocarbons from the 
well. 
 
The barrier systems are: 
− System for recovery of pressure control 
in stuffing box/grease injection that con-
tains the following main elements; hy-
draulic pump, hoses, pump operator, 
power supply. 
− System for closing the flow of hydrocar-
bons, including wireline BOP valve (seal 
BOP and shear/seal BOP), hydraulic 
master valve (HMV) in valve tree, and 
system for depressurization/draining to 
closed drain. The wireline BOP func-
tionality should be functional tested, and 
this testing may be regarded as an opera-
tional barrier against the wireline BOP 
failure mode “failure to close on de-
mand”. 
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Potential size of the release; 
− Diffuse or very small if the pressure in 
the stuffing box/grease injection head is 
recovered. 
− Minor if the wireline BOP closes imme-
diately and the system is depressurized 
and drained. Then the upper limit of the 
size is the volume between the wireline 
BOP and the stuffing box/grease injec-
tion head. If the HMV closes, the size is 
limited to the volume between the HMV 
and the stuffing box/grease injection 
head. 
− Major leak if neither wireline BOP nor 
HMV closes. 
 
Comments;  
− By a ”diffuse” release is meant a very 
small release that usually not will be de-
tected by gas detectors or will be regis-
tered in any incident registration system 
like Synergi. 
− If the wireline BOP closes, the stuffing 
box may be repaired. 
− Critical event if this occurs at the same 
time as the wireline equipment is stuck in 
the wireline BOP/valve tree and hinders 
the closing of valves. 
− Hydraulic master valve in valve tree is 
qualified as ”wireline shear valve” on 
some platforms, but not on all. 
− If all these barriers fail, it may still be 
possible to recover the “safe state”, either 
by closing the downhole safety valve or 
by killing the well by mud through the 
kill wing valve on the valve tree. 
3.2.2 Release due of hydrocarbons due to 
failure during assembling of lubrica-
tor 
Release of hydrocarbons due to failure dur-
ing assembling of the lubricator may be 
caused by use of wrong gasket, use of dam-
aged gasket, damaging the gasket during as-
sembling, damage on thread, or not screwed 
enough together, etc. 
The initiating event is failure during as-
sembling of the lubricator. Factors influenc-
ing the initiating event are procedure for as-
sembling of the lubricator, time pressure, 
competence, layout of working place, etc. 
Operational mode when release occurs is 
during start-up of wireline operation or later 
during the wireline operation. 
The existing barrier functions are;  
− To reveal failure during assembling, incl. 
gasket failures  
− To detect release from lubricator before 
start-up of the wireline operation. 
 
The barrier systems are;  
− System for 3rd party inspection of work, 
incl. inspection of used gaskets. 
− System for leak testing of lubricator be-
fore start-up of the wireline operation 
− System for closing the flow of hydrocar-
bons, including wireline BOP valve (seal 
BOP and shear/seal BOP), hydraulic 
master valve (HMV) in valve tree, and 
system for depressurization/draining to 
closed drain. The wireline BOP func-
tionality should be functional tested, and 
this testing may be regarded as an opera-
tional barrier against the wireline BOP 
failure mode “failure to close on de-
mand”. 
 
Potential size of the release; 
− No release if failures are revealed before 
start-up of the wireline operation. 
− Minor if the wireline BOP closes imme-
diately and the system is depressurized 
and drained. Then the upper limit of the 
size is the volume between the wireline 
BOP and the stuffing box/grease injec-
tion head. If the HMV closes, the size is 
limited to the volume between the HMV 
Qualitative analysis of human, technical, and operational barrier elements during well interventions 
8 
and the stuffing box/grease injection 
head. 
− Major leak if neither wireline BOP nor 
HMV closes. 
 
Comments;   
− Visual inspection of the gaskets is per-
formed prior to assembling, but it may be 
difficult to reveal potential damage in the 
gasket after assembling. 
− It doesn’t exist data for how often fail-
ures are made during assembling of lu-
bricators, but the interviews indicate that 
during leak testing failures are revealed 
up to 1 out of 20 times.  
3.2.3 Release of hydrocarbons due to ca-
ble breakage 
Release due to cable breakage may occur 
when the cable breaks and the cable are 
pressed out through the stuffing box/grease 
injection head. The cable may be broken by 
an incident or as a planned action due to op-
erational problems. 
The initiating event is cable breakage 
where the cable is pressed out through the 
stuffing box/grease injection head. Factors 
influencing the initiating event are wear and 
tear of cable, efficiency of weight indicator, 
”weak-point”, coupling to tool-string, etc.  
Operational mode when release occurs is 
during the wireline operation. 
The existing barrier function is to close 
flow of hydrocarbons from the well. 
 
The barrier systems are; 
− Blowout preventing plug in the stuffing 
box/ grease injection head. 
− System for closing the flow of hydrocar-
bons, including wireline BOP valve (seal 
BOP and shear/seal BOP), hydraulic 
master valve (HMV) in valve tree, and 
system for depressurization/draining to 
closed drain. The wireline BOP func-
tionality should be functional tested, and 
this testing may be regarded as an opera-
tional barrier against the wireline BOP 
failure mode “failure to close on de-
mand”. 
 
Potential size of the release; 
− No release if the blow out preventing 
plug is functioning as planned. 
− Minor if the wireline BOP closes imme-
diately and the system is depressurized 
and drained. Then the upper limit of the 
size is the volume between the wireline 
BOP and the stuffing box/grease injec-
tion head. If the HMV closes, the size is 
limited to the volume between the HMV 
and the stuffing box/grease injection 
head. 
− Major leak if neither wireline BOP nor 
HMV closes. 
 
Comments;  
− The blow out preventing plugs in the 
stuffing box/grease injection head may 
be of different types.  
− The cable may be broken by an incident 
or as an intended action due to opera-
tional problems like the wireline equip-
ment got stuck in the well, need for inter-
rupting the wireline operation due to bad 
weather conditions, etc.  
− During pulling out of the hole factors as 
time pressure and tool weight is impor-
tant.  
3.3 Use of barrier block diagrams 
Barrier block diagrams were developed in 
order to illustrate and communicate these 
scenarios. Barrier block diagrams are 
equivalent to event trees. The barrier block 
diagrams illustrate an initiating event and 
barrier functions and systems aimed to pre-
vent leakages. The barrier block diagrams 
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were preferred as modeling technique be-
cause it gives a clear and consistent repre-
sentation of the different barrier functions 
and elements which are available in order to 
prevent releases despite of occurrences of 
the initiating events. Further, it enables 
separate analysis of different barrier func-
tions by use of suitable analysis methods 
(e.g., fault tree analysis). By defining the 
initiating event different from the release, 
focus is automatically moved towards like-
lihood reducing measures.  
These barrier systems include technical, 
organizational and human aspects. For a 
more detailed description of barrier block 
diagrams, see Sklet & Hauge (2004).  
In Figure 2 – Figure 4 barrier block dia-
grams for the same three scenarios as de-
scribed in subsection 3.2 are shown in order 
to illustrate the principles.  
 
Figure 2. Release of hydrocarbons due to leak-
age in stuffing box/ grease injection head. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Release of hydrocarbons due to failure 
during assembling of the lubricator. 
 
Figure 4. Release of hydrocarbons due to cable 
breakage. 
 
3.4 Summary of physical and non-physical 
barriers 
As seen in the barrier block diagrams, both 
physical and non-physical barriers aimed to 
prevent release of hydrocarbons during 
wireline operations are identified. This bar-
rier block diagrams will represent the left 
side of a Bow-Tie representation of a total 
”Diffuse” release in 
stuffing box/grease 
injection head
Recovery of pressure 
control in stuffing box/ 
grease injection head
WL seal BOP 
closes
”Safe state”
Release
Small releaseDepressuri-zation/draining
WL shear/seal 
BOP closes
HMV in valve 
tree closes
Failure during 
assembling of 
lubricator
3rd party 
inspection of 
work
Leak test
Failure during 
assembling 
revealed
WL seal BOP 
closes
Release
Small releaseDepressuri-zation/draining
WL shear/seal 
BOP closes
HMV in valve 
tree closes
Cable 
breaks ”Safe state”
Blowout plug 
in stuffing 
box
WL seal 
BOP closes
Release
Small 
release
Depressuri-
zation/draining
WL shear/
seal BOP 
closes
HMV in 
valve tree 
closes
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risk analysis of a wireline operation, and 
this left side of the Bow-Tie diagram is il-
lustrated in Figure 5  
 
 
 Legend for barriers in the Bow-Tie diagram;  
1. System for verification of depressurized 
system 
2. Recovery of pressure control 
3. Blowout plug in stuffing box/grease in-
jection head 
4. 3rd party inspection of work 
5. Leak test 
6. Wireline BOP 
7. HMV in valve tree 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the barriers in a Bow-
Tie diagram. 
 
To summarize the main results from the 
analysis of barriers aimed to prevent release 
of hydrocarbons during wireline operations; 
− First of all, as seen in Table 1, the sur-
face production tree, the wireline riser, 
the body of the wireline BOP, the wire-
line lubricator, and the stuffing box / 
grease injection head may be seen as 
elements in the primary barrier against 
release of hydrocarbons. 
− In most of the scenarios, the wireline 
BOP and/or the HMV in the valve tree 
act as backup of the primary barrier if the 
primary barrier fails. 
− Several operational barriers exist and are 
important in order to prevent release of 
hydrocarbons during wireline operations. 
Examples are 3rd party inspection of 
work (operational barrier aimed to pre-
vent that human failures lead to release), 
system for verification of depressurized 
system before disassembling (operational 
barrier aimed to prevent disassembling of 
pressurized systems), and leak testing of 
the wireline equipment (an operational 
barrier against the failure mode “external 
leak to the environment” from connected 
equipment). 
− Further, other types of operational barrier 
exists that are important measures in or-
der to reduce the risk for major release 
during wireline operations, e.g., func-
tional testing of the wireline BOP may 
be seen as an operational barrier against 
functional failure of the wireline BOP 
with respect to the failure mode “failure 
to close on demand”. In addition, both 
technical and operational safety barriers 
exist on a lower level aimed to prevent 
the occurrence of the initiating events in 
our release scenarios. This subject may 
be illustrated for the initiating event 
“Cable breaks” (see Figure 4), where op-
erational restrictions control the pull out 
speed, alarms indicate when the weight 
load exceed the maximum limit, and a 
slip valve limits the maximum traction 
power. 
4 DISCUSSION  
Well interventions have other attributes than 
the normal production or processing of hy-
drocarbons on the platforms, and have a risk 
of leakages. The literature on well interven-
4
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Valve on closed 
drain in wrong 
position after WL
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2
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tions has mainly focused on the technical 
aspects related to the downhole equipment, 
and has not paid as much attention to the 
risk of release associated with the opera-
tional aspects. Another characteristic is that 
there are contractor companies working on 
an irregular basis that perform the well in-
terventions, and the operational conditions 
of each wireline operation are different be-
cause the wells are different. This means 
that planning, risk analysis, co-operation 
and communication between other organiza-
tions involved in the operation or involved 
in parallel operations are essential.  
There are several important aspects that 
have been revealed in this study. Wireline 
operations demonstrate the importance of 
having control of the energy, since these op-
erations are operating on a live well. One 
basic requirement to well operations is that 
during drilling and well operations there 
should at all times be at least two independ-
ent and tested well barriers (PSA, 2001b). In 
some critical steps in some types of wireline 
operations this requirement is not fulfilled 
due to technical constraints on the platform 
design and layout of the wireline equipment. 
These steps should be identified during the 
planning of the wireline operation, and risk 
compensating measures should be identi-
fied.  
This subject may be illustrated by an in-
cident on one platform where a plug was in-
cidentally released in the valve tree. For a 
while this plug blocked both the valves in 
the valve tree and the wireline BOP at the 
same time as the downhole safety valve was 
out of function. In this situation, the secon-
dary well barrier was unavailable at some 
time during this wireline operation. The 
triggering cause for this event was a human 
failure while setting the release time (opera-
tion of the minute switch instead of the hour 
switch) that resulted in release of the plug 
after 10 minutes instead of one hour. After 
the incident, several measures have been 
discussed, both a physical barrier to prevent 
human failure (hide the minute switch by a 
cover), and an operational barrier to prevent 
human failure (3rd party verification of the 
timer setting). This discussion of risk reduc-
ing measures illustrates the barriers at dif-
ferent levels, in this case a barrier against 
the human failure “setting wrong release 
time”. 
The presented release scenarios shows 
the importance of both physical as well as 
non-physical barriers, and it is important 
that the operator companies identify all 
critical work tasks where 3rd party inspec-
tion of work should be required in order to 
reduce the risk of leakage. 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has presented some results from 
a study focusing on physical and non-
physical barriers aimed to prevent release of 
hydrocarbons during wireline operations on 
oil and gas production platforms. 
The basic requirement is that during 
drilling and well operations, there should at 
all times be at least two independent and 
tested well barriers.  
Eight release scenarios has been devel-
oped reflecting different causes of release 
and illustrating different types of barriers 
aimed to prevent release. Our study has re-
vealed some non-physical barriers that seem 
to be important in order to prevent release of 
hydrocarbons in addition to the physical 
barriers. The most important non-physical 
barriers are; 
− System for verification of depressurized 
and drained system before disassembling 
of normally pressurized hydrocarbon 
systems. 
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− 3rd party inspection of critical work tasks 
in order to reveal human failures. 
− Leak test of equipment. 
 
Our study has also identified several im-
portant barriers on a lower level, either 
aimed to prevent the occurrence of the initi-
ating events in our scenarios, or to ensure 
the functionality of the technical barriers. In 
addition some key success factors in order 
to avoid releases, such as understanding of 
the risk associated with each specific wire-
line operation, allowance of the risk factors 
in planning and execution, communication, 
distribution of responsibility and coordina-
tion (e.g. in emergency situations where the 
wireline operators has local control of the 
well), have been identified. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the main principles for the safety 
work in high-risk industries such as the nu-
clear and process industry, is the principle 
of defence-in-depth or use of multiple layers 
of protection (IAEA 1999, Reason 1997, 
CCPS 2001). 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD) emphasizes this principle in their 
new regulations concerning health, safety 
and environment in the Norwegian offshore 
industry (NPD, 2001a). An important issue 
in these new regulations is the focus on 
safety barriers, and in the first section of the 
management regulation, it is stated that 
“barriers shall be established which a) re-
duce the probability that any such failures 
and situations of hazard and accident will 
develop further, and b) limit possible harm 
and nuisance”.  
The IEC 61508 (IEC 1998) and IEC 
61511 (IEC 2002) standards have a major 
impact on the safety work within the proc-
ess industry, and describe a risk-based ap-
proach to ensure that the total risk is re-
duced to an acceptable level. The main 
principle is to identify necessary safety 
functions and allocate these safety functions 
to different safety-related systems or exter-
nal risk reduction facilities. In IEC 61511 a 
safety function is defined as a “function to 
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be implemented by a SIS (Safety Instru-
mented System), other technological safety-
related system or external risk reduction fa-
cilities which is intended to achieve or 
maintain a safe state for the process in re-
spect to a specific hazardous event”. An im-
portant part of the standards is a risk-based 
approach for determination of the safety in-
tegrity level requirements for the different 
safety functions. IEC 61508 is a generic 
standard common to several industries, 
while the process industry currently devel-
ops a sector specific standard for application 
of SIS, i.e., IEC 61511 (IEC 2002). In Nor-
way, the offshore industry has developed a 
guideline for the use of the standards IEC 
61508 and IEC 61511 (OLF 2001), and the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) re-
fers to this guideline in their new regula-
tions (NPD 2001a). Overall, it is expected 
that these standards will contribute to a 
more systematic safety work and increased 
safety in the industry. 
Further, the NPD in section 7 in the 
management regulation (NPD, 2001a) re-
quires that “the party responsible shall es-
tablish monitoring parameters within his ar-
eas of activity in order to monitor matters of 
significance to health, environment and 
safety”, and that “the operator or the one re-
sponsible for the operation of a facility, 
shall establish indicators to monitor changes 
and trends in major accident risk”. These 
requirements imply a need for surveillance 
of safety functions during operation. In ac-
cordance with these requirements, 
NORSOK (2001) suggests that “verification 
of that performance standards for safety and 
emergency preparedness systems are met in 
the operational phase may be achieved 
through monitoring trends for risk indica-
tors. […] Examples of such indicators may 
be availability of essential safety systems”. 
Also IEC requires proof testing and inspec-
tion during operations and maintenance in 
order to ensure that the required functional 
safety of safety-related systems is fulfilled 
(IEC 2002).  
In order to monitor the development in 
the risk level on national level, the NPD ini-
tiated a project called “Risk Level on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf”. The first 
phase of the project focused on collection of 
information about defined situations of haz-
ard and accident (DSHA), while the second 
phase also focus on collection of informa-
tion about the performance of safety barriers 
(NPD/RNNS 2002). According to this pro-
ject, the performance of safety barriers has 
three main elements: 1) functional-
ity/efficiency (the ability to function as 
specified in the design requirements), 2) re-
liability/availability (the ability to function 
on demand), and 3) robustness (ability to 
function as specified under given accident 
conditions).  
The NPD uses the term safety barrier in 
their regulations. However, they have not 
defined the term, and in a letter to the oil 
companies as part of the project “Risk Level 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf” 
(NPD/RNNS, 2002), they have referred to 
the definition proposed by ISO (2000): 
“Measure which reduces the probability of 
realizing a hazard’s potential for harm and 
which reduces its consequence” with the 
note “barriers may be physical (materials, 
protective devices, shields, segregation, etc.) 
or non-physical (procedures, inspection, 
training, drills, etc.)”. Accordingly, the NPD 
uses the term barrier in an extended mean-
ing and is therefore similar to other terms 
used in the literature, such as defence (Rea-
son 1997), protection layer (CCPS 2001), 
and safety function (as used by IEC). The 
term safety function is used in this paper.  
Surveillance of safety functions during 
operations in order to meet the requirements 
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stated by the NPD (NPD 2001a) and IEC 
(IEC 1998 and IEC 2002) is not a straight-
forward task, but is a challenge for the oil 
companies. Therefore, several oil companies 
have initiated internal projects to fulfill the 
requirements (see e.g. Sørum & Thomassen 
2002). This paper focuses on the surveil-
lance of safety functions during operations 
and maintenance. The paper presents main 
characteristics of safety functions, factors 
influencing the performance, a failure cate-
gory classification scheme, and finally a 
discussion of challenges related to the sur-
veillance of safety functions during opera-
tions and maintenance. The discussion is 
based on experiences from the Norwegian 
petroleum industry and results from a re-
search project concerning the reliability and 
availability of computerized safety systems. 
2 CHARACTERISTICS OF SAFETY 
FUNCTIONS 
Safety functions may be characterized in 
different ways, and some of the characteris-
tics influence how the surveillance of the 
safety function is performed. The following 
characteristics are further discussed in this 
section: type of safety function, local vs. 
global safety functions and active vs passive 
systems. 
IEC 61511 (IEC 2002) defines a safety 
function as a “function to be implemented 
by a SIS, other technology safety-related 
system or external risk reduction facilities, 
which is intended to achieve or maintain a 
safe state for the process, in respect of a 
specific hazardous events”. By SIS IEC 
means an instrumented system used to im-
plement one or more safety instrumented 
functions. A SIS is composed of any combi-
nation of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final 
element(s). Other technology safety-related 
systems are safety-related systems based on 
a technology other than electri-
cal/electronic/programmable electronic, for 
example a relief valve. External risk reduc-
tion facilities are measures to reduce or 
mitigate the risk that are separate and dis-
tinct from the SIS. Examples are drain sys-
tems, firewalls and bunds. 
A distinction between global and local 
safety functions is made by The Norwegian 
Oil Industry Association (OLF) (OLF, 
2001). Global safety functions, or fire and 
explosion hazard safety functions, are func-
tions that typically provide protection for 
one or several fire cells. Examples are 
emergency shutdown, isolation of ignition 
sources and emergency blowdown. Local 
safety functions, or process equipment 
safety functions, are functions confined to 
protection of a specific process equipment 
unit. A typical example is the protection 
against high level in a separator through the 
PSD (Process Shutdown) system. 
CCPS distinguishes between passive and 
active independent protection layers (IPL) 
(CCPS 2001). A passive IPL is not required 
to take an action in order  to achieve its 
function in reducing risk. Active IPLs are 
required to move from one state to another 
in response to a change in a measurable 
process property (e.g. temperature or pres-
sure), or a signal from another source (such 
as a push-button or a switch). An active IPL 
generally comprises a sensor of some type 
(detection) that gives signal to a decision-
making process that actuates an action (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Basic elements of active protection 
layers (CCPS, 2001)  
Sensor
(instrument,
mechanical or
human)
Decision making
process
(logic solver,
relay, mechanical
device, human)
Action
(instrument,
mechanical, or
human)
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3 SAFETY FUNCTIONS FOR PROCESS 
ACCIDENTS 
The need for safety functions is dependent 
on specific hazardous events. Figure 2 gives 
a simplified illustration of the event se-
quence and necessary safety functions for 
“process accidents”. The event sequence 
begin with the initiating event “leakage of 
hydrocarbons (HC)”, and are followed by 
spreading of hydrocarbons, ignition, strong 
explosions or escalation of fire, escape, 
evacuation, and finally rescue of people. 
The main safety functions in order to pre-
vent, control or mitigate the consequences 
of this accident are to prevent the hydrocar-
bon leakage, prevent spreading of hydrocar-
bons, prevent ignition, prevent strong explo-
sion or escalation of fire, and to prevent 
fatalities. These safety functions may be re-
alized by different kinds of safety-related 
systems. In this paper, we focus on the 
safety function “prevent spreading of hy-
drocarbons”.  
 
Figure 2. Event sequence for process accidents. 
 
In principle, the safety function “prevent 
spreading of hydrocarbons” may be fulfilled 
in two different approaches, 1) stop the sup-
ply of HC, and 2) remove HC. In this paper, 
we focus on the former approach in order to 
illustrate some of the challenges related to 
the surveillance of safety functions.  
The main elements of the active safety 
function “prevent spreading of hydrocar-
bons by stopping the supply” are shown in 
Figure 3. Firstly, the leakage of HC must be 
detected, either automatically by gas detec-
tors, or manually by human operators in the 
area. Secondly, a decision must be taken, ei-
ther by a logic solver or a human decision. 
The decision should be followed by an ac-
tion, in this case, closure of an ESDV 
(Emergency Shutdown Valve). The action 
may either be initiated automatically by the 
logic solver, or by a human operator push-
ing the ESD-button, or manually by a hu-
man operator closing the ESD-valve manu-
ally.  
There should be an integrated approach 
for surveillance of safety functions that in-
corporates hardware, software and hu-
man/organizational factors. 
 
Figure 3. Safety function – prevent spreading of 
hydrocarbons.  
 
4 FAILURE CLASSIFICATION 
For safety functions implemented through 
SIS technology (as in Figure 3), IEC 61508 
and IEC 61511 define four safety integrity 
levels (SIL). The SIL for each safety func-
tion is established through a risk-based ap-
proach. To achieve a given SIL, there are 
three main types of requirements (OLF, 
2001): 
− A quantitative requirement, expressed as 
a probability of failure on demand (PFD) 
or alternatively as the probability of a 
dangerous failure per hour. This re-
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quirement relates to random hardware 
failures. 
− A qualitative requirement, expressed in 
terms of architectural constraints on the 
subsystems constituting the safety func-
tion. 
− Requirements concerning which tech-
niques and measures should be used to 
avoid and control systematic faults. 
The requirements above influence the 
performance of the SIS, and in this section 
we present a failure classification scheme 
that can be used to distinguish between dif-
ferent types of failure causes (hardware and 
systematic failures). The scheme is a modi-
fication of the failure classification sug-
gested in IEC 61508.  
The basis for the discussion can be 
traced back to the research project PDS (Re-
liability and availability for computerized 
safety systems) carried out for the Norwe-
gian offshore industry (Bodsberg & Hokstad 
1995, Bodsberg & Hokstad 1996, Aarø et al 
1989), and the still active PDS-forum that 
succeeded the project (Hansen & Aarø 
1997, Hansen & Vatn 1998, Vatn 2000, 
Hokstad & Corneliussen 2000). The classi-
fication presented in this section is one of 
the results in the new edition of the PDS 
method (Hokstad & Corneliussen 2003).  
According to IEC 61508 (Section 3.6.6 
of part 4), failures of a safety-related system 
can be categorized either as random hard-
ware failures or systematic failures. The 
standard also treats software failures, but we 
consider this as a subclass of the systematic 
failures (see Note 3 on p16 of IEC 61508-
4). The standard makes a clear distinction 
between the two failure categories, and 
states that random hardware failures should 
be quantified, while systematic failures 
should not (IEC 61508-2, 7.4.2.2, note 1).  
In IEC 61508-4 (Section 3.6.5), a ran-
dom hardware failure is defined as a "fail-
ure, occurring at a random time, which re-
sults from one or more of the possible 
degradation mechanisms in the hardware". 
IEC 61508-4 (Section 3.6.6) defines a sys-
tematic failure as a "failure related in a de-
terministic way to a certain cause, which 
can only be eliminated by a modification of 
the design or the manufacturing process, 
operational procedures, documentation or 
other relevant factors".  
The standard defines "hardware-related 
Common Cause Failures (CCFs)” (IEC 
61508-6, Section D.2): "However, some 
failures, i.e., common cause failures, which 
result from a single cause, may affect more 
than one channel. These may result from a 
systematic failure (for example, a design or 
specification mistake) or an external stress 
leading to an early random hardware fail-
ure". As an example, the standard refers to 
excessive temperature of a common cooling 
fan, which accelerates the life of the com-
ponent or takes it outside it’s specified op-
erating environment.  
Hokstad & Corneliussen (2003) suggest 
a notation that makes a distinction between 
random hardware failures caused by natural 
ageing and those caused by excessive 
stresses (and therefore may lead to CCFs). 
The classification also defines systematic 
failures in more detail. The suggestion is an 
update of the failure classification intro-
duced in the PDS project, (Aarø et al 1989), 
but adapted to the IEC 61508 notation, and 
hence should not be in conflict with that of 
IEC 61508. The concepts and failure cate-
gorization suggested by Hokstad and Corne-
liussen (2003) is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Failure categorization (Hokstad & 
Corneliussen 2003). 
 
Hokstad & Corneliussen (2003) define the 
failure categories as: 
− Random hardware failures are physical 
failures, where the delivered service de-
viates from the specified service due to 
physical degradation of the module. 
Random hardware failures are split into 
ageing failures and stress failures, where 
ageing failures occur under conditions 
within the design envelope of a module, 
while stress failures occur when exces-
sive stresses are placed on the module. 
The excessive stresses may be caused ei-
ther by external causes or by human er-
rors during operation.  
− Systematic failures are non-physical fail-
ures, where the delivered service devi-
ates from the specified service without 
any physical degradation of the module. 
The failure can only be eliminated by a 
modification either of the design or the 
manufacturing process, the operating 
procedures, the documentation or other 
relevant factors. Thus, modifications 
rather than repairs are required in order 
to remove these failures. The systematic 
failures are further split into interaction 
failures and design failures, were interac-
tion failures are initiated by human errors 
during operation or testing. Design fail-
ures are initiated during engineering and 
construction and may be latent from the 
first day of operation.  
As a general rule, stress, interaction and 
design failures are dependent failures (giv-
ing rise to common cause failures), while 
the ageing failures are denoted independent 
failures. 
To avoid a too complex classification, 
every failure may not fit perfectly into the 
above scheme. For instance, some interac-
tion failures might be physical rather than 
non-physical. 
The PDS method focuses on the entire 
safety function (Hokstad & Corneliussen 
2003), and intends to account for all failures 
that could compromise the function (i.e. re-
sult in "loss of function"). Some of these 
failures are related to the interface (e.g. 
"scaffolding cover up sensor"), rather than 
the safety function itself. However, it is part 
of the "PDS philosophy" to include such 
events. 
5 SURVEILLANCE OF SAFETY 
FUNCTIONS 
This section discusses the surveillance of 
safety functions during operation related to 
the failure classification in the previous sec-
tion. 
The requirements for surveillance are re-
lated to the functional safety, and not only 
to the quantitative SIL requirements (see 
section 4). In IEC 61508-2, section 7.6.1 it 
is stated that one should “develop proce-
dures to ensure that the required functional 
safety of the SIS is maintained during op-
eration and maintenance”, and more explic-
itly stated in IEC 61511-1, section 16.2.5, 
“the discrepancies between expected behav-
ior and actual behavior of the SIS shall be 
analyzed and where necessary, modification 
made such that the required safety is main-
Systematic
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tained”. In addition to the quantitative 
(PFD) requirement, systematic failures and 
changes in safety system/functions should 
be considered. Also changes not explicitly 
related to the safety function may influence 
the safety level (number of demands, opera-
tion of the process, procedures, manning, 
etc.), however such conditions will not be 
treated in this paper. The discussion is lim-
ited to the boundary outlined in Figure 3. 
In operation or during maintenance the 
performance of the safety functions or part 
of the functions may typically be observed 
by means of a range of activi-
ties/observations, Table 1 illustrates the re-
lation between the failure cause categories 
(as discussed in section 4) and the main 
types of activities/observations.  
 
Table 1.  Different types of surveillance of 
safety functions. 
Surveillance ac-
tivity 
Random hardware 
failures 
Systematic  
failures 
 Ageing Stress Inter-
action
Design
Actual demand x x x x 
Automatic self-
test 
x x   
Functional test x x   
Inspection x x (x)  
Random detec-
tion 
x x (x)  
 
Not every failure encountered during the 
different surveillance activities may fit per-
fectly into the scheme, but it illustrates 
which failure categories that typically can 
be identified by use of different surveillance 
activities.  
The actual demands of a function can po-
tentially reveal both systematic and random 
hardware failures, provided that there is a 
systematic approach for registration of fail-
ures. The frequency of actual demands is, 
however, in most cases low, and it is there-
fore important that the organization focuses 
on the actions taken after an actual demand. 
As an example statistics from HSE (HSE 
2002a) shows that gas detectors detected 59 
% of 1150 gas leakages reported in the pe-
riod 1-10-92 to 31-3-01, while the remain-
ing releases were mainly detected by other 
means, i.e., equipment not designed for the 
purpose (visual means, by sound, by smell, 
etc.).  
In addition to the actual demands, the 
SIS functions must be tested, and there are 
two types of testing: 1) functional tests and 
2) automatic self-tests. These tests are es-
sentially designed to detect random hard-
ware failures. However, no test is perfect 
due to different factors as the test do not re-
flect real operating conditions, the process 
variables cannot be safely or reasonably 
practicably be manipulated, or the tests do 
not address the necessary functional safety 
requirements (e.g. response time and inter-
nal valve leak) (HSE 2002b).  
Components often have built-in auto-
matic self-tests to detect random hardware 
failures. Further, upon discrepancy between 
redundant components in the safety system, 
the system may determine which of the 
modules have failed. This is considered part 
of the self-test. But it is never the case that 
all random hardware failures are detected 
automatically (“Diagnostic Coverage”). The 
actual effect on system performance from a 
failure that is detected by the automatic self-
test may also depend on system configura-
tion and operating philosophy. 
Functional testing is performed manually 
at defined time intervals, typically 3, 6 or 12 
months intervals for component tests. The 
functional test may not be able to detect all 
functional failures. According to Hokstad & 
Corneliussen (2003) this is the case for: 
− Design errors (present from day 1 of op-
eration), examples are: software errors, 
lack of discrimination (sensors), wrong 
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location (of sensor), and other shortcom-
ings in the functional testing (the test 
demand is not identical to a true demand 
and some part of the function is not 
tested).  
− Interaction errors that occur during func-
tional testing, e.g., maintenance crew 
forgetting to test specific sensor, tests 
performed erroneously (wrong calibra-
tion or component is damaged), mainte-
nance personnel forgetting to reset by-
pass of component. 
Thus, most systematic failures are not 
detected even by functional testing. In al-
most all cases it is correct to say that func-
tional testing will detect all random hard-
ware failures but no systematic failures. 
The functional tests may be tests of:  
− The entire system/function typically per-
formed when the process is down, e.g., 
due to revision stops. 
− Components or sub-functions. Compo-
nent tests are normally performed when 
the process is in operation.  
Component tests are more frequent than 
the system tests due to less consequences on 
production. Experience do, however, show 
that full tests (from input via logic to output 
device) “always” encounter failures not cap-
tured during component tests.  
In IEC 61511-1, inspection is described 
as “periodical visual inspection”, and this 
restricts the inspections to an activity that 
reveals for example unauthorized modifica-
tions and observable deteriorations of the 
components. An operator may also detect 
failures in between tests (Random detec-
tion). For instance the panel operator may 
detect a transmitter that is “stuck” or a sen-
sor left in by-pass (systematic failure).  
6 DISCUSSION 
The data from the various activities de-
scribed above should be systematically ana-
lyzed to 1) monitor the actual performance 
of the safety functions and 2) systematically 
analyze the failure causes in order to im-
prove the performance of the function. The 
organization should handle findings from all 
above surveillance activities, and should fo-
cus on both random hardware and system-
atic failures. The failure classification in 
PDS may assist in this work. 
6.1 Performance of safety functions 
As stated above, the performance of 
safety functions has three elements: 1) the 
functionality/efficiency, 2) the reliability, 
and 3) the robustness. The functionality is 
influenced by systematic failures. Since 
these failures seldom are revealed during 
testing, it is necessary to register systematic 
failures after actual demands or events that 
are observed by the personnel (inhibition of 
alarms, scaffolding, etc.).  
Traditionally, the reliability is quantified 
as the probability of failure on demand 
(PFD) and is mainly influenced by the dan-
gerous undetected random hardware failure 
rate (λDU), the test interval (τ) and the frac-
tion of common cause failures (β).  
The PDS-method (Hokstad & Cornelius-
sen 2003), however, accounts for major fac-
tors affecting reliability during system op-
eration, such as common cause failures, 
automatic self-tests, functional (manual) 
testing, systematic failures (not revealed by 
functional testing) and complete systems in-
cluding redundancies and voting. The 
method gives an integrated approach to 
hardware, software and hu-
man/organizational factors. Thus, the model 
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accounts for all failure causes as shown in 
Figure 4. 
The main benefit of the PDS taxonomy 
compared to other taxonomies is the direct 
relationship between failure causes and the 
means used to improve the performance of 
safety functions. 
The robustness of the function is defined 
in the design phase, and should be carefully 
considered when modifications on the proc-
ess or the safety function are performed.  
6.2 Analysis of random hardware failures 
from functional tests 
Data from functional tests on offshore in-
stallations is summarized in a CMMS (com-
puterized maintenance management sys-
tem). The level of detail in reporting may 
vary between oil companies and between in-
stallations operated by the same company. 
Typically, the data is presented as failure 
rates per component class/type independent 
of the different safety functions which the 
components are part of. This means that the 
data from component tests must be com-
bined with the configuration of a given 
safety function in a reliability model (e.g. a 
reliability block diagram or PDS) to give 
meaning with respect to SIL for that safety 
function. Alternatively a “SIL budget” for 
detection (input), decision (logic) and action 
(output) might be developed. This can be 
advantageous since tests of the components 
are more frequent, and data from tests can 
be used to follow up component perform-
ance independent of safety functions.  
It is important to have a historical over-
view of the number of failures and the total 
number of tests for all the functional tests in 
order to adjust the test interval, but it is 
equally important to analyze the failure 
causes to prevent future failures. This is par-
ticularly the case for dependent failures (i.e. 
stress failures). An example is sensors 
placed in an environment that results in 
movements and temperature conditions that 
further may lead to stress failures on several 
sensors. The functional tests will reveal ran-
dom hardware failures but will not differen-
tiate between independent (ageing) and de-
pendent failures, and the fraction between 
independent and dependent failures must be 
analyzed.  
Common cause failures may greatly re-
duce the reliability of a system, especially of 
systems with a high degree of redundancy. 
A significant research activity has therefore 
been devoted to this problem, and Høyland 
and Rausand (1994) describe various as-
pects of dependent failures.  
For the β-factor model we need an esti-
mate of the total failure rate λ, or the inde-
pendent failure rate (λI), and an estimate of 
β. Failure rates may be found in a variety of 
data sources. Some of the data sources pre-
sent the total failure rata, while other present 
the independent failure rate. However, field 
data collected from maintenance files nor-
mally do not distinguish between independ-
ent failures and common cause failures, and 
hence presents the total failure rate. In this 
case, the β, and λI will normally be based on 
sound engineering judgment. An approach 
is outlined in IEC 61508 for determining the 
plant specific β(s). 
The maintenance system (procedures and 
files) should be designed for assisting in 
such assessments, and it is especially impor-
tant to focus on the failure causes discussed 
in this paper 
The tests and calculated PFD numbers 
may be used as arguments for reducing the 
test interval or more critical, to increase the 
test interval. Such decisions should not be 
based on pure statistical evidence, but 
should involve an assessment of all assump-
tions the original SIL requirement was 
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based on. OLF suggests an approach for as-
sessment of the failure rate (OLF, 2001), but 
the oil companies have not implemented this 
approach fully yet. 
6.3 Analysis of systematic failures 
As described earlier, the systematic failures 
are almost never detected in the tests or by 
inspection, but it is important to analyze the 
systematic failures that occur in detail and 
have a system to control systematic failures.  
Systematic failures are usually logged in 
other systems than the CMMS, but the in-
formation is normally not analyzed in the 
same detail as the data from functional tests. 
In particular, it is important to investigate 
the actions taken by the safety functions 
when an actual demand occurs. Systematic 
analysis of gas leaks is important for gas de-
tection systems. Such analyses may indicate 
if the sensors have wrong location and do 
not detect gas leakages. In addition, other 
systems like incidents investigation, systems 
or procedures for inhibition of alarms, scaf-
folding work, and reset of sensors must be 
in place and investigated periodically. An-
other possibility that could be utilized more 
in the future, is to build in more detailed 
logging features in the SIS logic, to present 
the signal path when actual demands occur. 
This type of logging might give details 
about failed components and information 
about how the leak was detected. 
6.4 Procedure/system for collection of 
failure data 
Experiences from the failure cause analysis 
should be used to improve the procedures 
and systems for collection and analysis of 
failure data. A structured analysis of failures 
and events may reveal a potential for im-
provements in the actual maintenance or test 
procedures, or need for modifications of the 
safety-related systems to improve the func-
tionality.  
An important aspect regarding collection 
of failure data is the definitions of safety-
critical failures. Ambiguous definitions of 
safety-critical failures may lead to incorrect 
registration of critical failures (e.g. failures 
that are repaired/rectified “on the spot” are 
not logged) or registration of non-critical 
failures as critical ones. The oil companies 
in Norway have initiated a joint project with 
the objective to establish common defini-
tions of critical failures of safety functions. 
6.5 SIS vs. other types of safety functions 
Our case, “prevent spreading of HC by 
stopping the supply” is an active safety 
function, and we have not discussed chal-
lenges related to surveillance of passive 
safety functions. However, the functionality 
of passive safety functions is integrated in 
the design phase of the installation, and in 
practice, passive safety functions will be 
tested only during real accidents. Surveil-
lance of passive safety functions may be 
carried out by continuous condition moni-
toring or periodic inspection.  
The focus of this paper has been surveil-
lance of SIS. However, surveillance of other 
safety functions as other technology safety-
related systems and external risk reduction 
facilities is important to control the risk dur-
ing operation. The failure classification and 
the surveillance activities presented above 
may also be used for other active, safety-
related systems. Surveillance of some kinds 
of external risk reduction facilities in the 
form of operational risk reducing measures 
as operational procedures may require use 
of other kinds of surveillance activities.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
Recent standards and regulations focus on 
the entire life cycle of safety functions, and 
in this paper we have focused on the surveil-
lance of safety functions during operations 
and maintenance.  
The main message is that there should be 
an integrated approach for surveillance of 
safety functions that incorporates hardware, 
software and human/organizational factors, 
and all failure categories should be system-
atically analyzed to 1) monitor the actual 
performance of the safety functions and 2) 
systematically analyze the failure causes in 
order to improve the functionality, reliabil-
ity and robustness of safety functions.  
Not all surveillance activities reveal all 
kind of failures, and a comprehensive set of 
activities should be used. Failures of safety 
functions should be registered during actual 
demands (e.g. gas leaks), testing (functional 
tests and self-tests), and inspection. The pre-
sented failure classification scheme can con-
tribute to an understanding of which surveil-
lance activities that reveal different types of 
failures. 
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